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Foreword 
Throughout the world, traditional ways of delivering physical infrastructure and public ser-
vices are reassessed to find new ways of providing them more efficiently. These assess-
ments do not merely focus on technical and economic aspects, but also address legislative 
frameworks and organizational aspects to improve incentive structures among the different 
stakeholders. Furthermore, research is conducted to examine whether and to which extent 
public infrastructure can be provided in cooperation with or by the private sector. 
The overall research goal of the doctoral thesis of Mr. Kleiss is to categorize and analyze 
institutional arrangements for the provision of municipal solid waste combustion projects 
(MSWC). Institutional arrangements describe the nature and structure of formal and informal 
relationships between the various public and private stakeholders involved. The theoretical 
framework is built upon microeconomics and new institutional economics, combining eco-
nomics, law, psychology as well as organization theory for better understanding of complex 
economic realities and phenomena.  
Obviously, research in this context has to be transdisciplinary, integrating theories, methods 
and instruments of the different associated disciplines. Accordingly, this doctoral thesis pro-
vides a very comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis of the MSWC sector and cov-
ers various technical, environmental, economic and organizational aspects. The market sur-
vey and nine representative case studies from Germany in Singapore are presented to vali-
date the elaborated institutional arrangements. 
The theoretical and empirical findings of this thesis are of utmost importance to both re-
search and practice. Various useful implications are given for the technical and economic 
development of MSWC projects and the formation of institutional arrangements. The doctoral 
thesis of Mr. Kleiss does not only lay foundations for further research in the MSWC sector, 
but is also highly relevant to other infrastructure sectors.  
 
 
Weimar, November 2008            Prof. Dr.-Ing. Hans Wilhelm Alfen 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research context 
The provision of municipal solid waste management infrastructure is a service of general 
public interest that is characterized by market failure, mainly caused by negative environ-
mental externalities. As a consequence, the public sector has to assure that reliable and en-
vironmentally friendly waste management infrastructure and services are available 
(Paschlau, 2002; Rahmeyer, 2006; Thärichen, 2004). In order to conserve natural resources, 
waste management activities must be embedded in a general environmental policy frame-
work1 that defines the waste hierarchy as shown in the following Figure  1-1. 
 
Figure  1-1: Waste hierarchy 
Source: own 
Today, most economists agree that market failure in the infrastructure sector of municipal 
waste management does not automatically require a public provision of waste management 
services. Instead, the public sector is primarily responsible for the coordination and monitor-
ing that required services, such as waste collection, treatment and disposal, are implemented 
(Mühlenkamp, 2002). In practice, municipal authorities aggregate the demand for residual 
municipal waste management services2 and make the classical make-or-buy decision as 
principals of the transaction, i.e. they can decide whether to provide waste management ser-
vices themselves or to engage external organizations. 
                                                
1 See e.g. Agenda 21 - Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (UN, 1992) 
2 Vice versa households and commercial entities that generate household like waste are usually re-
quired by law to use the publicly coordinated and controlled waste management system. 
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Historically, municipal solid waste management infrastructure was provided by the public 
sector throughout the world. Similar to other infrastructure sectors, this slowly started to 
change in the 1970s when private sector began to participate in delivering municipal solid 
waste management service (Eggerth, 2005). In the recent past however, a partly reverse 
trend can also be observed. For example, in Germany, some waste management services 
are again provided by the public sector after temporarily being supplied by private companies  
(Christmann, 2004, p. 113; Keppler, 2007).  
While initially private sector participation focused on short-term outsourcing of waste collec-
tion services or the operation of landfill sites, private stakeholders nowadays also play a vital 
role at technically and economically complex residual municipal waste treatment facilities. 
Especially in developed countries and fast growing urban centers, residual waste treatment 
has become a crucial activity in pursuing the waste management hierarchy. Here, municipal 
solid waste combustion (MSWC) has evolved as an environmentally friendly and reliable 
treatment technology that minimizes the negative environmental impacts of waste. 
This research is settled within the context of (i) the technical and economic complexity of 
MSWC and (ii) the wide spectrum between public and private infrastructure delivery. The 
following sections present the research objectives, scope, state, methodology and structure. 
All of them have evolved as a result of dynamic and iterative processes involving numerous 
presentations and valuable discussions with different researchers, policy makers and practi-
tioners in the field of municipal waste management.  
1.2 Research objectives 
The main objective of this research is to theoretically and empirically analyze institutional 
arrangements for the provision of municipal solid waste combustion (MSWC) infrastructure 
on the basis of a profound understanding of its complex technical and economic characteris-
tics. Within the research context, institutional arrangements describe the nature and structure 
of relationships between the various stakeholders that are involved in specific municipal solid 
waste management projects. Institutional arrangements are governed by formal and informal 
institutions and can vary between the two extremes of (i) hierarchy and (ii) market, whereas 
several hybrid forms exist between them. 
To approach the overall research objective, five more detailed research objectives have been 
isolated. These objectives are: 
1. To gain a purposeful understanding of technical and economic aspects of MSWC. 
2. To analyze the microeconomic characteristics of market for MSWC and to identify possi-
ble deviations from the model of perfect competition.  
3. To elaborate on a theoretical framework to be used for categorizing and describing insti-
tutional arrangements for MSWC.  
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4. To verify these institutional arrangements in the two developed markets for MSWC of 
Germany and Singapore. 
5. To explain the reasons for the emergence of institutional arrangements for MSWC in 
these two markets. 
The findings of this research will contribute to existing theories. Furthermore, practical impli-
cations are derived from the theoretical and empirical findings to support the development of 
institutional arrangements for new MSWC projects. 
The research does not aim at evaluating or comparing the performance of different institu-
tional arrangements for MSWC. Such comparative analysis would certainly have to rely on 
quantitative data, which is impossible to collect with the constraint resources of a doctoral 
research project. Due to confidentiality reasons it is almost impossible to gain access to pri-
vate information about prices, price adjustment mechanisms, contract durations, detailed risk 
sharing, as well as the internal transaction costs of public and private stakeholders. 
1.3 Research scope  
Already narrowed by the research objectives, the research scope is limited within the munici-
pal solid waste management value system by (i) the waste stream and (ii) the waste treat-
ment technology. Only residual municipal solid waste stream is relevant and waste combus-
tion is considered as the treatment technology. Other waste streams (e.g. recyclables or bio-
logical waste) and other waste treatment options (e.g. mechanical biological treatment) are 
not examined. This limitation has different reasons and was only done after thorough consid-
erations and discussions with senior researchers. An extension of analysis to other waste 
streams would have created too broad a scope with a high probability of delivering mixed 
results for different waste streams. The research study was limited to MSWC, because the 
major treatment alternative mechanical biological treatment continues to suffer from severe 
technical and economic problems (see e.g. Bilitewski, 2007). 
Another important limitation of the research scope is related to the characterization and de-
scription of institutional arrangements. Here, the institutional environment, which encom-
passes of formal and informal rules on the macro-level that are non transaction specific, is 
treated as exogenously given. This is a necessary and logical confinement, as the research 
objectives target at explaining the emergence of institutional arrangements. 
The research scope combines technical, economic and institutional theories with quantitative 
and qualitative analyses. This transdisciplinary scope is necessary, because so far there 
does not exist a fundamental and comprehensive overview for institutional arrangements for 
MSWC that takes into account its unique technical, economic and institutional characteristics 
(see next chapter). 
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Even though the research scope is limited to MSWC, the generic characteristics of the meth-
odological approach as well as some of the theoretical and empirical findings are likely to be 
translatable to other areas outside the defined research scope. Furthermore, this thesis aims 
to trigger and support similar research endeavors for other activities within the municipal 
solid waste value system. 
1.4 State of the research 
In comparison with other infrastructure sectors, the number of existing research studies on 
economic and institutional aspects of municipal waste management, especially municipal 
waste treatment, is rather limited. Recent studies on private sector participation in infrastruc-
ture development have focused on general subjects such as risk management (Akintoye, 
Beck, & Hardcastle, 2003; Elbing, 2006; B. Weber, Alfen, & Maser, 2006) or financing (Boll, 
2007; Merna & Njiru, 2002) and were mostly applied to public real estate development (K. 
Fischer, 2007; Littwin & Schöne, 2006) or road infrastructure (Abednego, 2007; Beckers, 
2005; Thomas, 2005). 
Cantner (1997) has conducted a comprehensive analysis of the Germany municipal waste 
management including economic, legal and cost calculation aspects. Even though some of 
his theoretical assumptions and findings can be disputed, it can nevertheless be considered 
as a pioneering work in the sector. 
There also exists a small number of scientific works about institutional and organizational 
aspects of municipal waste management in Germany, most of which focus on private sector 
participation. Their major constrain however, is their broad scope covering the entire waste 
management value system,  whereby the specific characteristics of individual elements in the 
value system are only marginally analyzed and discussed (e.g. Höftmann, 2001; Wagner, 
2000; Winkler, 1999). Another constraint of existing research in Germany is the often re-
gional focus onto individual federal states (Baum, Cantner, Ilg, & Sprinkart, 2003; Wagner, 
2000)3. 
Yet, there exist two empirical studies focusing on the infrastructure sector of MSWC that are 
worth mentioning explicitly. The first one was conducted by Gaube (2006) who quantitatively 
analyzed treatment prizes of the German MSWC market and the impacts of possible regula-
tory measures onto them. The other is done by Berenyi (2006) who compiled statistical data 
including organizational aspects of MSWC in the USA.  
Furthermore, numerous theoretical studies on institutional arrangements for general infra-
structure development with special focus on private sector participation in Germany have 
                                                
3 Most of the work is the output of a research program that was sponsored by the Bavarian Ministry of 
Environment. 
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been conducted e.g. by Eggers (2004), Mühlenkamp (2005), Waffler (2002).. But as Reich-
ard  (2005) points out, the number of empirical studies is very limited. 
To the knowledge of the author, there exists no scientific work, where theoretical and empiri-
cal aspects of institutional arrangements for MSWC plants are combined and thoroughly ana-
lyzed. An empirical overview as well as two representative exploratory case studies from 
Japanese market can be found at Kleiss & Imura (2006). 
Thus, the presented research state highlights the relevance of the research objectives. There 
is a strong demand to fill in the gap in describing institutional arrangements for the provision 
of MSWC infrastructure on the basis of theoretical and empirical analysis while embracing 
the transdisciplinary complexity of technical and economic aspects. 
1.5 Research methodology 
The applied research methodology has to follow the nature of defined research objectives 
(Dunleavy, 2004). Due to the transdisciplinary characteristics of these research objectives 
and recommendations of senior researchers, a combination of  qualitative and quantitative 
methods is applied (Bryman & Bell, 2003; Creswell, 2006; R. W. Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Ta-
shakkori & Teddlie, 2000). 
The achievement of the first three research objectives mostly relies mainly on a critical re-
view and application of accepted theories and existing studies. For this purpose an extended 
literature review and theory analysis were conducted. In order to attain the first research ob-
jective, i.e. the understanding technical and economic aspects of MSWC infrastructure, pri-
mary data was also collected from developers and manufacturers to support the theoretical 
findings. 
For the forth research objective, i.e. for the verification of the theoretically derived institutional 
arrangements used the markets in Germany and Singapore, quantitative research methods 
are applied. Given the size of the German market for MSWC, a survey was carried out to 
gather cross-sectional data on applied institutional arrangements at a single point in time. 
Since the market for MSWC is much smaller in Singapore, the required data and information 
was collected through personal interviews and secondary sources. 
A qualitative case study methodology is used to meet the fifth research objective. Here, each 
identified institutional arrangement forms a case for which a representative case study is 
undertaken to understand the rationale for the emergence of the particular institutional ar-
rangements. For achieving a greater generalization of research findings, only case studies 
with a strong representative character are selected. The multiple case study methodology is 
selected due to its potential strength of identifying and understanding complex processes 
and interactions between various issues that must be addressed within the research context 
(Yin, 2003).  Such multiple case study approach is a recognized research methodology and 
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has successfully been applied to interdisciplinary doctoral research studies (see e.g. K. 
Fischer, 2007; Leiringer, 2003; Mahalingam, 2005). 
As Menard (2001) points out, case studies “are particularly relevant in New Institutional Eco-
nomics because of the need to deal with a limited number of discrete modes of organizing 
transactions, both at the micro-level and at the level of the set of institutions that characterize 
a society. Such comparative approaches have been extremely fruitful in other disciplines “.  
Therefore, the case studies are conducted to describe and explore representative institu-
tional arrangements for MSWC in the two developed MSWC markets of Germany and Sin-
gapore. The descriptive nature of the case studies is well suited to portray the different insti-
tutional arrangements and to exemplify the intrinsic differences between them. The explora-
tory nature of case studies is very helpful to understand decision making, implementation 
and change processes that have led to the emergence of individual institutional arrange-
ments (Gummesson, 2000, p. 3). Further, the exploratory case study approach can better 
identify informal institutions that shape institutional arrangements. 
Even though the case study research is an accepted methodology in social sciences, not 
only many researches from natural sciences but also economics and business administra-
tion4 are prejudiced against this qualitative research methodology (Bryman & Bell, 2003; 
Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2003). Especially in terms of exploratory case studies, they 
mostly criticize the limitations in generalizing the findings and the potential threat of subjectiv-
ity (Gummesson, 2000). These are considered serious threats and hence will be taken into 
account in the specific design of case studies as well as the formulation of conclusions. 
These potential shortcomings can be minimized by analyzing multiple cases and collecting 
data from different sources within each case study.  
Altogether, taken into account the defined research objectives and limited resources avail-
able, descriptive and exploratory case study research is the appropriate methodology. To 
conclude in the words of R.W. Scholz & Tietje (2002, p. 25): “Case studies are good for prob-
lems where truth is relative, reality is realistic and a structural relationship is contingent”.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The opening chapter includes the research con-
text, the research objectives and scope, the review of research state as well as the applied 
methodology. 
Chapter two briefly presents the general aspects of the waste management sector into which 
this research integrates. It explains the characteristics of residual municipal waste, the mu-
                                                
4 Especially with Anglo-American or Asian background 
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nicipal waste management value system as well as the economics of residual waste from a 
microeconomic and macroeconomic perspective. 
In chapter three a profound understanding of the technical and economic characteristics of 
MSWC infrastructure is developed. Special attention is given to positive and negative exter-
nalities as well as costs and revenues that occur throughout the entire life-cycle. 
Chapter four explores the specific aspects of the market for MSWC. Based on the standard 
economic model of perfect competition, different forms of market failures and applicable 
measures are briefly presented in general and are applied to MSWC infrastructure thereafter. 
Chapter five develops the theoretical framework for institutional arrangements for MSWC. 
Attention is drawn to transaction costs economics and its application to the public sector in 
general and MSWC infrastructure in specific. Further, an analysis of involved stakeholders 
and their specific objectives is carried out.  
Chapter six and seven constitute the empirical part of the research. Beginning with a short 
description of the specific institutional environments and historical developments, quantitative 
evidence for applied institutional arrangements for MSWC in Germany and Singapore is pre-
sented. Each type of institutional arrangement is elaborated by means of at least one repre-
sentative case study to describe its main characteristics and explore the reasons for their 
particular emergence. 
The final chapter summarizes and discusses the major research findings and ends with an 
identification of further research demand. 
The following Figure  1-2 illustrates the logical sequencing of chapters: 
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Figure  1-2: Research structure 
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2 Background 
2.1 Waste classification 
Solid waste can be classified by the source of its generation into industrial, municipal, con-
struction and demolition as well as mining waste. Municipal solid waste encompasses waste 
from households as well as waste from other, mainly commercial sources that has similar 
characteristics and composition. Besides recyclable, kitchen and residual waste from resi-
dential and commercial sources, municipal solid waste includes bulky waste and waste from 
different municipal services, such as park and garden maintenance or street cleaning ser-
vices. Municipal solid waste excludes fluid waste, e.g. from sewage collection and treatment 
(see e.g. UN (1997),  1999/31/EC). The following Figure  2-1 roughly structures the major 
sources and types of municipal solid waste: 
 
Figure  2-1: Major sources and types of waste 
Source: own 
As elaborated in chapter  1.3, the research scope encompasses primarily residual waste from 
municipal sources and its thermal treatment in MSWC plants (see gray boxes in Figure  2-1).  
2.2 Characteristics of residual municipal waste 
Residual municipal waste consists mainly of waste that households do not convey to recy-
cling or composting schemes. A considerable portion is also contributed by curbside collec-
tion as well as leftovers from the separation of recyclables and bulky waste. The composition 
and characteristics of residual waste depend on a variety of interrelated factors that differ 
considerably in accordance with the institutional environment. The three major factors are: (i) 
the consumption patterns of residential households and commercial businesses, (ii) the 
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availability of waste separation and recycling schemes and (iii) willingness of waste genera-
tors to separate and recycle.  
A representative example of the composition of residual solid waste from households in 
Germany is given in the following Figure  2-2: 
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Figure  2-2: Typical composition of residual waste from households in Germany 
Source: Pretz & Uepping (2007) 
The composition of waste determines its physical and chemical characteristics. Major vari-
ables include net caloric value (NCV), total organic content (TOC), moisture content, chlorine 
concentration and particle size. The NCV usually ranges between 7,000-11,000 kJ/kg and 
correlates strongly with the content of paper and plastics not being recycled (Winterstein, 
Hilbert, Pflüger, Sabrowski, & Kahle, 2004). The TOC and moisture content are mainly ef-
fected by the separation rates of kitchen and garden waste.  
2.3 Waste management value system 
The waste management value system can be interpreted as the string of all activities be-
tween the generation of waste and the final disposal of its end products5. These different 
activities are separable from each other and could be delivered by different organizations. In 
practice, some or all value system activities are vertically integrated and delivered by a single 
organization. 
                                                
5 The presented model of the waste management value system is derived from Porter’s (1985) generic 
model of a value system, which is formed by interconnected organizations that are jointly involved in 
the delivery of goods and services. Hereby, each organization possesses its own individual value 
chain consisting of primary and support activities (Porter, 1985). 
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The following Figure  2-3 presents the value system for municipal waste management and 
different options and elements for each activity: 
 
Figure  2-3: Waste management value system  
Source: own, based on Eriksson et al. (2005) 
The different activities of the waste management value system are briefly described below. 
Please note that not all of these elements must necessarily be provided as part of municipal 
waste management infrastructure and services. A simple scenario, as found in many eco-
nomically developing or transition countries, often consists of waste collection, transportation 
and disposal only. 
2.3.1 Waste collection 
There exist different methods for collecting municipal waste. The three most commonly ap-
plied methods are (i) simple emptying of small scale waste containers, (ii) collection of waste 
which is put into one-way plastic bags or (iii) the exchange of filled large-scale containers by 
identical empty containers (Bilitewski, Härdtle, & Marek, 1996, pp. 64-70). While the first two 
methods are applied for the collection of municipal waste from households and commercial 
sources, the last is mostly used for commercial sources only6. 
Waste collection includes the local transportation from the source of waste to the transfer 
station. Other value creating elements at the level of waste collection include street sweeping 
and the provision of waste containers. Waste collection is comparatively labor intensive and 
less capital intensive (Rinschede & Wehking, 1991). 
                                                
6 In economically developing environments the method exchanging large-scale containers can also be 
found at household waste collection, if waste containers are provided for larger neighborhoods.  
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2.3.2 Transfer 
Because it is often too costly to transport municipal waste over long distances in waste col-
lection vehicles, special waste transfer stations can be established in the vicinity of the waste 
generation. Thereby, the waste collection vehicles unload their waste, which is transferred 
after a short period of time onto larger units. Due to the proximity of waste transfer stations to 
residential areas, they are normally constructed in encapsulated buildings to control noise, 
odor or dust emissions. In densely populated urban areas with high municipal waste genera-
tion rates and long transportation durations due to traffic congestion, transfer stations can be 
advantageous even if transport distances to waste treatment or disposal facilities are com-
paratively short. 
Besides waste compacting machinery, waste transfer stations can also comprise equipment 
for mechanical separation or mixing of waste. Thus, valuable recyclables (e.g. ferrous or 
non-ferrous metals) can be separated and the waste be homogenized. 
From a logistic point of view, waste transfer stations also function as a storage and buffer for 
leveling out short fluctuations in waste generation. From here, the waste can be transported 
in a continuous and controlled manner to waste treatment facilities. 
2.3.3 Waste transportation 
Long distance waste transportation is an important waste management activity whenever a 
transfer station exists between waste collection and treatment. Hereby, the compacted waste 
is usually reloaded into containers and transported either by trucks, trains or ships to the 
waste treatment facility.  
Most commonly the municipal waste is transported by trucks, because it allows the highest 
logistical flexibility and least fixed assets. However, for the frequent transportation of high 
waste quantities over long distances, the transportation by trains can provide a less costly 
and environmentally friendly alternative. Waste transportation by ships is relatively uncom-
mon, even though waste treatment facilities are frequently located nearby inland water ways. 
2.3.4 Waste treatment 
2.3.4.1 General 
The principal objective of all waste treatment methods is to eliminate or minimize the nega-
tive impacts of waste on humans and the natural environment during its final disposal or utili-
zation. Ideally, waste treatment also creates material or energetic products that can be used 
for other purposes. 
Today, the major options for waste treatment are (i) thermal treatment, (ii) mechanical-
biological treatment and (iii) composting. While the first two methods are applied to residual 
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municipal waste, composting requires the separation of kitchen and garden waste at its 
source. 
As shown in the following Figure  2-4, all treatment methods for residual municipal waste in-
volve a combustion stage at some point: 
 
Figure  2-4: Options for mechanical, biological and thermal residual waste treatment  
Source: own, after Thomé-Kozmiensky (2006, p. 14) 
2.3.4.2 Thermal waste treatment 
In many developed countries, thermal waste treatment is the dominant technology for resid-
ual municipal waste treatment. As shown in the following Figure  2-5, the share of thermally 
treated residual waste is often close to the technically applicable maximum value of 80-85% 
(Vaccani, 2007, p. 227). Due to the accentuation of environmental legislation, land scarcity in 
fast urbanizing regions and increasing transportation and energy costs it can be expected 
that the importance of thermal waste treatment will continue to grow around the world. 
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Figure  2-5: Share of thermal waste treatment for municipal waste in 2005 
Source: Berenyi (2006), Vaccani (2007), own data 
The major technological options for waste treatment through thermal processes encompass 
(i) waste combustion (mass burning), (ii) pyrolysis and (iii) gasification. The most frequently 
applied option is waste combustion, where residual municipal waste is burned on grates in 
industrialized facilities without prior treatment or separation. The technical, financial and eco-
nomic aspects of MSWC will be described and analyzed in detail in the following chapters 3 
and 4. 
Apart from a few demonstration projects, pyrolysis and gasification play virtually no role at 
the current municipal waste management industry in Europe (Faulstich, 2006). However, in 
Asia, mainly in Japan and South Korea, gasification has gained remarkable importance 
(Themelis, 2007). 
2.3.4.3 Mechanical biological waste treatment 
Especially in Europe and starting in the late 1990s, mechanical biological treatment (MBT) 
has evolved as an alternative method for municipal solid waste treatment. In a typical MBT 
plant, the residual waste is mechanically separated into high-caloric and low-caloric fractions. 
The high-caloric waste (also: refuse derived fuel) is combusted in specialized plants7, while 
                                                
7 Depending on quality of refuse derived fuel, co-combustion in coal burning plants or cement kilns is 
also technically possible. 
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the low-caloric waste is biologically treated trough rotting or anaerobic digestion and after-
wards disposed in sanitary landfill sites8. 
In Germany and other European countries, many operators of MBT plants currently face se-
rious technical and economic problems. Reasons include difficulties to meet target values for 
total organic content (TOC) at the biological treatment stage and the often unexpected high 
costs for the thermal treatment of the high-caloric waste fraction (Bilitewski, 2007). 
2.3.4.4 Composting 
Composting is the classical method for treating biological waste. A pre-requisite is that bio-
logical waste, i.e. kitchen and garden waste, is separated from other municipal waste at the 
source and collected by separate vehicles. In a composting plant the biological waste is 
screened for unwanted materials, homogenized and afterwards stocked for a certain period 
of time, during which the biodegradation takes place under aerobic conditions. The final 
compost products can be used for agricultural or landscaping purposes. Compared to ther-
mal or mechanical-biological waste treatment, the negative environmental effects from com-
posting are only few9. 
Please note that composting should not be considered as an alternative to thermal or me-
chanical-biological waste treatment, but considered as a complementary treatment technol-
ogy for a different waste stream. 
2.3.5 Disposal 
The last element of the municipal waste management value system is the final disposal of 
treated or untreated waste. Sanitary landfill sites are the most frequently applied form of final 
above ground disposal. Their design can be very complex and has to reflect the chemical 
and physical waste characteristics as well as regional, hydrological and climatic conditions of 
its location. After a landfill site is being filled, it is capped to avoid penetration of rainwater 
and to allow the development of vegetation. The slag from MSWC is frequently used as the 
first layer for such capping. 
Underground waste disposal facilities are engineered in salt or rock caverns. Because of 
their separation from the biosphere and groundwater, they are especially suitable for hazard-
ous waste. Underground waste disposal facilities are therefore commonly used for the stor-
age of residues from the flue-gas cleaning systems of MSWCs. 
                                                
8 For a comprehensive overview on technical aspect of mechanical biological treatment see e.g. 
Soyez (2001). For recent development trends in Germany refer to Fricke, Bahr, Münnich, & Santen 
(2006). 
9 For comprehensive overview on biological waste treatment see e.g. Bidlingmaier (2000). 
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To control and minimize negative environmental impacts, waste disposal facilities require 
monitoring and maintenance (e.g. collection and treatment of leachate) over long periods of 
time after their closure. The costs for these after-closure activities should already be col-
lected during operation of these facilities and be included in the disposal fees10. 
The major conceptual difference between waste treatment and disposal facilities is that 
treatment facilities have a maximum (constant) throughput capacity, while disposal facilities 
are characterized by a maximum volume capacity.  
2.4 Economics of municipal waste generation 
2.4.1 General 
From an economic perspective, municipal waste can bee considered as a by-product of 
commercial production and private household consumption. It differs from “normal” economic 
goods in two important ways. Firstly, the marginal utility for its owner is lower than the mar-
ginal private cost for its further use (Holm-Müller, 1997, p. 24).  Secondly, negative external-
ities are created if the waste is disposed in an uncontrolled way (Choe & Fraser, 1998)11. 
However, both municipal solid waste and “normal” economic goods have one thing in com-
mon: they are transportable. Therefore, unlike other infrastructure sectors, such as water 
supply or road networks, waste management does not possess the characteristics of a net-
work industry. 
2.4.2 Macroeconomic perspective 
As shown in the following Figure  2-6, municipal waste generation rates per capita differ con-
siderably between various countries12: 
                                                
10 For a comprehensive overview on design, construction and monitoring of sanitary landfill sites see 
e.g. Bagchi (2004) or Salvato, Nemerow & Agardy (2003, pp. 820-856)  
11 For externalities see also chapter  4.3. 
12 Please note that municipal waste generation rates can also vary strongly within countries. 
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Figure  2-6: Generation of municipal waste in selected countries 
Source: OECD (2007), NEA (2007) 
Based on a comprehensive analysis of historical data on waste generation rates from differ-
ent OECD countries, Johnstone and Labonne (2004) have identified three key economic and 
demographic determinants that can explain the generation of total and household municipal 
waste at national levels: 
1. Household income has positive impact on waste generation rates. Depending on saving 
rates, an increase in real household income directly increases consumption and hence 
waste generation. However, marginal waste generation rates normally decrease with in-
creasing household income. 
2. Average household size and proportion of children in households have a significant nega-
tive correlation with household waste generation. This could be explained by the assump-
tion that larger families jointly share meals and consume products in larger sizes with 
relatively less packaging material. 
3. Degree of urbanization or population density have positive impacts on municipal waste 
generation rates, because consumption behavior changes towards increasing usage of 
packed goods and food.  
Other surveys and studies have confirmed these three determinants and identified additional 
minor factors, such as infant mortality or education of people, both these correlate negatively 
with municipal waste generation rates (Beede & Bloom, 1995; Gellynck & Verhelst, 2007; 
Hong, 1999; Iseley & Lowen, 2007; Podolsky & Spiegel, 1999). 
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2.4.3 Microeconomic model for waste separation 
Based on the outlined macroeconomic determinants of total municipal waste generation it is 
interesting to analyze how households separate recyclables and residual waste. A microeco-
nomic model for this purpose is presented by Kinnaman & Fullerton (1996; 2001) and makes 
following assumptions13: 
Households produce municipal waste m as a result of their consumption c: 
m = (1/α)c (1) 
, where 1/α is the portion of waste from consumed goods. 
The municipal waste is either recycled r or collected as residual waste w: 
m = w + r  (2) 
Households maximize their utility u = u(c), where uc > 0 and ucc<0. The disposal cost per unit 
of residual waste pw is positive and constant, while direct recycling costs pr are zero. How-
ever, the recycling of waste consumes time kr , which multiplied by the wage pk causes the 
opportunity costs pkkr. For simplification kr can be assumed as: 
1nr δr
1n
1k ++=
 (3) 
Thus the marginal costs of recycling MCr are calculated: 
MCr = pkkr = pkδrn  (4) 
The variable δ can be interpreted as the efforts that different recycling schemes cause to the 
households. 
In contrast with Kinnaman & Fullerton (2001) it is assumed that MCr is not only a linear, but a 
concave curve depending on the exponent n, because the efforts for recycling increase ex-
ponentially with growing recycling rate14. 
The following Figure  2-7 illustrates the model and shows how the price of residual waste dis-
posal pw and the marginal cost of recycling MCr determine the recycling rate r. 
                                                
13 For an extended mathematical model see Kinnaman & Fullerton (2001). The model is widely applied 
in different forms by various studies on municipal waste and policy development (see e.g. OECD, 
2004, pp. 44-47; Palmer, Sigman, & Walls, 1997). 
14 For example it is easier and less time consuming to separate larger newspapers (high volumes) 
than smaller packaging paper materials (lower volumes). 
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Figure  2-7: Choice of recycling and residual waste generation 
Source: own, based on Kinnaman & Fullerton (2001) 
As shown by the relationships in the above figure, an increase of residual waste disposal 
fees to pw* also increases recycling rate to r*. This increase, however, greatly depends on 
marginal cost for recycling, i.e. the opportunity costs of households pkkr. 
According to this model it can be expected that a simplification of waste recycling schemes 
from δ to δ** has a greater impact on the recycling rate. It must however be noted that 
households benefit from reduced residual waste disposal costs (hatched area) only if a full 
unit based pricing is applied15. 
Empirical studies on household behavior support the presented model. Price elasticity for 
municipal residual waste generation is relatively low and decreases further with increasing 
income (Stehling, 1999, p. 23). For high income countries, such as Germany, the price elas-
ticity can even be assumed as zero (Gaube, 2006). 
In comparison with residual waste generation from households, surprisingly little theoretical 
or empirical research has been done on municipal waste from commercial sources. How-
ever, it can be assumed that the presented model is equally valid for this source of waste 
                                                
15 The reduced disposal costs are less likely to affect individual households wherever multiple house-
holds share waste collection containers due to the existing freerider problems.   
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generation16. Commercial enterprises are likely to behave even more rationally than house-
holds and therefore the opportunity costs and the ease to recycle determine price elasticity. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter provided a brief background on general aspects of municipal waste manage-
ment. The treatment of residual waste is an important waste management activity in most 
developed countries, because it minimizes the waste’s negative environmental externalities. 
Waste treatment is a part of a broader waste management value system, which additionally 
consists of waste collection, transfer, transportation and disposal. Today, municipal solid 
waste combustion (MSWC) has evolved as the preferred treatment technology in many 
countries and its importance is likely to increase in other countries and densely populated 
areas as well. 
Municipal waste possesses unique characteristics from macroeconomic and microeconomic 
perspectives. The main macroeconomic factors that determine the demand for municipal 
waste management infrastructure and services are household income, average household 
size and the degree of urbanization. The presented microeconomic model shows that the 
separation of residual and recyclable waste largely depends on waste disposal costs and 
households’ opportunity costs which depend on wages and efforts for implementing available 
recycling schemes. Supported by empirical studies the model also shows that the price elas-
ticity for residual waste generation is comparatively small in high income countries with a 
recycling scheme in place. 
                                                
16 This assumption is based on personal communication with Thomas C. Kinnaman. 
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3 Technical and economic characteristics of municipal solid waste combustion 
This chapter aims at providing a short introduction to technical and economic aspects of mu-
nicipal solid waste combustion (MSWC), such as applied technologies, externalities and life-
cycle costs.  
3.1 Introduction 
Waste combustion is currently the most widely applied form of thermal waste treatment and 
can be done by applying and combining different specific technologies. Its major objectives 
are (see e.g. Bilitewski et al., 1996; EIPPCB, 2005): 
1. To convert the heterogeneous mixture of harmful substances within the waste into sub-
stances that can be easily fractionated and captured as inert materials in the flue-gas 
cleaning system and slag; 
2. To reduce the volume of waste in order to minimize the required disposal spaces; 
3. To recover energy that is generated during the thermal treatment processes; and 
4. To capture metals and other marketable secondary products.  
During the past two decades, technological developments for MSWC plants have undergone 
rapid developments that were triggered by stricter environmental regulation, public pressure 
and growing demand in a supplier’s market with fierce international competition. As a result, 
the state-of-the-art MSWC plants nowadays have low air emission and become more and 
more accepted as an efficient way for treating residual waste.  
The terms combustion and incineration are often used as synonyms and technically describe 
the oxidation of waste materials. However, a combustion plant17 is a complex facility where 
the actual waste combustion (or incineration) is only one step within a chain of physical and 
chemical processes. The following Figure  3-1 gives a simplified overview of the processes in 
a typical combustion plant: 
                                                
17 The term waste-to-energy (WTE) plant is also commonly used for waste combustion plants empha-
sizing the recovery of thermal energy as it sounds more environmentally friendly thus provoking less 
public concerns.  
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Figure  3-1: Simplified process diagram for typical waste combustion plant 
Source: own 
For special waste, such as bulky waste, the delivered waste is prepared prior to the thermal 
treatment. This usually includes physical treatment, such as shredding and separation of 
larger recyclables (e.g. scrap metal). The next four stages of drying, pyrolysis, gasification 
and oxidation are the actual processes of thermal waste treatment, where most volume and 
weight reduction take place. After the recovery of thermal energy from excess flue-gas, the 
treatment of process residues, such as flue-gas, waste-water and solid components is re-
quired to minimize environmental impacts. 
3.2 Solid waste combustion technology 
A typical MSWC plant consists of the following elements (Bilitewski et al., 1996; EIPPCB, 
2005; R. Scholz, Beckmann, & Schulenburg, 2001; Thomé-Kozmiensky, 2006; VDI, 2002):  
1. Waste receiving, storage, pre-treatment and charging, 
2. Firing unit, 
3. Energy recovery, 
4. Flue-gas cleaning, 
5. Storages and transfer stations for residues, 
6. Stack including emission control and monitoring system and 
7. Auxiliary infrastructure. 
These functional areas are designed by combining components from various manufacturers 
and suppliers. Some of them, e.g. firing grades, are specifically designed for MSWC plants, 
while others, e.g. charging units, are designed for wider range of application in the design of 
power plants.  
The layout of a typical municipal MSWC plant with its most important components is shown 
in the following Figure  3-2 and will be described shortly. 
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3.2.1 Waste receiving, storage, pre-treatment and charging 
At the waste receiving area, the delivered waste is weighted, documented and offloaded into 
the waste bunker. The waste bunker should be dimensioned to ensure the off-taking of waste 
and its storage functions as a buffer-zone for continued firing. Its volume should be large 
enough to store waste for at least five to seven days to ensure continuous 24/7 combustion. 
Many MSWC plants have separate areas for receiving special waste such as bulky waste. 
The preprocessing of waste usually encompasses the shredding of combustible bulky waste 
and removing of the waste disrupting the combustion processes. The mixing and homogeni-
zation of waste (materials, NCV) are important functions done manually by the crane within 
the bunker. Combustion plants that process waste from municipalities without waste recy-
cling policies can integrate more sophisticated waste separation units at this stage to extract 
marketable product (see also chapter  3.4.3.3).  
The off-loading and intermediate storage of waste can cause unwanted odor, dust and noise. 
Therefore, the waste receiving and storage facilities should be installed in closed buildings 
with slight atmospheric under-pressure. The storage of municipal waste outside the bunker 
should be avoided to minimize health and odor problems. A waste packaging station is in 
place to bale waste for outside storage in case the bunker is full due to excessive waste de-
liveries or longer operational shutdown due to planned or unplanned maintenance work. 
Most of the delivered waste is only visually inspected requiring experienced and motivated 
operating staff. Randomly, the waste quality might be tested in a laboratory for its compliance 
with contractual requirements and plants’ permission criteria. For operation, most crucial me-
chanical and physical characteristics of the waste are the net calorific value, density, size 
and the content of hazardous substances.  
The waste charging unit must be designed to ensure continued and controlled waste stream-
ing into the combustion unit. Stationary cranes that are usually operated semi-automatically 
or manually from a cabin above the bunker fill the waste into the hopper. An automatic inter-
lock mechanism must prevent backfiring into the hopper. The entire charging unit must be 
very robust to resist heavy mechanic and thermal stresses. 
3.2.2 Firing unit 
A vast majority of MSWC plants use grate firing systems consisting of (1) feeding table, (2) 
firing grate, (3) furnace, (4) combustion air system, (5) after-burning zone, (6) auxiliary 
burner, (7) slag remover (see e.g. Thomé-Kozmiensky, 2006, p. 57; VDI, 2002, p. 32). A 
typical arrangement of them is shown in Figure  3-3. 
The feeding table distributes waste from the chute onto the firing grates depending on meas-
ured parameters, such as steam production rate, oxygen content in the raw gas and tem-
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perature. In some MSWC plants (e.g. in Bamberg, Germany), an additional feeder is at-
tached to the system for co-combustion of dried sewage sludge or collected leachate from 
landfill sites. 
 
Figure  3-3: Firing unit  
Source: Martin GmbH (2007) 
The firing grate transports the waste through the furnace and ensures a continuous stoking 
of the fire on the basis of information from the combustion process control system (CCS). 
Among others, the major types of grates are: roller grates, forward feeding grates, reverse-
acting grates or traveling grates. Depending on the various design characteristics of the 
MSWC plant, they are either cooled by only air or by air and water together. Instead of grate 
systems, rotary kiln or fluidized-bed can also be used for waste combustion. However, these 
two alternatives are mostly applied for treatment of hazardous waste, sewage sludge or re-
fuse-derived fuels (RDF).  
The combustion of waste takes place in the bed on the grate (solid conversion) and in the 
after-burning zone above the grate (conversion). Depending on the desired combustion gas 
flow, parallel-flow, counter-flow and centre-flow current systems are available. The primary 
air for oxidation processes is added from below the grates by the combustion air system (4) 
that also controls air flow rate and distribution of air in the grate zones. A secondary air sys-
tem creates additional turbulences and fosters maximum burnout of combustion gases.  
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The transition region between the boiler and the furnace is regarded as the after-burning 
zone. At high temperature above 850°C, minimum residence time of 2 seconds and sufficient 
oxygen concentration a maximum burn-out of combustion gases like carbon-monoxide, fu-
rans, dioxins and others is ensured (17. BImSchV; Directive 2000/76/EC). 
An auxiliary burner using oil or natural gas is installed for controlled heating and cooling of 
facilities (especially the boiler) during run-up and shut-down of operation. If the net calorific 
value of the waste is too low, the auxiliary burner should be activated automatically to ensure 
that the minimum required temperature in the furnace and after-burning zone is reached. 
The slag18 remover collects and cools the residues accumulated during the combustion proc-
esses. It is designed according to the grate system and must ensure air sealing against the 
furnace as well as a prevention of blockage during the removal processes. In grate firing sys-
tems, the slag falls due to gravity into a remover or conveyor where water is usually used as 
the medium for cooling. The slag mainly contains minerals, metals and glass of which some 
could be recovered by the operator of the MSWC plant or by an external firm (e.g. extraction 
of iron could be done with magnets). The slag is stored within the combustion plant until it is 
transported for disposal at a landfill site or for further treatment. 
The total capacity of an MSWC plant correlates strongly with size of the firing unit and the net 
calorific value of waste. A combustion performance diagram can be drawn for every MSWC 
plant showing the relationship between thermal capacity, NCV and mass flow rate of waste 
(see appendix 2 for an example).  
3.2.3 Energy recovery 
Modern MSWC plants recover the thermal energy that is released as part of the combustion 
processes. For example, the German emission law (BImSchG) requires energy recovery and 
therefore all German MSWC plants possess a heat recovery system.  
The thermal energy from the hot flue-gas has a temperature between approx. 850-1,000°C 
can either be transformed into steam or water. Steam can be used on the other hand for fur-
ther transformation into electricity by turbines and generators or as a process steam for adja-
cent industrial off-takers. On the other hand, heated water can be supplied into a local heat-
ing system.  
There are different types of boilers, depending on the output, the heat transfer system and 
the throughput capacity. The simplest categorization is done by its output, where three major 
types of boilers exist: (i) hot water boiler; (ii) low pressure (LP) steam boiler19; (iii) steam 
boiler. Hot water boilers produce hot water under pressure at a temperature between 110-
                                                
18 Also named: bottom-ash 
19 Also-called: saturated steam boiler 
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200°C that can be used for heating purposes.  Low-pressure steam boilers produce process 
steam with a pressure of up to 20bar and a temperature between approx. 120-250°C. As 
compared to the last two types of boilers, steam boilers have a more complex design. 
The total energy efficiency of an MSWC plant depends mostly on the following three factors: 
1. Location: Hot water or process steam generation recovers more energy than pure elec-
tricity generation. The highest efficiency rate can be achieved with co-generation of hot 
water (or process steam) and electricity. Therefore the location of the MSWC plant and 
the existence of off-takers for hot water (district heating system) or process steam (indus-
trial application) has a decisive impact on energy efficiency. 
2. Steam parameters: The selection of steam parameters20 influence the efficiency of the 
boiler. Higher parameters increase the efficiency. 
3. Flue-gas cleaning system: The components of the flue-gas cleaning (e.g. ventilators, 
pumps) require electrical energy themselves. Therefore the design of the flue-gas clean-
ing system has an impact on the total energy efficiency of an MSWC plant. 
Due to the physical and chemical contents in the flue-gas, corrosion, erosion and fouling are 
serious problems that reduce the durability and reliability of boilers, especially steam boilers. 
Therefore, their design, integration into the overall system, operation and maintenance must 
be optimized to reduce unwanted interruption of the combustion schedule.  
3.2.4 Flue-gas cleaning  
Due to the various chemical components in the waste, large volumes of flue-gas containing 
various unwanted pollutants are generated during the waste combustion processes. There-
fore, minimizing the generation and cleaning of flue-gases are the most important emission 
reduction processes in MSWC plants. While the pollutants are distributed heterogeneously in 
the solid waste21, the flue-gas cleaning system fractions the flue-gas and treats them at dif-
ferent steps. 
In contrast with primary measures, such as ensuring high temperatures in the after-burning 
zone, which target at impeding the creation of pollutants, the flue-gas cleaning system is a 
secondary measure for precipitating, reducing and destroying unwanted and hazardous pol-
lutants, such as carbon monoxide, hydrogen chloride, dust, mercury and dioxins (see also 
 3.3). 
                                                
20 Standard steam parameters for MSWC plant are 40bar/400°C 
21 Prior sorting can do only little to reduce the heterogeneous distribution of pollutants in the waste.  
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Several different physical and chemical processes can be employed in flue-gas cleaning sys-
tem by combining different process components that are offered by numerous suppliers. Ma-
jor process components for flue-gas cleaning are (R. Scholz et al., 2001, p. 261): 
1. Filter systems (fabric filter or electrostatic precipitator (ESP)), 
2. Dry systems, 
3. Semi-dry (or semi-wet) systems, 
4. Wet systems, 
5. SCR (Selective Catalytic Reduction), 
6. SNCR (Selective Non-Catalytic Reduction), 
7. Activated-carbon filters systems. 
According to EIPPCB (2005, p. 102), these elements can be combined to 408 different op-
tions for flue-gas cleaning. The following Figure  3-4 shows three common combinations for 
wet, semi-wet and semi-dry flue-gas cleaning systems. 
 
Figure  3-4: Flue-gas cleaning systems 
Source: adapted from Fuchs (2006) 
The choice of flue-gas cleaning system largely depends on legal requirements for air pollut-
ants (e.g. 17. BImSchV). In many countries, such as Germany, public authorities frequently 
reduce the standard emission limits to a much lower level as a result of the planning permis-
sion processes. 
For example, the MSWC plant shown in Figure  3-2 corresponds with the wet flue-gas clean-
ing system and utilizes an electrostatic precipitator (ESP), two-stage wet scrubber, SCR and 
a bag filter (Sotec, 2007).  In all wet systems, a waste-water treatment facility is necessary to 
clean the effluent from the wet scrubber in a closed circle. 
At the final stage, the cleaned flue-gas is released through the stack into the atmosphere. 
The ducts and stack must be resistant to corrosion, as the exhaust gas has a fairly high con-
tent of moisture at a temperature of 60°C or higher.  
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3.2.5 Process control and monitoring system 
In comparison with gas or coal firing plants, the combustion of municipal solid waste is a 
rather discontinuous process due to the comparative inhomogeneity of the input material. A 
sophisticated control and monitoring system22 is therefore needed to ensure (i) a full burnout 
in the firing unit, (ii) an efficient transformation of thermal energy and (iii) a reliable function-
ing of the flue-gas cleaning systems. While these three systems can function independently, 
their superordinated integration into a central control and monitoring system is required for 
taking into account their interdependencies.  
Some pollutants (dust, HCl, SO2, NO2, total-C, CO, NH3) are continuously measured, while 
others (Hg, dioxin, furan, HF, PAH) are measured discontinuously. The public authorities that 
are in charge of supervising emission levels must get access to the data. In modern MSWC 
plants therefore the authorities have an online access to the measurement instruments in the 
stack. 
3.2.6 Auxiliary facilities 
Various supporting facilities are required for developing and operating the MSWC plant. They 
include: 
1. Civil structure for plant (foundation, construction cover) 
2. Storages and transfer station for operating materials and residues (especially for slag and 
residues from flue-gas cleaning) 
3. Connection to public infrastructure (road, railway, water supply, drainage, waste water 
disposal, electricity) 
4. Office building, control rooms, social rooms for workers (incl. showers, kitchen), visitor’s 
centre 
5. Waste packing station and suitable area for intermediate storage of waste.  
6. Parking spaces 
In some cases, MSWC plants are built in urban industrial zone that are close to commercial 
or residential areas. These locations have the advantage of short transportation distances 
and an easy access to the municipal district heating system. In contrast to construction in 
non-urban industrial areas, these facilities require higher architectural and civil design stan-
dards to integrate themselves into the environment and therefore increase public aware-
ness23.  
                                                
22 also: continuous monitoring system (CMS) 
23 The plant in Vienna, designed by the architect Hundertwasser, is a famous example. The plant has 
become a popular tourist destination and a plant at Osaka, Japan, has followed a similar design. An-
other plant, famous for its civil works, is the new MWCP in the City of Issy-les-Moulineaux, near Paris. 
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3.3 Externalities of municipal solid waste combustion 
Every society produces waste. MSWC, like all waste treatment methods, aims at minimizing 
the environmental impacts of residual waste. It is therefore important to remember that the 
environmental impacts of MSWC are much lower in comparison to the environmental im-
pacts of a non-existing municipal waste management. As compared to other waste treatment 
technologies, MSWC has rather little environmental impacts24. 
The classification of negative and positive environmental impacts correlates with the distin-
guishing between negative and positive externalities. Their economic analysis will be done in 
chapter  4.3. 
3.3.1 Negative environmental impacts 
During the waste combustion processes, various pollutants are produced with potential nega-
tive environmental impacts. Without adequate measures implemented in the flue-gas clean-
ing system (see chapter  3.2.4) the highest potential pollution could come from the flue-gas. 
Therefore a large amount of regulatory and policy efforts are focusing on the issue of mini-
mizing airborne pollution (see chapter  4.3.2).  
At the beginning of large scale commercial applications in the 1970s and ‘80s, MSWC 
caused severe air pollution and became known for their hazardous dioxin emission. The fol-
lowing public pressure and advanced environmental regulation triggered the development 
and implementation of improved technology. A study of Germany shows that the emission of 
dioxin could be reduced between the years 1990 and 2000 by 99.9% and is nowadays a 
negligible source of total national dioxin production (BMU, 2005)25. 
The slag (or bottom ash), which is by quantity the largest residue of the combustion does not 
cause major environmental impacts. Marketable ferrous and non-ferrous metal is usually 
extracted and used in industry. Depending on the quality of slag, it might either be disposed 
without further treatment at landfill sites or can be used as construction material (e.g. road 
construction). In the year 2001, about 84% of all slag from MSWC was utilized for road con-
struction or other underground work (Krass, Brüggemann, & Görener, 2004). In countries like 
Japan or Singapore, the slag is even used for off-shore land reclamation. 
                                                                                                                                                     
The plant is only a few kilometers away from the Eifel Tower and directly near the river Seine. Two 
third of the plant is located below the ground level to limit the maximum height to 21m. 
24 A comparison with other waste management strategies or technologies is very complex and is out of 
scope for this research. A comparative study can be found for example in (Murphy & McKeogh, 2004). 
25 Surveys in the USA show similar reduction, while backyard waste burning remains the largest 
source of dioxin (IWSA, 2007b). 
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However, the fly ash that is collected in the boiler or through physical treatment (e.g. ESP) 
has high contents of minerals and heavy metals. To prevent ground water pollution, the fly 
ash is usually disposed underground as filling material in old salt mines. 
The quality of residues as a result from chemical processes in the flue-gas cleaning largely 
depends on the chosen treatment system (dry, semi-dry, wet). The quantity depends on the 
process conditions, waste characteristics (e.g. chlorine content) and the required emission 
levels (e.g. HCl). For most of the residues from the flue-gas treatment no commercial use 
has been found. As such, they must be disposed in special landfills for hazardous waste or 
also underground sites. In wet treatment systems, gypsum and liquid hydrochloric acid are 
those end products that can be used as input material for further industrial application. Wet 
flue-gas treatment requires a wastewater treatment system that is usually designed in a 
closed circuit, therefore imposing no pollution to the environment. 
Also noise and odor can cause unwanted environmental impacts, especially if the MSWC 
plant is located in the vicinity of residential or office areas. Noise can be reduced through 
proper sound isolation of the building and the muffling of ventilator. Appalling odor frequently 
causes sever problems in the immediate surrounding of MSWC plants. To reduce the im-
pacts, the waste receiving could be built in a closed hall where trucks unload the waste into 
the bunker. An atmospheric low-pressure in the waste receiving hall, the waste bunker and 
all other closed buildings leads the air into the primary air system of the firing unit and en-
sures that the odor is not spreading uncontrolled. 
3.3.2 Positive environmental impacts 
It remains common consensus that the waste hierarchy of reduction, re-use and recycling 
should be pursued before the residual waste is treated and finally disposed. In many coun-
tries, MSWC is nowadays recognized as one of the most environmental friendly technologies 
for large-scale residual waste treatment. 
In the recent past, the thermal energy utilization of waste has come into the focus of political 
and technical discussion. The drivers for these developments are (i) the search of alternative 
energy sources as demand for fossil fuel is growing due to rapid economic growth in devel-
oping countries such as VR China or India and (ii) the need to reduce the emission of green-
house gases that are accounted responsible for global warming (IPCC, 2007). 
Empirical studies from different countries have shown that the production of thermal energy 
in MSWC plants reduces the emission of CO2 (Bilitewski & Schirmer, 2006; Thorneloe, 
Weitz, Nishtala, Yarkosky, & Zannes, 2002; UBA, 2002). In Germany it is estimated that 
MSWC will reduce greenhouse gas emissions between 2005 and 2020 by 2.95 Mio. CO2-
equiviants (Dehoust et al., 2005). The total reduction of CO2-emssions is a result of the fossil 
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energy content in the waste26 and has to be calculated in comparison with CO2-emissions 
and fossil carbon content of the substituted energy production (e.g. coal, oil) 
A pre-requisite for these positive environmental effects is a high efficiency of thermal energy 
utilization which depends strongly on the location of the plant and its local circumstances. 
Details on the calculation and comparability of energy efficiency of MSWC plants that are 
required for potential categorizations remain disputed (Beckmann & Scholz, 2007; VDI, 
2006). 
Whether MSWC should be categorized as a renewable form of energy production remains 
disputed in many countries around the world. As compared to other forms of renewable en-
ergy, like wind, photovoltaic or hydro-power, the environmental impacts from MSWC are 
considerably lower (BUWAL, 2005, p. 21). For example in the USA, 23 states regard MSWC 
as renewable energy under various laws and statues (IWSA, 2007a).  
Another important positive environmental effect from MSWC in comparison to other waste 
management options is the reduction of land use. Because the volume of waste is reduced 
by around 90%, much less space is required for landfill site. The land use which can be re-
duced even further if the residues are utilized by other industries, plays a very important role 
in densely populated countries and urban areas.   
3.4 Financial analysis of MSWC plants 
3.4.1 Overview 
The financial analysis of any infrastructure project should be based on all costs and revenues 
being occurred during the life-cycle of a project (Wübbenhorst, 1984)27. 
In order to do so, it is crucial to define the duration of the life-cycle. As compared to infra-
structure projects like roads or harbors that are usually designed to exist indefinitely, MSWC 
plants usually have a rather defined life-cycle at the project development stage. It starts with 
the project planning including the identification of demand and the preparation of a feasibility 
study; and ends with its demolition or dismantling. The machinery equipment of MSWC is 
often designed for an expected operational period of 25 to 30 years. 
In practice, however, it is common that MSWC facilities are not demolished at the end of their 
designed technical life expectancy and will rather get a refurbishment. The refurbishment 
might affect the entire plant or just a separated overhauling of diverse components, such as 
                                                
26 The fossil, i.e. biological, carbon content of municipal waste correlates negatively with the NCV. In 
Germany, it is around 65% for municipal waste with an NCV of 9 MJ/kg (Beckmann, 2007a). 
27 The life-cycle of a project is to be distinguished from an industry life-cycle. For example Stigler 
(1951) exemplifies at the cotton industry, how an industry undergoes different levels of vertical integra-
tion at different life-cycle stages, such as expansionary, mature or declining phase. 
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firing unit, boilers or flue-gas treatment systems. Such refurbishments could also be triggered 
by change in law (e.g. air emission regulation), an adaptation to changed waste composition 
or they could be a measure to accommodate growing or decreasing demand. 
The most important cost and revenue items occurring during the total life-cycle of MSWC 
plants are listed below: 
 
Life-cycle costs Life-cycle revenues 
1. Planning costs 
2. Capital costs 
3. Maintenance costs 
4. Operational costs 
5. Financing costs 
6. Disposal fees 
7. Costs for demolition 
8. Others 
1. Gate fees or availability 
payments 
2. Sale of energy 
3. Sale of recovered materials 
4. Subsidies 
 
Table  3-1: Life-cycle costs and revenues for MSWC plants 
Source: own 
The following figure Figure  3-5 is part of technical guidelines developed by VDI (2002) and 
indicates how the costs for an MSWC plant could be distributed during operation. Other cal-
culations and statistics from Europe show similar numbers (Kaufhold, Kaufmann, & Goe-
decke, 2005; Kaufmann, 2006; RenoSam, 2006).  
 
 
Figure  3-5: Typical life-cycle cost distribution for MSWC  
Source: VDI (2002) 
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A cost structure analysis of all MSWC plants in Germany by Gaube & Weigand (2005) calcu-
lated that fixed capital and fixed operational costs together account for up to 85% of total 
costs (without disposal fees). This high percentage illustrates the importance of plant dimen-
sioning and selection of technology. 
Theoretical calculations by AFEA (2002) and Auksutat & Löffler (1998) for MSWC plants un-
der comparable boundary conditions reveal that the total treatment capacity has the highest 
impact on total life-cycle costs. Therefore, the total life-cycle costs must always be seen in 
relation to the net capacity (actual treatment capacity), which is the product of gross capacity 
and plant availability. It is calculated as: 
[%/100%]ty availabili x [Mg]capacity  gross
[€] costs cycle-life total[€/Mg] costs Unit =  
The net calorific value (NCV) of the delivered waste can differ considerably during operation 
and strongly influences the net capacity of MSWC plant and the generated thermal energy. 
The interdependencies between an NCV, hourly throughput and energy generation are 
shown the combustion performance diagram (See appendix 2 for an example). 
As shown in the following Figure  3-6, unit costs decrease with growing treatment capacity. 
But the effect of decreasing unit costs is declining as well and increase of capacities over 
250.000Mg/a does show only small decreases in average costs. 
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Figure  3-6: Relationship between unit costs and capacity 
Source: own and data from AFEA (2002), Auksutat & Löffler (1998) 
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Formally the production function can be written as: 
C(x) = f(x) with f(x)/d(x) < 0; f(x)/d²(x) < 0 
The comparison of life-cycle costs between different facilities and applied technologies is a 
very difficult and complex task, because they are influenced by various project specific vari-
ables that are changing over time. There has been extensive research on benchmarking 
models for MWC facilities by Przybilla (2002) and Stegmann (2002), and the developed 
methodology can be a useful tool for specific plant owners or operators to identify and com-
pare their comparative strengths and weaknesses. Their applicability, however, as an up-
front decision making tool for optimization of life-cycle costs is very limited due to (i) re-
stricted data availability and (ii) inadequate inclusion of cost changes over time.  
In some countries, there exist standardized procedures for the public sector to calculate the 
occurring costs during the operation of the project. In Germany, the so-called LSP28 includes 
various fixed and variable cost items, including margins and risk premiums.  
The objective of the next chapters is to identify and illustrate the most important categories 
and their variations for life-cycle costs and revenues. 
3.4.2 Elements of life-cycle costs 
3.4.2.1 Planning costs 
The planning processes for MSWC project are very complex and require expertise in various 
fields. The planning costs can account for 2.5% – 6.0% of capital costs (VDI, 2002). Major 
planning activities include project management, planning for technical installations, prepara-
tion and implementation for procedures to obtain necessary permits, preparation and imple-
mentation of tendering procedure, supervision of construction works as well as claim man-
agement (Claus, 2000).  
The cost for preparing and obtaining planning permission largely depends on legal require-
ments and the social acceptance of the project.  The fees for technical, financial and legal 
advisory services can increase dramatically in case of extensive public hearings procedures 
and legal disputes with project opponents. Also the fees charged by the public authorities to 
grant the required permissions are relatively high and can easily sum up to more than €1m 
(Claus, 2000).  
                                                
28 LSP is the German abbreviation for „Leitsätze für die Preisermittlung auf Grund von Selbstkosten“ 
PR 30/53. See also: (Ebisch & Gottschalk, 1994; Winkler, 1999, p. 100) 
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3.4.2.2 Capital costs 
As explained earlier, MSWC plants are large-scale waste treatment facilities that employ so-
phisticated and complex technologies. Like large power plants, they are very capital intensive 
and require solid financing capacities and structures. 
There exist various factors influencing the design and thus the capital costs of an MSWC 
plant. As shown in the following figure Figure  3-7, these influences can be clustered into pro-
ject specific and global factors. Project specific factors are determined individually for every 
single project and differ strongly from case to case. Global factors, however, are given on a 
supra-level and are usually identical to all projects within a country.  
The most important global factors influencing capital costs of MSWC projects are (i) legal 
requirements; (ii) public acceptance of the technology; (iii) macroeconomic situation and (iv) 
competition of suppliers. Within a country, these global factors change rather over a time 
than from project to project. 
The most significant project specific factors determining the capital costs are (Brunner, 2006; 
Rand, Haukohl, & Maxen, 2000a): (i) capacity and waste characteristics; (ii) flue-gas cleaning 
requirements; (iii) energy utilization; (iv) civil works and architecture; (v) redundancy; (vi) local 
site conditions.  
 
Figure  3-7: Factors influencing capital costs 
Source: Own 
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These project specific factors are not independent variables. They are affected by the global 
factors and also influence one another. For example the total capacity of the MSWC plant 
and the characteristics of the treated waste determine the size and design of flue-gas clean-
ing and energy recovery system.  
The capital costs for larger MSWC plants are normally distributed among the following items: 
Components Percentage of total capital costs [%] 
Source (Vaccani, 2007) Manufacturer A Manufacturer B 
Planning/Engineering - 10 – 12 
Firing unit and boiler 20 – 25 18 – 22 
Flue-gas treatment 18 – 22 9 - 12 
45 
Electricity generation 10 – 12 20 - 22 15 
Control and monitoring system 6 – 8 5 – 6  5 
Slag and ash removal systems 4 – 6 - 5 
Balance of plant 4 – 5 8 - 10 10 
Civil structures 18 – 22 17 – 21 20 
Table  3-2: Distribution of capital costs 
Source: Vaccani (2007) and two manufacturers 
The costs for firing unit and boiler together account for the largest share of total capital costs. 
The design capacity (throughput) and waste characteristics (net calorific value, water con-
tent) are the most important factors that influence their design and thus the capital costs. 
The investment costs for flue-gas treatment system depend on the expected flue-gas charac-
teristics and the desired level of emission reduction. Dry flue-gas cleaning systems are less 
capital intensive than semi-wet and wet systems (LUA, 2001).  
Because of the complexities and interactions between the various parts of an MSWC plant, 
examinations of capital costs must either be in the form of sensitivity or scenario analyzes 
(see e.g. AFEA, 2002; Auksutat & Löffler, 1998; Doedens & Kühle-Weidemeier, 2004; Rand, 
Haukohl, & Maxen, 2000b; VDI, 2002). In a sensitivity analysis, individual parameters (e.g. 
design of flue-gas cleaning system) are changed to assess the level of change to the total 
costs. The scenario analysis can be utilized to compare different set of changes among one 
another. 
3.4.2.3 Operating costs 
Operating costs are the costs incurred by running the MSWC plant and they comprise of 
fixed and variable cost elements. Fixed costs occur independently of the operational per-
formance whereas variable costs represent expenses that strongly correlate with the actual 
quantity and quality of treated waste.  
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Labor and administrative costs are usually fixed and together they account for a large por-
tion of operational costs. The salaries depend strongly on national and local levels, as well 
as on additional surcharges for shift works, weekends and holidays. Even if the MSWC plant 
runs at low capacity, there is little flexibility in labor costs, because the facilities must run 
continuously 24 hours per day and 7 days per week. 
The operating costs for the flue-gas treatment system include costs for chemicals and filters. 
They are mostly variable operating costs, because their consumption largely depends on the 
volume and load of -as. Operating costs for dry flue-gas cleaning systems are higher than 
for wet systems, due to higher costs for filter bags. 
Usually there are no direct costs incurred for electricity required for the machinery, especially 
for the flue-gas treatment system and buildings because the electricity is mostly taken from 
its own generation. The amount of electricity used, however, has an indirect financial impact 
as it affects the revenues from sale of excess quantities. 
The cost for fuel that is required during start-up and shuot down of the plant also adds up to 
the operational costs. In case the net calorific value of waste is too low29, an additional fuel 
has to be added permanently during operation to ensure minimum temperatures in the com-
bustion chamber, thus substantially increasing the variable operational costs. 
3.4.2.4 Maintenance costs 
The equipment and buildings of the MSWC plants require frequent maintenance. Whether 
the maintenance is done by own personal or subcontractor depends on strategic considera-
tions of the operator which might be influenced by the plant size, technical experience and 
the possibility of sharing maintenance resources among several facilities operated.  
Smaller maintenance is usually done twice per year for 48 to 96 hours, whereas once a year 
a larger maintenance interruption is scheduled up to 500 hours. During the initial guarantee 
period, which is usually agreed between 16.000 and 32.000 hours, maintenance must be 
done by the suppliers as part of their contractual obligations. 
The calculation of maintenance costs should not only consider the cost for technical works, 
but it must also incorporate the opportunity costs for not operating the plant. These are pri-
marily the costs for balling and storing the waste that is continuously delivered on the basis 
of long-term contracts. Also revenues will be lost by not offering excess capacities on the 
spot market and not selling generated energy. 
                                                
29 Lower than 7,000 kJ/kg 
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3.4.2.5 Costs for disposal of residues 
Major residues from the combustion processes that must normally be disposed off at a 
charge are (i) the slag (bottom ash); the (ii) fly ash; (iii) flue-gas cleaning residues.  
The weight of slag amounts to approximately 25 to 30% of the combusted waste and the 
volume is reduced to 5-10% of its original baseline. Considering these large amounts, the 
costs for disposing the slag have a significant impact on life-cycle costs. These costs are 
mostly variable, since quantities depend on actual throughput. 
There exist two options for handling the slag. In the first option, which is mostly commonly 
applied (Krass et al., 2004), a specialized external company takes the residual slag from the 
MSWC plant and charges a fee that is lower than the tipping fees at landfill sites. This com-
pany then extracts ferrous and non-ferrous metals in its own facility, imposes further treat-
ment and markets the material. The fees depend greatly on the price of scrap metal (see 
appendix 1 for change of prices since 2002), the quality of slag and the existence of a market 
for utilization of the slag as construction material or other purposes30. 
In the second option, the MSWC plant owns and operates its own slag treatment facility for 
the recovery of marketable recourses and possible further treatment of slag. In this case, the 
operator must search for ways of utilizing and disposing the residual slag. Currently, the slag 
has a negative market value and a fee must be paid to the recipient.  
Fly ash from the boiler, electrostatic precipitator or filter system amounts for approximately 
two to three percent of the original waste weight. Due to the content of minerals and heavy 
metal, a utilization or recycling is very difficult and the fly ash is almost exclusively disposed 
in special landfill sites or as a filling material in underground mines (Rand et al., 2000b). The 
fees for disposal of fly ash are much higher than for residual slag. 
Many countries such as United Kingdom or Denmark impose a landfill tax. They were initially 
introduced to stimulate recycling schemes at times when all municipal waste was disposed in 
landfill sites without prior treatment. Because in most countries the landfill tax continues to 
exist even if the treatment of waste is legally required, it increases total variable operating 
cost if the slag or other residues are disposed in landfill sites. 
3.4.2.6 Financing costs 
As shown above, MSWC plants are very capital intensive and even at medium size easily 
reach investment costs of more than 100m Euros. Therefore the sources of funding and con-
sequently the financing costs are of utmost importance to total life-cycle costs. 
                                                
30 Currently, many landfill sites are closed in the EU and the slag can be used as a cheap material for 
surface sealing or for strengthening of roads on the landfill site. 
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The available sources of funding depend on the institutional arrangement (see chapter 6) 
and could include bank loans, off-balance sheet project finance, forfeiting, municipal bonds 
or leasing.  
The financing costs depend on the financing structure and consist of debt payback, interest 
payments, bridge funding costs, arrangement fees and commitment fees. 
3.4.2.7 Other costs 
In addition to the costs described above, life-cycle costs also include (i) land lease fee or 
land acquisition; (ii) insurances; (iii) fees for public authorities; (iv) general business taxes. 
3.4.3 Revenues 
3.4.3.1 Gate fees 
The gate fee is the charge to be paid by the customers (waste generator) for treating the de-
livered waste at the MSWC plant. In most MSWC markets they account for the largest share 
of total revenues.  
Plant operators often strongly rely on long-term contracts with public or private customers. 
These contracts have a duration of at least five years and often include a spectrum of waste 
treatment quantities with minimum guaranteed waste deliveries as well as a maximum avail-
able capacity for off-take. Usually, a baseline for the gate fee and a price escalation mecha-
nism are fixed for the entire contractual period. The baseline is often identical to the gate fee 
at the beginning of the contractual period, whereas the price escalation mechanism defines 
adjustments to the gate fee and could relate to unforeseen price changes such as change in 
inflation, consumer price indexes, financing costs (e.g. EURIBOR), energy prices, waste 
characteristics, labor costs or others. These price escalation mechanisms can be either very 
simple with only a single key indicator or they can be very complex on the basis of an exten-
sive mathematical formula with various indicators.  Because of their large time horizon, gate 
fees in long-term contracts often do not reflect actual market conditions governed by supply 
and demand. Therefore the gate fees in long-term contract can divert positively and nega-
tively from actual market prices. 
In comparison with long-term contracts, short-term contracts are usually agreed with a fixed 
price and without price escalation mechanisms. The prices are more likely to reflect market 
conditions of which available spare capacities in the market are most significant. 
Price differentiation (also: price discrimination) is commonly applied to the market for MSWC 
and describes the fact that the same production or service, i.e. the combustion of waste, is 
sold at different prices in the market. Reasons for price differentiation are different competi-
tive situation, waste treatment quantities, different contract durations as well as costumer 
relationships. 
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3.4.3.2 Energy revenues 
As compared to other waste treatment technologies, energy production in MSWC plants is 
relatively expensive and revenues, other than derived from electricity, depend strongly on the 
existence of local markets for thermal products such as process steam or heating water 
(Murphy & McKeogh, 2004). 
There exist various possibilities to sell generated energy. Process steam or heating water are 
usually sold on the basis of long-term contracts to local industrial off-takers or operators of 
the district heating systems. Similar to long-term waste treatment contracts, these contracts 
can be based on complex price escalation mechanisms. 
From a technical point of view, the transmission of electrical energy is less restricted than 
steam or heated water. As such, there are much more options for sale of electricity if the en-
ergy market is liberalized. Besides long-term contracts with individual companies, electricity 
could be sold on spot, future or option markets that are traded on platforms provided by en-
ergy exchanges (see e.g. EEX, 2007).  
In recent years, the energy prices have increased significantly (see appendix 1 for change of 
electricity prices since 2002). At the same time the price level has also fluctuated more 
strongly and as a result the risks and opportunities have increased in the market. Depending 
on their risk acceptance, operators of the MSWC might prefer a mixture of contracts and sign 
long-term agreements for a larger share of generated electricity and sell the remaining share 
on the market. Such structures also have the advantage of more flexibility with respect to 
quantities of generated electricity that change frequently depending on the operational per-
formances of the MSWC plant. 
In countries, where energy from the MSWC is legally classified as renewable energy, regula-
tory schemes might be in place to guarantee minimum prices level for energy sale. In these 
cases, operators often sign long-term energy sale contracts with net providers with prices 
above market level (see case studies from USA). The revenues from energy sale might thus 
even become the most important share of total revenues. 
3.4.3.3 Sale of recovered materials 
The MSWC plant can extract ferrous and non-ferrous metals from the slag if it owns and op-
erates a slag treatment facility (see also chapter  3.4.2.5). Revenues from the sale of scrap 
metal correlate powerfully with world market prices for raw materials and prices can fluctuate 
tremendously (see appendix 2 for change of prices since 2002). 
Depending on the applied technology, marketable products, such as hydrochloric acid or 
gypsum, can be retrieved from the flue-gas treatment system. Quantities, however, of these 
products are rather low, so that the total revenues from their sale are marginal in comparison 
to other cost and revenue items. 
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3.4.3.4 Subsidies 
Many infrastructure projects, independent of the institutional arrangement, receive direct or 
indirect subsidies for capital investments or for operational expenditures and are usually 
granted to pursue political objectives. Direct subsidies are payments to the project owners, 
usually in the form of cash, whereas indirect subsidies are given as tax exemptions, lower 
interest rates, guaranties or other public support affecting the project in a positive financial 
way.  
Case studies from various countries31 show, that MSWC plants have often received direct or 
indirect subsidies. These subsidies were often given to encourage improved emission reduc-
tion, advanced resource recovery or efficient energy utilization (see e.g. (Amsterdam, 2006). 
In many cases, this financial support has been a decisive source of funding and without the 
direct or indirect subsidies some MSWC projects would not have been bankable (see e.g. 
EIB, 2002). 
3.4.3.5 Availability payments  
Every MSWC plant must interrupt operations for scheduled or unscheduled maintenance 
work, during which no waste can be treated. The total period of interruptions is comparatively 
extensive, because the ramp-up and shut-down of the plant consumes additional time. The 
availability describes to what extend an MSWC plant is working according to the defined 
technical specifications. The availability can be calculated as the total annual net capacity or 
as a daily average net capacity and must be put in relationship to waste characteristics 
(mainly NCV). Through various measures, the availability of an MSWC can be maximized 
and modern MSWC plants achieve an average operational availability of up to 92% - 95%. 
Payments that are based on the net capacity of the MSWC plant are the so-called availability 
payments. Here the operator receives a fixed payment based on the actual availability of 
treatment capacities that is independent of the actually amount of treated waste. Other op-
erational values, such as energy efficiency rates or emissions could also be included in the 
compensation mechanisms. The payments are usually connected with a bonus-malus-
system to reflect reduced or increase availability. Price adjustment mechanisms can be 
agreed upon to reflect changes in various cost items (e.g. operational material).  
The advantage of this payment model is that the demand risk, which the operator often can-
not influence, is carried by the client, which is usually by public sector. 
Even though availability payments are common methods for compensations in PPP road 
projects (Alfen, Elbing, & Leupold, 2005), they have found few application projects for the 
                                                
31 In Japan MSWC plants, like all other infrastructure in this country, receive subsidies from the central 
government (Kleiss & Imura, 2006). 
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MSWC project with total life-cycle integration. A case study from Singapore, where this pay-
ment model is applied, is presented in chapter  7.4. 
3.4.3.6 Discussion 
As elaborated in the previous chapters, innumerable complex factors have an impact on the 
costs and revenues of an MSWC plant. As shown in the following Figure  3-8, capital invest-
ments, operational costs and revenues are directly interlinked with one another.  
 
Figure  3-8: Leverage of capital costs, operational costs and revenues 
Source: own 
In practice, the optimization between capital investments, operational costs and revenues 
require experience over a long period of time throughout all life-cycle phases and across di-
verse MSWC plants that use different technologies and operational strategies. The following 
list gives a glimpse of important interrelationships: 
1. Capital investment vs. maintenance costs: For example, more costly materials for boiler 
or grate system might result in a reduction of operational/maintenance costs or in an in-
crease of plant availability, vice versa. 
2. Flue-gas cleaning system: While older calculations strongly favor a dry flue-gas cleaning 
system over a wet and semi-wet system, experience of the MSWC operators suggest 
that wet systems might have lower total life-cycle costs if high volumes of flue-gas with 
high pollution content (e.g. chlorine) must be treated. 
3. Energy efficiency vs. capacity: If the operation is optimized to maximize the capacity, i.e. 
throughput, then the energy efficiency rate is below its maximum. Therefore possible 
higher revenues from gate fees must be leverage against lower revenues from energy 
sale. 
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4. Location: The location of an MSWC plant close to an urban area can reduce transporta-
tion costs and can possibly allow the connection to a central heating system city, thus in-
creasing energy efficiency (Beckmann, 2007b). Such a location, however, might increase 
costs and time during the permission procedures (due to increased public objections). Of-
ten additional investments for changes in the architectural design or flue-gas treatment 
system might be required, even though they are not justified from a technically objective 
point of view. 
5. Slag disposal vs. capacity: The costs for disposal of slag depend on its quality (e.g. or-
ganic content). An increase of throughput, i.e. net capacity, can be achieved by reducing 
the time for waste travelling on the grate. This measure, however, reduces the quality of 
the slag. 
6. Capital investments vs. recyclable revenues: Investment on facilities to extract recycla-
bles should justify the achievable revenues from the sale. 
7. Availability and redundancy: A high availability rate of the facility requires higher invest-
ments in redundant electronic and machinery components. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter presented a brief overview of the technical and economic aspects of MSWC. 
The most important components of a typical MSWC plant are waste receiving and charging 
facilities, firing unit, energy recovery, flue-gas cleaning, emission control and monitoring sys-
tem and auxiliary facilities. Depending on the project specific design requirements, various 
combinations of these different components are applicable. 
Even though the MSWC considerably decreases the negative environmental impacts of re-
sidual waste, it can be a potential source of negative environmental impacts by itself. How-
ever, due to improved technological development, most negative impacts are reduced to a 
minimum at the state-of-the-art MSWC plants. E.g. in Germany, dioxin emissions from 
MSWC are nowadays negligible. On the other hand, MSWC provides also additional positive 
environmental impacts which include reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and a reduction 
in land use.  
The financial analysis of the MSWC infrastructure assessed the costs and revenues that oc-
cur through the life-cycle. It was shown that capital investments are by far the largest share 
of total life-cycle costs for the MSWC plants and that they are influenced by various global 
and project specific factors. Other costs include planning, operation, maintenance, residual 
disposal and financing costs. The gate fees that are received for waste treatment are the 
most important share of the total life-cycle revenues, which also include income from energy 
generation, sale of recovered materials or subsidies.  
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4 Market specific aspects of MSWC 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 The model of perfect competition 
The theory of paretian welfare economics (also: new welfare economics) is a widely ac-
cepted framework that uses various microeconomic instruments to analyze how social wel-
fare is to be maximized. A central objective of paretian welfare economics is the achievement 
of Pareto efficiency32 which describes a situation as optimal if no individuals can be made 
better off without making someone else worse off. If this condition is fulfilled, then all goods 
and resources are distributed within the economy to those individuals who derive the biggest 
utility from them (Feldman & Serrano, 2006). 
Economists believe that the model of perfect competition leads to a Pareto efficient outcome 
and therefore many economists choose this model as their principle foundation of economic 
theory and analysis (Fritsch, Wein, & Ewers, 2003, p. 26).  The model of perfect competition 
is characterized by a number of extreme conditions and assumptions (Hernberg, 1986, p. 
299): 
1. A very large number of small producers and consumers are acting in an atomistic market 
where no individual producer or consumer can influence prices. The supply is determined 
by the production cost function and the demand is determined by the utility function of 
consumers.  
2. All goods and production factors can be divided into any small number without techno-
logical or other restrictions. 
3. All consumers want to maximize their utility, whereas producers want to maximize their 
profits33. 
4. All goods are homogeneous and can therefore substitute one another. 
5. The market is totally transparent and all participants receive complete and costless in-
formation about all goods and prices. 
6. All costs of individual consumption or production are included in the transaction proc-
esses, i.e. there exist no technical externalities. All transactions are done voluntarily. 
7. Changes in demand or supply of goods will immediately lead to new market equilibrium 
without delay. 
                                                
32 This concept was developed by and named after the Italian engineer and economist V. F. Pareto 
[1848-1923]  
33 It must be noted that profits of producers are zero in the model of perfect competition because at 
market equilibrium the market price equals marginal costs of production. 
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Similar to every model, the concept of perfect competition as the standard model for eco-
nomic analysis has its limitations. It is, however, a suitable starting point for elaborating the 
principles of price determination from which further analysis can emanate (Makowski & Os-
troy, 2001). 
It is important to distinguish two aspects of social welfare: economic efficiency and the distri-
bution of income. Economic efficiency is concerned with the allocation of goods and re-
sources whereas the distribution of income deals with the way the goods and resources are 
distributed among individuals. A Pareto efficient allocation of resources does not necessarily 
require that the income is distributed more or less equally among market participants. 
The desirable distribution of income depends on various normative preferences that are in-
fluenced by individual norms, beliefs and culture. In the context of this research, the effects 
of institutional arrangements for the MSWC infrastructure on the distribution of individual in-
comes play only a subordinated role34. It can be constituted that the waste management in 
general and especially the MSWC, is not a suitable object to influence the distribution of in-
come among individuals within the society according to given normative targets. Rather the 
most efficient provision of the MSWC infrastructure should become the central focus of 
analysis. 
4.1.2 The Problem of market failure  
As explained in the previous chapter, perfect competition in the market would lead to a 
Pareto efficient allocation of goods and resources in the economy. In reality, however, the 
requirements for perfect competition are often not met or limited due to social and techno-
logical constraints. Deviation from the various conditions for perfect competition can lead to 
distortions of the market which fails to produce an efficient allocation of resources (Mankiw, 
2004, p. 99). 
Economic theory discusses mainly four phenomena of market failures (see e.g. Fritsch et al., 
2003; Stiglitz, 2000). These are: 
1. Natural monopolies: due to a subadditive production function and non-contestability, ag-
gregate production costs are lowest if only one producer satisfies total market demand. 
2. Externalities: not all costs or benefits of a transaction are borne by the contractual parties 
directly involved. 
3. Information failures: producers and consumers do not possess equal or all necessary 
information about prices, utilities or relevant future developments. 
4. Inadequate market adaptation: the market equilibrium of supply and demand either does 
not exist, is unstable or fails to adapt adequately to changes. 
                                                
34 This aspect will be taken up at the analysis of stakeholders. See chapter  5.5. 
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The following sub-chapters analyze the causes and implications of these deviations from the 
model of perfect competition and apply them to the MSWC infrastructure. Further, the dis-
cussion incorporates an identification of and elaboration on measures to solve the problems 
associated with each form of market failure. As it will be shown, these different forms of mar-
ket failures are often interrelated and can be based on similar causes. 
The so-called public goods are frequently added to the list of market failures, referring to 
goods for which the unregulated market fails to produce the optimum output, because con-
sumers do not reveal their right preferences due to non-rivalry and non-excludability of con-
sumption. As Fritsch et. al (2003, p. 354) elucidate, public goods are merely a special form of 
positive externalities and therefore do not need to be analyzed separately. 
The phenomena of macroeconomic disturbances, such as unemployment, inflation and dis-
equilibrium, that Stiglitz (2000, p. 85) also groups as a form of market failure is not discussed 
here, because they are concerned only with macroeconomic issues that have little relevance 
to physical infrastructure provision of the MSWC. 
The analysis of market failures is an appropriate tool to identify the normative functions and 
limitations of the state in the economy (Mühlenkamp, 2002). Many fundamentals are based 
on microeconomic theory. 
4.1.3 Constraints of market failure concept 
There exists also some criticism against the theory of market failure and its suitability as an 
economic model for analysis. One rejection is derived from the claim that different forms of 
market failures are ubiquitous and that the theory of market failure itself is merely a failure of 
the theoretical model of perfect competition. Even though this argument is very strong, it 
must be admitted that the methodological strength and logical persuasiveness of starting with 
Pareto optimality under conditions of perfect competition and elaborating on the deviations 
as well as their impacts, is very powerful. So far, no serious alternatives have evolved and 
therefore the application of the market failure concept as one tool for economic analysis is 
justified35.  
There exist two more causes of serious reasons concern while applying the concept of mar-
ket failure. The first one was presented e.g. by Zerbe & McCurdy (1999) who argue that the 
conceptual shortcoming of the market failure theory is the negligence of the transaction 
                                                
35 One complementary school of theory is New Institutional Economics, whose roots are derived from 
microeconomic analysis. This theory, especially transaction cost economics, will be dealt with in the 
next chapter. 
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costs, which they identify as the major reason for imperfect competition36. It is argued that 
technical externalities, natural monopolies and information asymmetries are several types of 
externalities that reflect monetary effects not taken into the account by market participants as 
part of the production functions or utility functions. The reason is that in these cases the net 
value of externalities might be lower than the transaction costs associated with their inclusion 
into the decision making process. 
The second criticism to the market failure concept is not related to its analytical approach 
itself, but rather to the conclusions and implications drawn from it. As criticized for instance 
by Nelson (1987), many economists and especially policy makers use the occurrence of 
market failures automatically as a justification for governmental intervention. However, as 
explained by Mühlenkamp (2002), further conditions, in addition to the existence of a market 
failure, must be fulfilled for right actions of the government or the public sector to improve 
economic efficiency. First, the public sector must possess suitable means or instruments to 
overcome the particular problem of market failure and second, it must also be willing to im-
plement these instruments. These conditions, however, are again related to the transaction 
cost problem, because from an economic point of view, interventions from the public sector 
only lead to a Pareto optimum if all transaction costs associated with the interventions are 
lower than the benefits of improved allocation of goods. 
Both these constraints of the market failure concept, i.e. the transaction cost problem and the 
following limitations of government intervention to overcome the negative impacts of market 
failures must be taken very seriously. Therefore, both of them are incorporated into the theo-
retical framework for institutional arrangements in chapter  5. 
4.2 Natural monopolies 
4.2.1 Characteristics of natural monopolies 
The model of perfect competition assumes that all goods and production factors can be di-
vided into any small number. Technical restrictions, however, often constrain this assumption 
and in extreme situations, goods or production functions might not be dividable at all37. As a 
result of such indivisibilities the so-called natural monopoly might develop, which means that 
a single producer is able to produce at the lowest costs (Fritsch et al., 2003, p. 179).  
Baumol (1977) was the first to elaborate that a strict and global subadditivity of the produc-
tion cost function is the only and sufficient requirement for the development of a natural mo-
                                                
36 A very simplified definition describes transaction costs as the recourses required for exchanging 
goods. A more detailed definition and discussion of transaction costs is given in chapter  5.3.  
37 Examples can be found in network industries, such as gas pipelines, telecom networks, etc. 
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nopoly. Defined in a formal mathematical way, the cost function C(y) is subadditive if for any 
output vector y1,…,ym there is 
C(y1+…+ym) < C(y1) + C(y2) + … + C(ym). 
In other words, subadditivity exists if the aggregated costs for the separated production of 
goods are higher than the costs of production of all goods by a single producer. This defini-
tion for subadditivity of production costs is identical to the definition of natural monopolies. 
Decreasing average costs or economies of scale38, that many studies on microeconomic 
theory (Stiglitz, 2000, p. 191; Varian, 1996, pp. 416-421) present as sufficient reasons for the 
occurrence of natural monopolies are implied in the concept of subadditivity. Both are suffi-
cient, but not required for subadditivity. The following Figure  4-1 illustrates the deficiency 
problem in natural monopolies with monotonic decreasing of average production costs: 
 
Figure  4-1: Deficiency problem with decreasing average costs  
Source: (Fritsch et al., 2003, pp. 192-195) 
The development of a natural monopoly implies the deviation from another assumption of the 
perfect competition model of an atomistic market structure. Because now only one producer 
                                                
38 According to Baumol (1977) decreasing average costs occur if: C(vy1,…,vyn)/v < C(wy1,…,wym)/w 
with v>w and for a given output vector: y1+ … +yn  
Economies of scale are present for any input-output vector (x1,…,xr;y1,…,yn) where there exits an-
other input-output vector with (wx1,…,wxr;v1y1,…,vnyn) with w>1 and all vi ≥ w + δ, δ > 0  
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satisfies the demand of a large number of consumers, it is not a price-taker anymore, it can 
influence the prices itself. 
In the model of perfect competition, the goods are offered and produced at the price of mar-
ginal costs. In a natural monopoly, however, such a condition would cause a deficit because 
marginal costs are always below the average costs (see hatched area in Figure  4-1). To pre-
vent such losses, a natural monopolist could easily increase prices from marginal costs (PMC) 
to average costs (PAC), where he would make no profit or losses39.  
However, a natural monopolist, like every other monopolist, would be motivated to increase 
the prices even further to the profit maximizing Cournot-price where marginal revenues equal 
marginal costs (Cournot, 1938).  From a welfare economic point of view, this situation is not 
optimal, because a welfare loss with the value of the amount EAC exists (Figure 4-1, Fritsch 
et al., 2003, p. 195).  
Another negative effect of the production in a natural monopoly is an increased and long-
term survival of the so-called X-inefficiencies40. According to Leibenstein (1966) such X-
inefficiencies are the result of non-minimization of production costs and exist with different 
peculiarities in most industries and markets. In natural monopolies these X-inefficiencies can 
survive, whereas in competitive markets producers with higher X-inefficiencies would be 
pushed out by competitors in the long run. 
A further disadvantage associated with the lack of competition in natural monopolies is that 
there exists limited motivation for product or service improvements. There are still incentives 
to develop innovations that increase profits due to lower production costs, but they are not as 
essential for survival as they are in competitive markets (Posner, 1969).  
4.2.2 Measures for natural monopolies 
As explained earlier, natural monopolies can result in a welfare loss if the producer is able to 
set prices above average costs. But whether a monopolist is really able to enforce such 
prices depends on the contestability of the market. The model of contestable markets was 
developed by Baumol, Panzer & Willig (1982) who elaborated that the irreversible part of the 
market entry costs that are lost when exiting the same market, are decisive for the price set-
ting power of a monopolist. These irreversible costs are called sunk costs and must not be 
mixed up with fixed costs, because often the assets that are part of fixed costs can be sold at 
market exit41. 
                                                
39 It is important to remember that in microeconomics, return on equity is part of the production costs. 
40 The model of X-efficiencies or X-inefficiencies is concerned with production costs within a firm and 
must not be mixed up with the concept of efficient allocating of good and resource within a market. 
41 See also asset specificity later in chapter  5.3.2.1. 
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In a perfectly contestable market there are no cost discriminations against new entrants and 
any profit earned by the incumbent would motivate a competitor to enter the market. The 
phenomenon is also transferable to perfectly contestable natural monopolies:  in a contest-
able natural monopoly there would not exist any economic profits nor any X-inefficiencies in 
production, and the price for the goods would equal average costs.  
In reality, however, markets are often not fully contestable and market barriers exist for new 
entrants. These market barriers depend largely not only on sunk costs but also on access to 
suppliers and resources, availability of technology and knowledge (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 
1988, p. 290; Fritsch et al., 2003, p. 204).  
The question whether to intervene exogenously into a natural market to prevent monopoly 
price settings as well as the creation and survival of X-inefficiencies therefore strongly de-
pends on the contestability of the market. As a general conclusion, it can be claimed that an 
exogenous intervention into the market should only be considered if both subadditivity and 
high sunk costs exist together. 
There exist different measures to overcome or reduce the explained problems associated 
with natural monopolies.  If it is impossible to reduce the subadditivity of production costs or 
to increase the contestability of market, the most promising measures will be (Fritsch et al., 
2003): 
1. Price regulation, 
2. Timely limited auctioning of monopoly, and 
3. Public monopoly production. 
Examples of price regulation include direct price setting, rate of return regulation or price-cap 
regulation. It might also be possible to oblige the natural monopolist to set prices at marginal 
costs and pay subsidies for compensating losses (Stiglitz, 2000, p. 195). A major problem for 
effective price regulation is the lack of information about the production costs of the monopo-
lies. Whether it is possible to get access to correct information decides upon the success of 
such measures (Fritsch et al., 2003, pp. 227-239). 
Granting the monopoly for a limited period of time to a private firm in an auction is also often 
suggested for regulation of natural monopolies. In these so-called monopoly franchises, a 
competition among private companies is implemented and the right to produce the monopoly 
goods is granted to the bidder with the highest price (Riordan & Sappington, 1987). The du-
ration of the franchise should be aligned with the required sunk costs to ensure their pay-
back. 
In addition to a regulated or timely limited private monopoly, Mühlenkamp (2002) also elabo-
rated the possibility of a public company producing the monopoly goods. The public company 
would then be obliged to offer the goods at a price equal to average production costs without 
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making profit. A major disadvantage of public monopoly production might be that public com-
panies tend to have higher production costs in comparison to private companies. Stiglitz 
(2000, pp. 200-202) explains that lower incentives and higher restrictions at individual and 
organizational levels are the causes for such X-inefficiencies in public companies, even 
though many exceptions do exist.    
A comparison of price setting in an unregulated private monopoly in the Cournot-point with 
the price settings in a public monopoly at average costs is exemplified in the following Figure 
 4-2.  If a public producer made no profits, he would offer more goods for a lower price, al-
though his average production costs were higher than that of a private monopolist. In reality 
however, it is questionable whether public companies also would not have incentives to 
abuse their monopolistic power to gain profits, which in turn could be used for cross-
subsidizing other loss making public services and infrastructure (e.g. public transportation).  
 
Figure  4-2: Pricing in unregulated private monopoly and profit-free public monopoly  
Source: (after Mühlenkamp, 2002) 
Mühlenkamp (2002) concludes that from a welfare perspective, both a regulated private mo-
nopoly and the public monopoly are better choices than an unregulated private monopoly. 
However, neither option has a decisive advantage over others to overcome the explained 
problems.  
Another important aspect to reduce welfare losses is to prevent the monopolist abusing his 
market power onto upstream or downstream activities that are in direct connection to the 
product, for which cost subadditivity and market barriers exist. The monopolist could extend 
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his power either by (i) setting of predatory prices in the up- or downstream markets that are 
subsidized by the monopolies’ profit or by (ii) exacerbating the access for up- or downstream 
competitors to the monopoly goods, the so-called essential facility (Bolton, Brodley, & 
Riordan, 2000; Eckert, 2002; Gómez-Ibáñez, 2006). On the other hand, such bundling of the 
essential facility with connected markets could also create synergies that reduce production 
costs. The extent to which a monopolist can abuse his power, depends strongly on the con-
testability of the up- and downstream markets. 
Some economists, particularly the representatives of the ‘Chicago School’, express strong 
criticism against regulatory measures for natural monopolies. They argue that regulation of-
ten lacks the necessary information, that it is ill-directed through influential interest groups, 
and that it reduces incentives for efficient production. Regulatory failures that overweight the 
effects of the addressed market failures might be the result and could altogether cause more 
damage than good (Demsetz, 1968; Gaube, 2006; Ross, 2004). 
4.2.3 Application to the MSWC 
To identify the existence of natural monopolies in the MSWC infrastructure, it is necessary to 
look first at specific production functions of the MSWC plants. Based on empirical data it is 
shown in chapter  3.4, that the production functions of the MSWC plants are subadditive. Ma-
jor reasons are the decreasing investment costs per capacity that show discontinuity only at 
the point where a new firing unit is added to a plant. Therefore, the production function has 
no continuously decreasing average costs or decreasing marginal costs, but global subaddi-
tivity that is a sufficient evidence for the existence of a natural monopoly. To simplify further 
analysis, monotonously decreasing costs are assumed. 
Up to this point, only the internal production costs for the MSWC were considered without 
looking at all the costs that are part of the waste management value system (see chapter 
 2.3). The inclusion of all these costs, however, is necessary in order to figure out whether the 
natural monopoly encroaches in connection with the MSWC.  
The major cost elements (activities) of the value system that are not included in the internal 
production functions of the MSWC are the costs for (i) waste collection; (ii) waste transfer; 
(iii) waste transportation; (iv) residual disposal (see chapter  2.3 and  3.4). Thereof, the waste 
transportation costs are the most significant42. The costs for waste collection and combustion 
residual disposal (incl. combustion residual transportation) can be assumed as constant and 
therefore do not have a direct impact on the subadditivity of the local natural monopoly of an 
                                                
42 Among theorists it remains disputed whether transportation costs are part of production (transforma-
tion) cost or whether they should be treated as transaction costs (Blum, Dudley, Leibbrand, & Weiske, 
2005, p. 57). 
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MSWC plant. These assumptions are realistic because waste collection costs depend largely 
on the density of waste generation and not on the distance between waste generation source 
and the MSWC plant. Therefore, only waste transportation costs per unit increase with total 
treatment quantity (i.e. used capacity of MSWC plant), because the collected waste has to be 
transported within an increased catchment area. 
The waste transportation costs mainly depend on the distance between waste generation 
and the MSWC plant as well as on the unit costs that are different for specific transportation 
modes, such as roads, railways or inland waterways. The usage of waste transfer stations 
and optimization of logistic systems can effectively reduce waste transportation costs. Nowa-
days, most of the waste is transported by trucks to the MSWC plants  (see chapter  2.3.3). 
The share of transportation costs in relation to total costs grows monotonously with increas-
ing distance from the waste generation source to the location of the MSWC plants. The fol-
lowing Figure  4-3 shows how total costs are affected in case of high transportation costs:  
 
Figure  4-3: Local natural monopoly for the MSWC with high transportation costs 
Source: own 
It obvious that starting from point Xopt, the marginal transportation costs exceed the subaddi-
tive effects of waste combustion costs and that the sum of costs for transportation and com-
bustion starts to increase again. The result is a local natural monopoly, the size of which is 
not only dependent on the production costs of the MSWC but also on the cost function of the 
waste transportation to the MSWC plant. In cases of high transportation costs the geographic 
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location of the MSWC plant will thus become increasingly important43. Because the transpor-
tation costs are expected to rise in the future (mainly due to higher fuel prices and toll fees), 
their impact on the total cost function will gain importance44. 
In reality, the MSWC plants are often located relatively close to one another. As shown in the 
following Figure  4-4 for the MSWC plant in Zorbau (see also case study in chapter  6.3.8) an 
intensive competition among facilities is likely to take place because of its geographical vicin-
ity to multiple plants. 
 
Figure  4-4: Nearest competitors to the MSWC plant Zorbau  
Source: own, distances from http://maps.google.de  
Depending on local circumstances, most importantly, the population density and available 
transportation infrastructure to the MSWC plant, the size of a local natural monopoly can still 
be very large. In extreme cases (such as large and densely populated areas), the transporta-
tion costs do not lead to suppression of subadditivity in the total cost function. As shown in 
the following Figure  4-5, in such cases the economies of scale can be exploited over the en-
tire cost function and a natural monopoly exists without spatial limitations. The result is an 
extended natural monopoly. However, technical restrictions limited the maximum size of 
                                                
43 Spatial competition and the economics of location are a separate field of research and are analyzed 
in more depth as part of the industrial economics (Blum et al., 2005, pp. 99-138; Tirole, 2003, pp. 279-
287) 
44 The calculation of transportation costs and their impact on determining optimum size of the MSWC 
plant can be found for a simple hypothetical case study in Höhr (1988). 
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MSWC plants (see chapter  3.2) and therefore also an extended natural monopoly has a 
maximum technical size. 
 
Figure  4-5: Extended natural monopoly for the MSWC with low transportation costs 
Source: own 
In both cases of a local or an extended natural monopoly, the attention must now be drawn 
to the contestability of the MSWC market to analyze whether a monopolist is able to abuse 
his potential market power. 
In larger metropolitan areas (e.g. megacities with more than five to ten million inhabitants), 
technical restrictions limit exploitations of economies of scale in a single MSWC plant (see 
chapter  3.2). Here, several MSWC plants would be required to meet the demand for thermal 
waste treatment and they are often built at diverse places to further reduce transportation 
costs and to have separated access points to district heating systems. If MSWC were owned 
by different parties, they could compete with one another and therefore monopoly pricing 
would be impossible. If these MSWC plants were owned by one company, the described 
regulative measures might be required. 
Apart from any legal restrictions45, the most important market entry barriers that limit the con-
testability of a natural monopoly are high sunk costs. As shown in chapter  3.4.2, the devel-
opment and construction of the MSWC plants require large capital investments and it is very 
difficult to use all the assets or a share of it in another market (e.g. coal firing power plant). 
Also the costs for planning and obtaining the required permission form a large share of sunk 
                                                
45 Possible justifications of legal restrictions are elaborated in the next chapter. 
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costs. Therefore, it has to be constituted that a large portion of the investments are sunk in 
case a firm wants to leave the market for MSWC. 
The classification of the MSWC including transportation costs in relation to sunk cost and 
subadditivity is shown in the following Figure  4-6: 
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Figure  4-6: Sunk costs and subadditivity in the municipal waste management sector  
Source: (after Fritsch et al., 2003) 
As a result of the analysis, it can be constituted that the MSWC infrastructure has the charac-
teristics of a natural monopoly with a limited geographic extension depending on transporta-
tion cost characteristics as well as with a limited contestability due to high sunk costs. 
Whether regulative measures might be required to prevent Cournot pricing cannot be dis-
puted and depends on the described local circumstances. Any regulative measures must 
take into account the spatial extension of the local natural monopoly and also local modes of 
transportation. Furthermore, they should be implemented very carefully to ensure that nega-
tive impacts of regulation do not offset the anticipated welfare gains.  
Additionally, it must also be noted that Cournot pricing is usually limited in the MSWC market 
due to existing demand aggregation. In municipal waste management, the public sector ag-
                                                
46 The sunk costs for waste collection services are comparatively low. If a waste collector wants or 
needs to exit a (local) market, it can easily transfer most of the assets, i.e. the waste transportation 
vehicles, to another market or sell the vehicles within a functioning second-hand market (Saboe, 
2007). 
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gregates the demand of households and commerce (partly) and has therefore bargaining 
power in price negotiation.  
Wherever a natural monopoly for the MSWC exists, the effects of extending the monopolists’ 
activities on other markets must be thoroughly analyzed. Possible exploitation of market 
power has to be thoroughly analyzed if vertical integration exists between waste collection 
and MSWC. Such a combined ownership to bundle up activities is not necessarily undesir-
able as it can create synergies and lead to cost reduction. Yet, it is important to guarantee 
that rivaling waste collection companies will not be discriminated in their access to the 
MSWC plants (e.g. Bundeskartellamt, 2006; Monopolkommission, 2003).  
4.3 Externalities 
According to Kolstadt (2000, p. 91) an externality ”exists when the consumption or production 
choices of one person or firm enters the utility or production function of another entity without 
that entity’s permission or compensation”.  
For the case, that the utility function of a household Uh is directly influenced by the external 
production function of the producer y the utility function takes the following form: 
Uh = Uh(x,y), 
with  consumption x = [x1,…,xi] and production y = [y1,…,yi]. 
Depending on the impact of the externality, positive and negative externalities are distin-
guished. In case of positive externalities, one market participant benefits without costs from 
the action of the other, whereas in case of negative externalities, the action of one market 
participant imposes costs to the other.  
There exist three forms of externalities (Fritsch et al., 2003, p. 89): 
1. Technological externalities, 
2. Pecuniary externalities, and  
3. Psychological externalities. 
Only technological externalities can lead to a non-Pareto optimal market equilibrium of sup-
ply and demand. Due to their high relevance to the object of this research, the occurrence 
and effects of technological externalities on MSWC and applicable policy instruments are 
discussed in detail. Afterwards, pecuniary and psychological externalities are briefly pre-
sented. 
4.3.1 Technological externalities 
Technological externalities exist if there is a direct physical linkage between the consump-
tion, production or utility functions of the market participants that does not reflect all market 
transactions. As a result, the aggregated private costs/utilities of the consumer or producer 
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deviate from the total social costs/utilities. The difference between the two is regarded as 
additional social cost/utility (Fritsch et al., 2003, pp. 90-91). 
The problems of technological externalities and their implications have long been a central 
focus of theoretical and empirical analysis in the fields of environmental economics and envi-
ronmental policy development (see e.g. Endres, 1994; Kolstad, 2000; Wiesmeth, 2003). As 
shown in chapter  3.3, the MSWC plants have potential impacts on the environment that 
cause negative as well as positive technological externalities. The following table provides 
examples for externalities from the MSWC on other consumers and producers. 
Form of exter-
nality 
Example for MSWC infrastructure 
Negative 
MSWC/Consumer 
The construction of an MSWC plant reduces property values in the neighbor-
hood, because it spoils the previously nice views from gardens. 
Positive  
MSWC/Consumer 
AN MSWC plant generates electricity with lower green house gas emissions 
than electricity generation from fossil fuels. The price for sale of electricity is 
the same. 
Negative  
MSWC/Producer 
The flue-gas of an MSWC plant with a simple flue-gas treatment system in-
creases the emission of particulate matter. A plant for waver production in its 
vicinity needs to install additional filters for their cleanrooms.  
Positive  
MSWC/Producer 
The manufacturer of MSWC plants invests into R&D for the development of a 
new method to reduce flue-gas emissions. The same innovation is copied free 
of charge by manufacturers of coal firing plants. 
Table  4-1: Examples for externalities at MSWC plants 
As proven for example by Myles (1995, pp. 315-317), externalities can lead to a non Pareto 
optimal equilibrium of the market, as incorrect quantities of goods will be produced and con-
sumed. Because welfare will not be maximized under these conditions, the implementations 
of economic policies could be justified. The following Figure  4-7 shows that the quantity of 
produced goods with negative external effects at market equilibrium (XM) would be higher 
than the efficient quantity level (XE) that includes the social costs. 
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Figure  4-7: Effects of negative technological externalities  
Source: after Stiglitz (2000, p. 216) 
The problem of technologic0al externalities is closely related to the problem of property 
rights. Where property rights for goods are not sufficiently defined (or are impossible to de-
fine) it is possible for a producer or consumer to use or benefit from those goods without pay-
ing adequate compensation (Baumol & Oates, 1988, pp. 26-28).  
4.3.2 Measures for technological externalities 
The objective of economic policy making is to reduce the undesired effects of technological 
externalities by internalizing them into the production, consumption or utility functions of the 
market participants. The following sections provide an overview of available measures, fol-
lowed by an elaboration of their applicability to the research object MSWC 
4.3.2.1 Education and ethical appeal 
Politicians often believe that educating people by increasing their awareness for the conse-
quences of their consumption and by appealing to the ethical standards of the producers 
result in the reduction of negative externalities. Motivating voluntary internalization of nega-
tive externalities through education and ethical appeals could also be interpreted as increas-
ing positive psychological externalities (see chapter  4.3.5). The costs associated with the 
reduction of the negative externality would be offset by its psychological benefit. 
According to Fritsch et al. (2003, p. 111) the potential to overcome market failure problems 
due to technological externalities is very limited, especially in case where the costs for reduc-
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ing the externality has to be paid by only a small group while the number of beneficiaries is 
much larger. 
4.3.2.2 Taxes and subsidies 
An attempt to reduce the effects of negative externalities is to impose taxes and fees. Uni-
form taxes that are levied based on the level of externalities are named Pigouvian taxes, af-
ter the influential work of Pigou (1932). As shown in the following Figure  4-8, the height of 
taxes would be optimal if they leveraged the difference between marginal private costs and 
marginal social costs.  
 
Figure  4-8: Pigou Tax  
Source: after Endres (1994, p. 94) 
An accurately calculated tax would therefore represent the external costs associated with the 
production of the goods and correct level of production and consumption. To collect all nec-
essary data and information to determine the optimal level of tax is very difficult in practice 
and every solution is most likely an approximation of the Pareto-optimum (Baumol & Oates, 
1971).  
The Pigouvian tax would only overcome the market failure problem associated with negative 
technological externalities if it not only led to a reduction of the produced goods but the col-
lected tax also compensated for the cost of the externality. In reality, the payment of tax 
revenues to the parties that suffer from the negative externality might not be very realistic, 
because it is either very difficult to identify the claimant or the government uses the tax for 
other purposes. 
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Another problem with the Pigouvian tax is the requirement that the tax should to be adjusted 
to changing levels of externality. In case the negative technological externality is eliminated, 
the tax should be abolished as well. In reality however, the government might have little in-
centives to do so47.  
The Pigouvian solution for internalization would also be applicable for positive technological 
externalities. In such cases, subsidies (which are nothing else than negative taxes) are paid 
to the producer of the positive externality to compensate for market prices that do not reflect 
all benefits. The problem with such subsidies is that the money must first be collected from 
the beneficiaries and the prices do not reveal the true costs for the goods anymore (Kolstad, 
2000, p. 128). 
4.3.2.3 Coase theorem 
In a market economy, it should be the central focus of policy development to find market 
based solutions for problems associated with technological externalities. The most prominent 
approach in this context was proposed by Coase (1960) who argued that the allocation of 
property rights and their trading with the market participants would eventually internalize 
technological externalities. The so-called Coase-theorem implies that it is irrelevant to the 
externality equilibrium to whom the property rights are assigned. In theory, the negotiation of 
property rights is a very efficient way to internalize externalities and would provide incentives 
for right technology application. The model is based on a number of assumptions, such as, 
no information failure, no transaction costs, free contract rights and equal utility functions for 
all participants 
The chief problem of the Coase theorem is the correct allocation of property rights. In many 
cases, for example, unpolluted air, it is technically impossible or too expensive to allocate the 
property rights. It is therefore debatable whether the Coase theorem is a solution at all for the 
problem of externalities, because the non-existence or high transaction costs for property 
right allocation are often the causal reason for the technical externality (see chapter  4.3.1). 
Based on the problems to correctly allocate property rights and the various unrealistic as-
sumptions of the model, the application of the Coase theorem to overcome problems with 
externalities in a real world is very limited and has found little application in history so far 
(Fritsch et al., 2003).  
                                                
47 It is very rare that governments abolish any taxes. A prominent example is the introduction of a tax 
on Champagne in Germany by the emperor Wilhelm II the year 1902 to finance the building up of the 
navy. Even today the tax is still paid, although its original purpose has vanished a long ago. 
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Yet, the ideas of the Coase theorem are still very valuable. In case of existing externalities, it 
should be examined whether property rights could be allocated or whether other policies 
cause the non-allocation of property rights.  
4.3.2.4 Tradable permits 
Another market based solution to internalize externalities originates from the creation of trad-
able permits. The principal ideas are derived from the elements of the Coase theorem to 
trade property rights for negative externalities. But instead of exchanging the rights between 
the parties that produce the externality and are affected by them, here the government de-
fines the total amount of externalities. The permits (property rights) are then allocated or sold 
to the producers who can use them themselves or trade them in the market. If the marginal 
costs for reducing the negative externality are lower than the market price for the permits, the 
producer will be willing to reduce the externality.  
To prevent punishment for producers with less negative externalities, the initial allocation of  
tradable permits should be based on the level of production and not on the initial amount of 
externality (Stiglitz, 2000, pp. 229-230).  
Tradable permits are well suited for limiting the total amount of negative externalities. They 
also induce the development and application of more cost-effective technology with less ex-
ternalities (Fritsch et al., 2003, p. 139). However, similarly to Pigouvian taxes, the concept of 
tradable permits usually does not compensate the party that still pays a price for the negative 
externality (whose amount is now only limited).  
4.3.2.5 Command-and-control 
In practice, legal obligations are the most common form of regulating negative technological 
externalities. These legal obligations are referred to as command-and-control (CAC) and 
could be either (i) technology restrictions or (ii) emission restrictions. Under technology re-
strictions the individual polluters must take legally specified physical steps to reduce or solve 
the causes of negative externalities (Kolstad, 2000, p. 139). Such a regulation requires a 
very costly collection of information about various industries and production processes.  
The second option of emission restriction either forbids or sets standards for different forms 
of externalities with which the producers have to comply. Such standards could (i) limit the 
total amount of permissible externalities in a certain period of time, (ii) limit the externality per 
output unit or (iii) limit the externality per input unit (Helfand, 1981).  In contrast to technology 
restrictions, such standards do not define the technology that has to be applied by the pro-
ducer and therefore leaves more freedom for innovations.  
Both types of CAC should be combined with appropriate fines and penalties in case of non-
compliance, which rely on the enforcement in a strong and non-corruptive regulatory regime. 
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Such fines are different from Pigouvian taxes, because they should be much higher than the 
marginal social costs of the produced negative externality. 
The greatest advantage of CAC measures is their high certainty in how much of the negative 
externality will be generated. Therefore they are very well suited for reducing negative exter-
nalities where a monetary evaluation of an externality as a starting point for a market based 
abatement is very difficult or impossible. From a technical point of view, the enforcement of 
CAC can easily be monitored. The total transaction costs for reducing the negative external-
ity are comparatively low in contrast to market based incentives where numerous producers 
and consumers are involved (Kolstad, 2000, p. 141).  
A major disadvantage of CAC is that they do not ensure equal marginal costs for reducing 
the negative externality among different producers. In contrast to the Coase theorem or trad-
able permissions, the legal obligations do not ensure the abatement of negative technologi-
cal externalities at the lowest costs.  
4.3.2.6 Liability for damages 
The principal idea of liabilities is that the generator (either consumer or producer) is legally 
responsible for the effects of negative technological externalities caused by his actions. It 
means that the party that is harmed through the externality should be compensated for the 
damage. 
There exist two basic forms of liability: (i) strict liability and (ii) negligence rule. Under the sys-
tem of strict liability, the producer is liable for all negative externalities regardless of any pre-
cautionary measures implemented. He, therefore, has to pay for all internal abatements to 
reduce the external costs as well as for the external costs that he has not internalized. As 
shown in the following Figure  4-9, the producer would then set the level of precaution where 
the costs of precaution and the expected damage are at their minimum (C*). Under the sys-
tem of negligence rule, however, the producer will only be liable for the negative externality if 
he has not complied with a defined standard (which should be equal to C*). Instead of paying 
fines for not meeting defined standards, the producer will have to pay for actual external 
costs he has caused (see e.g. Bohm & Russell, 1985; Endres, 1994, pp. 55-89). 
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Figure  4-9: Optimum level of precaution  
Source: after Endres (1994, p. 65) 
In practice, however, the appropriateness of legal liabilities to provide correct incentives for 
internalizing externalities is limited. The first constraint is the difficulty to measure and legally 
prove the external costs that are often monitored long after their production. Another reason 
is that the negative technological externalities can be larger than producers’ wealth and 
bankruptcy would then limit the volume of compensation (Larson, 1996). The mitigation of 
liability costs to insurances might not necessarily lead to an optimum level of precaution (C*) 
due to problems of moral hazard and asymmetric distribution of information (Zweifel & Tyran, 
1994). 
4.3.2.7 Public provision 
A measure to reduce allocative inefficiencies caused by positive or negative technological 
externalities is often seen in the public sector providing the goods. The proponents argue 
that public provision is suitable for goods where nobody can be excluded from consumption. 
Such non-excludability is prevailing for goods from the consumption of which nobody can be 
excluded due to technical restrictions or too high transaction costs (Fritsch et al., 2003, p. 
113). In these cases, the elaborated market based solutions for internalizing externalities, i.e. 
Coase theorem, tradable permits and liability, are not applicable, because they require the 
assignment of property rights.  
Where consumers cannot be excluded, the government could provide the right amount of the 
good and internalize the positive or negative costs of the technological externality. Such a 
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measure obviously requires the government to aim at maximizing the welfare and possess-
ing sufficient information about the market, especially about the utilities of consumers. 
4.3.3 Application to MSWC 
The previous chapter presented a number of policy instruments that are available to address 
the effects of technological externalities. In theory and practice, there exists a widespread 
discourse about the appropriateness of these instruments and the degree to which positive 
and negative externalities are to be eliminated. 
The following Table  4-2 lists the presented policy instruments and indicates their applicability 
in cases of positive and negative externalities: 
Applicability to externality 
Measure/ Policy instrument 
Positive Negative 
1. Education and ethical appeal (X) X 
2. Taxes  X 
3. Subsidies X  
4. Coase theorem X X 
5. Tradable permits  X 
6. Command and control (X) X 
7. Liability for damages  X 
8. Public provision X X 
Table  4-2: Measures for negative and positive technological externalities  
As shown in chapter  3.3, the treatment of waste in the MSWC plants causes positive as well 
as negative externalities. Even though education and ethical appeal are important measures 
to reduce the waste generation rates and increase recycling rates (e.g. school public pro-
grams), they can be considered as rather ineffective means for the voluntary internalization 
of the MSWC’s externalities. While producers of commodities might gain a competitive ad-
vantage from better than the required environmental performance (Reinhardt, 1999), the de-
velopers and operators of the MSWC plants are most unlikely to be able to benefit from such 
a strategy on a local level. The power of business ethics, however, should not be underesti-
mated on a global scale. Especially multinational waste management or utility companies 
show little willingness to own and operate the MSWC plants with high negative externalities 
in their portfolio due to their social corporate responsibility codex and the potential pressure 
from the international media and NGO activists, even though such facilities would comply 
with local standards.  
Taxes are considered to have only limited impact on reducing the waste generation rates 
because of low price elasticity (see also chapter  2.4.3). In the absence of legal requirements, 
they could be used to influence waste streams. For example, high landfill taxes would sup-
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port the thermal treatment of waste in the MSWC plants prior to its disposal and therefore 
reduce considerably the negative externalities (e.g. land use, methane emission and ground 
water pollution). The waste combustion taxes that are based either on weight or greenhouse 
gas emissions have virtually no potential to reduce other negative externalities, because the 
thermal treatment of waste with the CO2 as the final production of complex chemical reac-
tions is desirable in order to reduce overall impacts of municipal waste generation. The un-
wanted emissions (e.g. CO, NOx) could be reduced by taxes, even though the described re-
strictions apply (see chapter  4.3.2.2). In some countries48, there exist taxes on both landfilling 
and on the MSWC. Here, the assumption is inevitable that the state primarily uses the tax to 
increase is budget.  
Direct or indirect subsidies are found in various countries to address positive technological 
externalities from the MSWC (see also chapter  3.4.3.4). They are often provided as an incen-
tive for efficient energy recovery with reduced greenhouse gas emission from fossil fuels. 
Similar to taxes, the determination of subsidy level is practically impossible. 
Applying the ideas of the Coase theorem to allocate and trade property rights as a measure 
to internalize most externalities from the MSWC is also practically impossible due to high 
technical and administrative transaction costs. During the planning approval procedures, 
however, certain trade activities between the developer of the MSWC plant and local citizens 
are thinkable. For example, in one Japanese project, the citizens accepted the construction 
of a thermal waste treatment plant in its municipality after the operator promised to support 
financially the construction and operation of a local spa. 
Recently, tradable permits are adopted in various developed countries to limit or decrease 
the total emission of greenhouse gases from industrial sources49. Inclusion of the MSWC 
plants into any such emission trading program would internalize these positive technological 
externalities and certainly provide a dynamic incentive to increase their energy efficiency. In 
Germany, however, as in many other countries, the MSWC plants are explicitly excluded 
from national emission trading laws (see e.g. §2(5) TEHG for Germany)50.  
Due to the explained shortcomings of the other policy instruments, command-and-control 
measures dominate the limitation of negative externalities from the MSWC. In most countries 
air emission limits are legally set without restricting any technology. The following table pro-
vides an overview of emission thresholds for the most important MSWC air pollutants in se-
                                                
48 E.g. in Denmark there is a landfill tax of 375 DKK/Mg (50€/Mg) and a waste combustion tax of 330 
DKK/Mg (44€/Mg). 
49 See e.g. Annex I countries in the Kyoto protocol to the UNFCCC. 
50 The current exclusion of the MSWC plants from emission trading is much disputed. The discussion 
seems to be based rather on political than on economic or environmental terms. 
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lected industrial countries as well as an example for further reduction by local authorities in 
Germany51.  
Contaminant 
[mg/Nm³] 
USA Japana Singapore European 
Union 
Example for plan-
ning permission 
in Germany 
Source of information MACT National 
law 
(NEA, 2001) 2000/76/ 
EC 
(ZV-TAD, 2007) 
Total carbon    10 10 
Carbon monoxide (CO) 100 100ppm 625 50 50 
Hydrogen chloride 
(HCI) 
29 700 200 10 2 
Hydrogen fluoride (HF)    1 0,1 
Sulphur dioxide (SO2) 29 7.247**  50 5 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) 160-250  250 700 200 70 
Particulate matter 
(dust) 
27  40 100 10 10 
Mercury (Hg) 0,08  4.571 3 0,03 0,01 
Dioxins in ng/TEQ   0.1 0,1* 0,1 0,1 
a Depending on flue-gas volume and location of MSWC plant. Here: Maishima Osaka Plant 
* 1.0 ng TEQ/Nm 3 for MSWC plants commissioned before 1st January 2001 
** SOx for 1 hour 
Table  4-3: Comparison of daily-average emission limits for MSWC 
In many countries such emission limits are set by policy makers with the support of technical 
experts. The US EPA, for example, applied a process called MACT (most achievable control 
technology) to define emission limits based on the best available technology. Besides com-
mand-and-control measures for air emissions, there also exist limits for other negative exter-
nalities, such as odor, noise and vibration. 
On the other hand, command-and-control measures could also increase externalities. For 
example in Germany, all MSWC plants are required by law to utilize thermal energy from the 
waste. A compensation for positive externalities due to reduced CO2-emission, however, is 
currently not in place. 
Liabilities for damages are commonly applied to technical facilities, including the MSWC 
plants. The German environmental liability act, for example, includes the MSWC plants in the 
list of facilities that are liable for any damages caused by them (see UmweltHG §1 attach-
ment 1(76))52. For the compensation, it is irrelevant whether the MSWC plant complied with 
existing laws and regulations. As part of their insurance package, owners and operators are 
                                                
51 In the past, it had been common practice in Germany to reduce emission well below the legal limit 
during approval procedures. 
52 A new USchadG will be added in 2007 to cover liabilities for damages in ground, water bodies or 
biodiversity. Here the authorities can make the claims, if no legal or natural person has been dam-
aged. 
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usually insured against claims from these liabilities. In practice, however, the law has so far 
little relevance due to problems in legal enforcement (Schwarze, 2004).  
It is often argued that public provision of the MSWC infrastructure is better suited to address 
problems of technological externalities. They purport that especially negative externalities are 
better reduced through public provision, because private companies merely want to maxi-
mize profits without caring about any externalities. Such statements have little justification if 
other measures to reduce externalities are implemented and enforced. Therefore, a general 
justification for public provision of the MSWC infrastructure cannot be derived. On the con-
trary, there might even exist persuasive reasons for private provision, because it could be 
argued that the separation of interests between the public sector and private MSWC infra-
structure provision is a precondition for transparent and effective application of command-
and-control measures. Even in countries with a weak law enforcement regime, public provi-
sion might not be a better choice, because here the weak authority would control itself. 
If an individual municipality wishes to increase further the positive externalities (e.g. in-
creased energy efficiency or advanced architectural design) or to further reduce negative 
externalities (e.g. emissions reduction) then it could either technically specify them in the 
tendering documentations or incorporate them into the payment mechanism. The application 
of availability payments would especially be suitable if emissions are to be measured over a 
longer period of time. 
4.3.4 Pecuniary externalities 
The effects of pecuniary externalities are of indirect nature and occur if the prices of one pro-
ducer influence the prices of the other (see e.g. Kolstad, 2000, p. 93; Viner, 1932). These 
effects are not regarded as market failures, but they are actually desirable means of effective 
resource allocation in a market based economy. In contrast to technical externalities, pecuni-
ary externalities do not justify any policy interference with the market because they do not 
cause an inefficient allocation of resources (Holcombe & Sobel, 2001). 
Pecuniary externalities accumulate wherever ideal substitutes for a product exist. In Ger-
many, the existence of pecuniary externalities in the waste sector could very well be ob-
served with the introduction of TASi that required the treatment of municipal waste prior to 
their final disposal by June 1, 2005. Many landfill sites considerably reduced their prices to 
sell capacities that would not be needed anymore after the deadline. Before June 1, 2005, 
the low prices for landfilling reduced incentives for waste recycling or treatment in more envi-
ronmentally friendly facilities.  
After the introduction of the TASi regulation, pecuniary externalities continue to exist in the 
market for the MSWC. Because commercial waste generators can more easily choose be-
tween alternative waste treatment technologies (which are perfect substitutes for them), the 
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consumption and therefore the prices between MSWC and M(B)T in combination with RDFC 
strongly influence each other. 
4.3.5 Psychological externalities 
Psychological externalities describe the relation between the utility function of two parties 
that are dependent on each other, but can exist without a direct physical connection or mar-
ket transaction. This phenomenon implies that individuals do not always act selfishly, i.e. 
they do not aim exclusively at maximizing their own utility. Psychological externalities are 
used to explain altruistic behavior which decreases with the size of groups or markets 
(Becker, 1981). Classic examples of psychological externalities are voluntary donations to 
people in need in the wake of a natural hazard or the consumption of the so-called “fair 
trade” products.  
The concept of psychological externalities can well be observed in the municipal waste sec-
tor. Suppose the households or consumers pay a fixed fee for waste services53, thus they 
have no monetary incentives for reusing or separating their waste. Still, many households 
might reuse plastic bags for shopping or separate paper and take them to special collection 
systems. By acting in an environmentally friendly way they receive a higher psychological 
utility and furthermore affect the waste recycling and treatment industry.  
Psychological externalities can be an important aspect to explain the behavior in environ-
mental issues. They depend on normative attitudes that are influenced by education, culture, 
income level or religion. Under certain circumstances, psychological externalities can cause 
market failure (Fritsch et al., 2003, pp. 106-108). 
4.4 Inadequate market adaptation 
One fundamental assumption of perfect markets is that supply and demand are always in 
equilibrium. There exist, however, various situations where an equilibrium is not developed at 
all or where the market does not adapt adequately to establish a new equilibrium.  Such de-
viations from the model of perfect competition could be referred to as a market failure, be-
cause perfect markets always produce these goods without time constraints (Stiglitz, 2000, 
p. 81).  
The phenomenon of inadequate market adaptation can have three different forms (Fritsch et 
al., 2003, p. 351): 
1. Incomplete markets, 
2. Markets with unstable equilibrium, and 
                                                
53 In many countries, households pay nothing or only fixed fees or taxes for waste services (e.g. coun-
cil tax in the UK). 
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3. Inflexible markets. 
Early economic theorists have focused on agricultural and financial markets to analyze the 
phenomenon of incomplete markets. But as it is shown later, the problem has also relevance 
to other markets, such as municipal solid waste management. 
4.4.1 Incomplete markets 
There exists the possibility that demand and supply for goods are not in equilibrium at all. In 
theory, this could happen, if supply and demand were totally price-inelastic, so that the price 
mechanism would not be working anymore. An incomplete market is an extreme case, where 
goods are not produced at all, even though the willingness to pay is higher than production 
costs. In reality, however, such a market failure probably only exists in timely or spatially re-
stricted markets or if no substitutes for the goods exist (Fritsch et al., 2003, p. 331). 
Another explanation can be the absence of certain complementary markets. If the supply of 
products from these complementary markets is not available, the market that requires the 
input will not function. The development of complementary markets can sometimes require 
extensive coordination efforts, which could be very challenging, especially in developing or 
transition countries (Stiglitz, 2000, p. 83) 54. 
4.4.2 Markets with unstable equilibrium 
The cobweb theorem is a popular model to explain the development of an unstable equilib-
rium in an isolated market. The theoretical explanation for the existence of such an instability 
is that producers frequently assume prices in their current time period t to continue to be un-
changed in the future t+1. Their production decision in t+1 is then based on the cost in the 
previous period t, which might result in an over- or undersupply. If the elasticity of prices and 
supply are of a certain magnitude, a change in supply or demand will result in a continuous 
fluctuation of both and no static equilibrium will be reached. This phenomenon is also known 
as a ‘pig cycle’. In addition to the mentioned price elasticity, the fluctuation of prices and the 
timely extension of a cycle depends strongly on the ability to store the goods (R. H. Coase & 
Fowler, 1935). 
An extreme case of the cobweb theorem is shown in the following Figure  4-10. If the abso-
lute price elasticity of supply is higher than the price elasticity of demand, a change in de-
mand or supply caused by an exogenous event will lead to an unstable market with explod-
ing prices (Ezekiel, 1938). 
                                                
54 Consider the market for composting: If there does not exist a market for separation, collection and 
transportation of biodegradable waste, no market for composting will be developed, even if there ex-
ists a demand for compost. 
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Figure  4-10: Cobweb theorem with exploding market equilibrium 
Source: Hernberg (1986) 
In the long run, it is rather unrealistic that a distortion of the market equilibrium may lead to 
an “explosion” of prices and quantities for goods or that the ‘pig cycle’ may continue to exist 
perpetually. The reason is that market participants learn from their experiences and nowa-
days there is often plenty of information available upon which producers can make their deci-
sions (Fritsch et al., 2003, p. 341).  
4.4.3 Inflexible markets 
An important assumption of the perfect market model is that changes in demand or supply of 
goods will lead to a new market equilibrium without delay (see chapter  4.1.1). In many mar-
kets, however, especially if they require high sunk costs, such a flexible development of a 
new equilibrium is not always possible. Problems arising from inflexible markets can be ob-
served in both directions: either when the demand is growing or when the demand is falling. 
In the first case it might be possible that inflexible markets do not produce a Pareto-efficient 
amount of certain goods. This can be due to the growth in demand for the goods, the produc-
tion of which requires stepwise investments in irreversible production facilities leading to 
sunk costs (Kruse, 1985, p. 54). In case the demand only slightly exceeds current production 
capacities, the producers might be reluctant to invest into a new production unit and there-
fore the growing demand will not be met. 
In the second case of falling demand, the inflexibility of markets with high sunk costs could 
lead to the so-called ‘cutthroat’ competition, if the decreasing demand resulted in prices be-
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low average production costs. If, however, the average prices are still higher than the share 
of irreversible costs per output, the individual producers will not leave the market. If in this 
‘cutthroat’ competition prices fall further and below the irreversible costs of some producers, 
these producers will quit the market. As shown by Fritsch et al. (2003, p. 349), not necessar-
ily the producer with highest average costs will be the first to quit the market. Such inefficient 
sequencing of producers leaving the market would therefore result in allocative inefficiencies 
during market adaptation processes. 
The occurrence of these two problems of inadequate adaptation certainly depends on the 
total size of the market. If the number of producers is very high, the adaptation processes will 
be rather fast and the effects of high sunk costs less important. If, however, the size of the 
market with high sunk costs is smaller, the allocative inefficiencies due to inadequate adapta-
tion will exist for a longer period of time and can cause severe problems within these mar-
kets. 
4.4.4 Measures for inadequate market adaptation 
The options to decrease or eliminate market failure due to inadequate market adaptation are 
limited. The most effective way to reduce unstable markets is through extensive information 
policy. If it is too costly for individuals to collect data and information about the market, public 
authorities will collect, analyze and provide them (see e.g. statistical bureaus or private mar-
ket research institutes). 
In cases of incomplete markets without equilibrium in supply and demand for essential goods 
and products, the government could intervene into the market by setting maximum prices 
(e.g. for food crises) or by setting minimum prices (e.g. minimum wages). 
The occurrence of inefficient sequencing of producers leaving the market in a ‘cutthroat’ 
competition could be reduced by providing financial incentives to producers with higher aver-
age costs to leave the market. Such a measure, however, will only be justified if average 
costs can be verified easily by outsiders and if the financial support is limited in time. Long-
term subsidies, such as given by the EU to farmers for not producing, should be avoided. 
Other available measures to reduce undersupply in case of inadequate market adaptation 
includes storing of goods (e.g. governmental storages for vaccines and medicines) or the 
support for developing substitute products (e.g. financing of R&D). 
4.4.5 Application to MSWC 
As shown in chapter  2.4.3 the price elasticity for residual municipal waste management is 
comparatively low and changes in waste quantities are often based on exogenous factors. In 
a simplified model it can be assumed, that the production of the MSWC takes demand as 
given and that municipal waste generators are price takers. Thus, it is realistic to suppose 
that supply reacts to changes in demand, not vice versa. 
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The occurrence of a market failure due to incomplete markets is rather unlikely for in case of 
the MSWC, because at least the supply side shows certain price elasticity, even though with 
rather high inflexibility (see below for the problem of inflexibility). One can also assume that 
complementary markets will be in place before demand in the MSWC exists, because the 
complementary markets (e.g. waste collection and slag disposal) require less technical ex-
pertise and less sunk costs. 
The existence of an unstable market equilibrium as one form of market failure is rather 
unlikely, mainly because price elasticity in demand is very low. Also, one can assume that 
there is enough information available in the market, so that the ‘pig-cycle’ would not be de-
veloped (see also Kaufmann & Heinemann, 2007). Short-term fluctuations in demand and 
supply, which are the characteristics of an unstable market equilibrium, can be leveraged to 
a certain extent through storing of waste in waste transfer stations and large temporary stor-
ages55. 
There are, however, two significant reasons, why the market for the MSWC is comparatively 
inflexible in coping with significant long-term changes in demand that cannot be leveraged by 
short time storing. First, the MSWC requires high sunk costs and secondly, the development 
of new capacities is very time consuming. The expansion of existing facilities or the devel-
opment of new ones can sometimes take two to three years56 and involves various time re-
lated risks. Such inflexibility could lead to inadequate market adaptation (undersupply) if de-
mand for the MSWC changes rapidly, e.g. due to changes in law57.  
In case of increasing demand for the MSWC, one important measure is timely, transparent 
and open information policies. Public waste management strategies should be accurately 
timed and waste disposal contracts have to be structured adequately to address issues of 
sunk costs (see chapter  5). Another valuable measure is to explore opportunities for reducing 
the time that is required for project development and implementation. One option is that pub-
lic policy makers and authorities could ease legal requirements for project approval proc-
esses. Another option is applied by professional project developers and operators of the 
MSWC plants who sign umbrella contracts with important suppliers to reduce order times. 
If demand for the MSWC is falling58, the distribution of life-cycle costs will play an important 
role in the adaptation of the market. The impact of such changes in demand is much lower 
                                                
55 Many MSWC plants own or borrow baling equipment in case they cannot threat the delivered waste 
(either because too much is delivered during high waste generation seasons or during maintenance 
periods). 
56 Even longer development phases of five and more years are known.  
57 E.g. 1999/31/EC requires that practically all municipal waste must be treated prior to disposal. 
58 If for example changes in law require mandatory recycling of certain material (e.g. plastic bottles). 
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on the MSWC plants with comparatively lower sunk costs and higher flexible costs (see 
chapter  3.4.2). To choose such flexibility might therefore be a desirable design criterion for 
new facilities, if high fluctuation or decrease in demand were expected in the future, even 
though average costs will be higher for these plants, if capacities are fully used. Although 
such different cost structures would support the theoretical concept of wrong sequencing of 
producers leaving the market, one should not conclude that a market failure exists justifying 
external intervention. Here, the participants in the free market should make their own deci-
sions and balance the structure of life-cycle costs to address falling demand against com-
parative average costs. 
If baling must be extensively used due to insufficiently available waste treatment capacities, 
further market failures caused by negative externalities will be the consequence59.  
4.5 Information failures 
There exist two forms of information failures that could cause Pareto inefficient markets. 
These are (ii) incomplete information and (ii) uncertainty (Fritsch et al., 2003, p. 279). At this 
point it is important to re-emphasize that the level of analysis is the market and not a specific 
transaction within the market. The latter is the domain of other economic theories, such as 
new institutional economics. 
4.5.1 Incomplete Information 
Often the producers or consumers are not fully informed about the goods that are exchanged 
in the market. Such incomplete information will exist, if either (i) prices are unknown, (ii) utili-
ties are unknown, (iii) or if information is distributed asymmetrically between the market ac-
tors (Fritsch et al., 2003, p. 321).  
Sometimes, consumers do not possess complete information about the full price of the 
goods and therefore the allocation in the market is not efficient60. If the utility of the goods is 
not fully known by the consumers, it will be possible that too little or too much of the goods 
will be consumed. This might especially be the case, if the utility of the goods can be seen 
long after its consumption61.   
                                                
59 The new TASi law for Germany required that all waste must be treated prior to disposal since June 
1st 2005. Even though the new regulation was well known in advance, there was an undersupply for 
waste treatment of 2.5 million Mg/a at that time (see appendix 3). Due to inadequately slow market 
adaptation it is estimated that a total amount of 12 million Mg of untreated or pre-treated waste must 
be baled and stored (Alwast, 2006). The environmental impacts remain unknown. 
60 Examples could be door-to-door sales or subscription contracts. 
61 Examples could be education or health precaution. 
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A more severe form of incomplete information is asymmetry of information among market 
participants, which could cause inefficient market allocation due to (i) adverse selection, (ii) 
moral hazard or (ii) opportunistic hold-up. As shown in a landmark publication of Akerlof 
(1970), ex-ante asymmetric information about the quality of goods can lead to adverse selec-
tion in markets where only goods with low quality will be exchanged. In an extreme case, 
such an adverse selection could result into the non-development or total breakdown of a 
market due insufficient demand or supply for the particular goods (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 
1976).  
The problem of moral hazard is yet another result of information asymmetry. It describes the 
situation in which one party is unable to observe the activities or behavior of the other party 
after the contract is signed. Here, the transaction might not happen at all due to the potential 
threat that one party does not enter the contractual relationship in good faith62.  
Opportunistic hold-up can occur in long-term contracts if two conditions are fulfilled. First, at 
least one party must undertake irreversible investments in order to prepare for the transac-
tion. Second, the future demand and quality of the goods cannot be specified in the contract 
with sufficient certainty  (Rogerson, 1992). Due to the risk that one contractual party abuses 
its position ex-post, the Pareto efficient level of investments might not be achieved or the 
transactions might not happen at all. 
4.5.2 Uncertainty  
Uncertainty differs from incomplete information by being concerned with future developments 
that no party in the market is able to foresee. Because, any market activity involves risks and 
opportunities as a resulting in an unpredictable world, uncertainty should not be made re-
sponsible for Pareto inefficient allocations. The time that markets need for reacting on uncer-
tain developments is rather a question of adaptability (see chapter  4.4). 
It might be possible that a market for certain goods will not be developed at all, if market par-
ticipants are very risk adverse and uncertainties are high. Such an extreme non-development 
of a market will more easily be observed, if sunk costs are high and the opportunistic hold-up 
likely. In reality, however, many transactions might just not take place because one contrac-
tual party is unwilling to accept the allocation of risks at a given price level63. Such situations 
are normal in a competitive market and should not be referred to as a market failure. 
                                                
62 Insurance industry is a popular example.  
63 This situation is similar to the characteristics of incomplete markets. 
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A special case of a market failure due to uncertainty is recognized by economists in the field 
of research and development (Stiglitz & Wallenstein, 2000). Especially in fundamental re-
search, the market might not be willing to provide sufficient quantity of the good R&D64.  
4.5.3 Measures for information failures 
As explained above, there exist only extreme situations, in which incomplete information or 
uncertainty lead to market failure. In most cases of incomplete information, the market par-
ticipants can acquire necessary information through screening or spread information in the 
market through signaling. If the transaction costs for screening and signaling by individual 
market participants are higher than the benefit, actions by organizations within the market or 
by the government will be desirable. Such activities could include the compulsory introduc-
tion of minimum quality standards, obligation to disclose certain product information, external 
quality controls, occupational licensing or certification (Tirole, 2003, p. 113).  
Governmental intervention into the market could be justified in extreme cases of market fail-
ure. For example, the state guarantees could be provided to overcome problems of moral 
hazard in the financial sector (e.g. provision of student loans). Also the financial support for 
fundamental research is a suitable measure. 
4.5.4 Application to MSWC 
In developed countries, market failure due to incomplete information and uncertainty is very 
unlikely for the market of MSWC. Although the problem of information failure exists at a 
transaction specific level for the MSWC, it can be assumed that the market is functioning. 
The variety of policy instruments that are usually already in place to address problems of 
external effects also reduce the occurrence of information failures. These instruments in-
clude, for example minimum quality standards (emission limits), public disclosure of informa-
tion (mandatory publishing of actual emissions) and licensing. 
In developing and transition countries, high uncertainty about waste generation rates, waste 
composition as well as legal developments are said to be the reason for the non-
development of the market. Here, the development of a sound institutional environment must 
be fostered. In addition to that, the provision of guarantees by the government or external 
third-party organizations can prove to be helpful. In most cases, however, markets are more 
likely not to develop due to insufficient profitability rather than uncertainty65. 
                                                
64 One could also argue that fundamental research is good with very big positive externalities, where 
the internalization of positive externalities (e.g. through patents) is not desirable. 
65 Projects in other infrastructure with higher profitability (e.g. airports) are often developed even 
though uncertainties are high too.  
Market specific aspects of MSWC 
78 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter discussed four relevant forms of market failures: natural monopolies, external-
ities, inadequate market adaptation and information failures. Further, it analyzed their occur-
rence in and implications for the market of MSWC 
An isolated view of the MSWC plants assumes the existence of natural monopolies due to 
subadditivity of the cost function. The natural monopoly also possesses limited contestability 
which is caused by high sunk costs. However, an inclusion of transportation costs into the 
total cost calculation shapes natural monopolies in two different ways. In case of compara-
tively high transportation costs a local natural monopoly with spatial limitations evolves. If the 
transportation costs are lower, the subadditivity of total cost function will continue to exist. 
However, the size of this so-called extended natural monopoly is also technically limited. To 
reduce welfare losses within natural monopolies, price regulation, competition for the market, 
public provision and aggregation of demand are available policy measures.  
Different positive and negative technological externalities occur in the infrastructure sector of 
the MSWC. It is shown that command-and-control measures are best suitable to internalize 
negative environmental externalities. Other measures such as taxes, subsidies, education 
and ethical appeal, liability for damages and tradable permits could also help to reduce posi-
tive and negative externalities and might be applied in addition to command and control 
measures. The applicability of the Coase theorem must mostly be denied due to practical 
impossibilities of allocating property rights. 
With respect to the possible inadequacy of market adaptation, the analysis has shown that 
incomplete markets or unstable market equilibriums are unlikely to exist for the MSWC infra-
structure. However, due to high sunk costs and long development phases for the MSWC 
plants, there is reason to believe that the market is comparatively inflexible in coping with the 
significant long-term demand changes caused by exogenous factors. 
The two forms of information failures that could cause market failures are incomplete infor-
mation and uncertainty. In developed economies or densely urbanized areas, where the 
MSWC has the highest relevance, such information failure is unlikely to cause a malfunction-
ing of the market, because signaling and screening mechanisms are usually in place. 
In the next chapter the theoretical framework for applicable institutional arrangements for 
MSWC will be developed. It will employ theories of new institutional economics, the historic 
roots of which can actually be found in the analysis of the market competition. 
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5 Theoretical framework for institutional arrangements 
5.1 Introduction  
New institutional economics is an interdisciplinary theory building that joins economics, law, 
psychology and organization theory for better understanding and analyzing complex eco-
nomic realities and phenomena. In contrast with frictionless neoclassical economics, its cen-
tral assumption is that institutions do matter for economic performance (Furubotn & Richter, 
2005, p. 1). 
The following Figure  5-1 provides an overview of distinct branches that evolved under the 
umbrella of an institutional view of economics. The three theoretical concepts of (i) property 
right economics; (ii) agency theory and (iii) transaction cost economics form the most signifi-
cant components of new institutional economics (Dollery, 2001).  
The fourth branch of public choice theory is frequently allocated to the research field of new 
political economics as part of political sciences (Johnson, 1991). Nevertheless, there exists a 
variety of interrelationships and overlaps between the new institutional economics and new 
political economics that have resulted into new powerful analytical tools66. 
 
Figure  5-1: Transaction cost economics and alternative theories to economic institutions  
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1990) 
There exist various different definitions of institutions, which are applied in the field of eco-
nomics, sociology and political science (Scott, 2001, pp. 1-16). A very generic and widely 
accepted definition is done by North (1990), who describes institutions as “the rules of the 
                                                
66 See e.g. budget maximizing model of bureaucracy in chapter  5.5.3. 
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game in a society or, more formally, [they] are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction”. They structure the incentives and constraints of political, social and eco-
nomic exchange. Institutions can be of formal as well as informal kind and also include their 
enforcement arrangements. Their major purpose, i.e., cause for their evolvement, is to pro-
vide a framework for human interaction that reduces uncertainties.   
Formal institutions are evidently written documents as well as rules which can be executed 
through a formal position, such as authority or ownership. They are usually created with a 
special purpose and might exist for a limited time only. Informal institutions, on the other 
hand, are based on implicit understanding among human beings and include social norms, 
routines, culture and behavior. They are socially driven and do not change instantly, because 
they often evolve over a longer period of time (Zenger, Lazzarini, & Poppo, 2002).  
With respect to the research object of municipal solid waste combustion (MSWC), formal 
institutions are for example short- or long-term waste treatment contracts as well as written 
environmental laws or public procurement regulations. Informal institutions are, for example, 
social networks among different stakeholders or public acceptance of MSWC plants. 
It is important to distinguish organizations from institutions. While the latter ones are the rules 
of the game, organizations must be understood as the players (North, 1990, pp. 4-5). In the 
field of waste management, these could be for example public bureaus, private waste man-
agement companies, investors, advisors or diverse interest groups. Obviously, the differen-
tiation between institutions and organizations is not always razor sharp and the boundaries of 
a firm (and of other organizations) have long been the subject for various theories. 
5.2 Institutional dimensions 
New institutional economics differentiates between the two dimensions (or levels) of (i) insti-
tutional environment and (ii) institutional arrangement.  
The institutional environment67 defines the formal and informal rules on the macro-level limit-
ing permitted and accepted actions and behavior (norms) within the society (North, 1990). 
The institutional environment is not specific about a transaction or an institutional arrange-
ment as it rather concerns the general definition and enforcement of property rights and con-
tract laws, which are of course rudimentary for economic activities and transactions. Secure 
property rights ensure that people are able to keep the returns of their entrepreneurial activi-
ties. In addition, well defined property rights and contract enforcement decrease the transac-
tion costs associated with doing business (Ronald H. Coase, 1937). The institutional envi-
ronment includes both the functions of the government as well as the power distribution be-
tween the different levels of government (Williamson, 2000). 
                                                
67 Also: institutional framework (North, 1990) or institutional atmosphere. 
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The institutional arrangement68 encompasses the institutions, i.e. the formal or informal rules, 
on a micro level that structure specific transactions between organizations in a particular way 
(North, 1990). This terminology is frequently used in similar research contexts. For example, 
Mühlenkamp (1999, p. 23) uses the term institutional arrangement to describe the relation-
ships between public and private stakeholders in the public infrastructure delivery. 
Within the context of this research, the term institutional arrangement is used to describe the 
design of relationships between most relevant stakeholders of the MSWC projects.  It is im-
portant to bear in mind that there exist formal as well as informal institutions that govern insti-
tutional arrangements.  
5.3 Transaction cost economic approach towards institutional arrangements 
5.3.1 General 
What later evolved as the field of transaction cost economics was initiated by Coase’s (1937) 
influential article “The Nature of Firm”, in which he posed the question, why individual firms 
emerge at all in the economy. As a result, transaction and institutions became the nucleus of 
the economic analysis in which transaction costs have a crucial impact on institutional ar-
rangements. 
Transaction cost economics looks at how the nature of specific transactions, referred to as 
attributes of transactions, influences the choice of an institutional arrangement. Hereby, the 
institutional environment is treated as exogenously given. Therefore, the transaction costs 
that arise to the stakeholders of the institutional arrangements in a defined institutional envi-
ronment are of primary concern to transaction cost economics. 
Already at this point it is important to distinguish between transactions and contracts. Accord-
ing to Williamson (1985b, p. 1) a “transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred 
across a technologically transferable interface”. A contract can be understood as “a formal, 
legal commitment to which each party expresses approval and to which a particular body of 
law applies” (Masten, 1988). A contract can therefore include a single transaction or as in the 
case of a long-term contract, numerous transactions. It is important to bear in mind that not 
all transactions necessarily require a contract69.  
The transaction cost economics stresses the importance of human behavior for any eco-
nomic analysis of transactions. Based on the insights of cognitive psychology the traditional 
                                                
68 Williamson (1985b) uses the term “governance structure”. 
69 In practice, however, most transactions are carried out on the legal basis of explicit or implicit con-
tracts, such as buyer-seller agreements or employment contracts. Transactions without contracts are 
for example gifts or robbery. 
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neoclassical model of the ‘homo economicus’ is transformed to the model of a ‘homo psy-
chologicus’ who acts opportunistic and with bounded rationality (Simon, 1985).  
Opportunistic behavior is the human “self interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985b). It 
refers to incomplete or distorted distribution of information that leads ultimately to information 
asymmetries in both ex ante as well as ex post situations. Opportunism can embrace obvi-
ous forms, such as lying, cheating and stealing or it can involve more subtle forms of active 
or passive behavior, such as negligence or the intentional ignoring of certain things and de-
velopments. Bounded rationality must be clearly distinguished from opportunistic behavior. It 
assumes that even if economic actors want to behave rationally their ability to do so is only 
limited (Simon, 1978). The cognitive abilities of humans are restricted and therefore not eve-
rybody has the competence required to act in a way that is objectively seen as rational. 
The theoretical concept of transaction costs economics was predominately developed by 
Williamson (1971; 1985b) and is rooted on the perception that the costs for a transaction in a 
market (transaction costs) are decisive for the institutional arrangements of a specific trans-
action. Originally defined by Coase (1937) as the “cost of using the price mechanism”, mar-
ket transaction costs are nowadays distinguished into four components (Furubotn & Richter, 
2005, pp. 52-54): 
1. Search and information costs are the costs for searching suitable contractual parties (e.g. 
firms, individual customers and employers) as well as for collecting information about 
prices and quality of goods in the market.  
2. Bargaining and decision costs are the costs that are arise from writing and negotiating 
contracts. 
3. Supervision and enforcement costs are the costs for monitoring and measuring the con-
tractual obligation, especially timely delivery, quality and quantities. They also include 
costs for enforcing the contract in case disputes arise between the parties due to per-
ceived deviations from the contract.  
4. Investments in social relations are the costs to build up social networks within the market 
to reduce information complexity, personal uncertainty and bounded rationality. 
The behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism are the causes for these 
transaction costs. As a result, all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete due to high 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1985b)70. The theory of incomplete contracts was strongly 
                                                
70 In contrast with transaction cost economics, the agency theory (also: principal agent theory) as-
sumes implicit contracts and investigates the different relationships between the principal and another 
agent. It focuses primarily on the problem of economic incentives for each economic actor and how 
the incentives are created and defined ex ante (see e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989a; Sappington, 1991). 
Theoretical framework for institutional arrangements 
83 
influenced by the work of Hart & Moore (1988; 1999) who analyzed the effect of contractual 
parties’ inability to formulate contracts that would cover all contingencies. Even if the parties 
were willing to specify contingent clauses ex ante, they could not do so completely because 
(i) it is either too expensive to describe them ex ante or (ii) it is impossible or too expensive to 
verify them ex post.  
The main purpose of transaction cost economics is to solve the paradigm problem of vertical 
integration, i.e. to give reasons for the make-or-buy decision (Williamson, 2005). It tries to 
determine and analyze the factors (attributes of transaction) that are decisive for the emer-
gence of distinctive institutional arrangements. According to the transaction cost economics, 
the institutional arrangement is chosen on the basis of the lowest total cost of transaction, 
which is the sum of transaction and production costs, and it could entail either a hierarchical 
structure (internal production), a market structure (external production) or any hybrid mode 
between these two extremes. 
Many researchers, especially at doctoral level, are tempted to apply transaction cost eco-
nomics to all kinds of problems. But the warning of David & Han (2004) must be taken seri-
ously, who note “[…] that many classic works are said to be frequently cited, yet rarely read. 
[…] Transaction cost economics, it seems, is often appropriated to serve as a basic for ana-
logues and a source of insight. And, more than occasionally, it is loosely interpreted and 
used as a metaphor, or even just as a ritual marker.” Bearing this in mind, the concept of 
transaction cost economics will be presented and critically assessed as a theoretical frame-
work to explain the evolvement of institutional arrangements. Subsequently, it will be applied 
to the public sector and to the MSWC infrastructure. 
5.3.2 Attributes of a transaction 
The height of transaction costs depends mainly on three attributes (or dimensions) of trans-
actions. The first and most significant attribute of a transaction is asset specificity, while un-
certainty and frequency play an important role as well (Williamson, 1984). 
5.3.2.1 Asset specificity 
Asset specificity refers to durable investments that are done as part of a distinct transaction 
and the value of which is much lower if used in the best alternative way. The excess value of 
an asset over its value to the second highest valuing user is called a quasi-rent (B. Klein, 
Crawford, & Alchian, 1978). As a result of asset specificity, the identities of the parties in the 
transaction matter and therefore contractual as well as organizational safeguards are put in 
place to secure continuity of the relationship (Williamson, 1985b, p. 55).  
There is an important difference between the two related concepts of asset specificity and 
sunk costs. The latter is concerned with the consequences of asset specificity in specific 
markets and whether they cause a potential threat to allocative efficiency. The transaction 
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cost economics extends this concept of asset specificity and analyzes how idiosyncratic at-
tributes of a specific transaction govern the institutional arrangement (Williamson, 1984). 
Four types of asset specificity can be distinguished (Joskow, 1985, 1988)71:  
1. Site asset specificity refers to investments in highly immobile assets at an ex-ante speci-
fied location that is chosen mutually by the contractual parties. 
2. Physical asset specificity refers to investments in machinery or equipment that are spe-
cifically designed and built in accordance with the requirements of the transaction. An al-
ternative use outside the initial transaction has much lower value. 
3. Human asset specificity refers to investments in unique human capital as part of the 
transaction specific relationship. People develop trust and specific knowledge as the re-
sult of continuous learning processes. These transaction specific relationships are of little 
use to transactions in other institutional arrangements. 
4. Dedicated assets refer to general investments by the agent to serve a specific principal. 
The agent will be left with considerable access capacity in case the relationship is termi-
nated prematurely. 
Assets that are specific to a transaction are also-called ‘idiosyncratic’ investments and they 
will create dependencies of at least one or both contractual parties if they concur with oppor-
tunistic behavior and bounded rationality.  As shown in the following Table  5-1, asset speci-
ficity alone would not become the source for potential disputes without occurrence of 
bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior at the same time.  
Behavioral assumptions 
Bounded rationality Opportunism 
Asset specificity 
Implied contracting 
process 
not existing 
high 
high 
high 
high 
not existing 
high 
high 
high 
high 
zero 
high 
Planning 
Promise 
Market 
Governance 
Table  5-1: Contracting models  
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1985a) 
                                                
71 A wider classification of asset specificity also includes (5) brand name capital (B. Klein & Leffler, 
1981), and (6) temporal specificity which refers to the timely constraints in identifying and arranging 
alternative transactions with new contractual parties (Masten, James W. Meehan, & Snyder, 1991). 
See also Williamson (1991). 
Theoretical framework for institutional arrangements 
85 
Transaction costs correlate with quasi-rents of assets, because increasing asset specificity 
encourages opportunistic behavior that the transactional parties need to mitigate through 
extensive contracts as well as control and enforcement mechanisms. 
5.3.2.2 Frequency 
Frequency is a further important attribute of transactions that impacts institutional arrange-
ments. For the analysis, two different kinds of frequencies are distinguished. The first one 
refers to the frequency of transactions between two specific market actors. Here, a higher 
number of anticipated transactions reduces the motivation and benefits of opportunistic be-
havior for both actors (Heide & Miner, 1992).  
The second kind of frequency refers to the frequency of transactions for specific goods 
among many trading partners (P. G. Klein, 2006)72. Williamsons (1984) argues that special-
ized institutional arrangements are more sensitively accustomed to the requirements of non-
standard transactions requiring idiosyncratic investments than unspecialized arrangements. 
However, the transaction costs for the development and set-up of specialized institutional 
arrangements are very high. Therefore, the frequency of a transaction is important for the 
selection of institutional arrangements, because the number of transactions must be suffi-
cient to leverage these high transaction costs. 
The transaction costs to set up specialized institutional arrangements can be reduced 
through the adaptation of institutional arrangements to similar markets. If such institutional 
adaptation with lower transaction costs is possible, specialized institutional arrangement will 
become beneficial even at a lower number of transactions (Mamadouh, Jong, & Lalenis, 
2002). 
5.3.2.3 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty has already been recognized by neoclassical microeconomics as a potential 
source of a market failure (see chapter  4.5.2). But the analysis of its impact on institutional 
arrangements for specific transactions and its interrelationship with asset specificity and fre-
quency is new within the domain of transaction cost economics. 
Uncertainty can be conceptualized one-dimensionally as ‘imperfect foresight’ (Furubotn & 
Richter, 2005, p. 81) or as a mixture of ‘volatility and ambiguity’, whereby volatility refers to 
the impossibility to predict changes in an environment over time and ambiguity describes the 
degree of uncertainty regarding the changes in perceptions of the environment irrespective of 
its change over time (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006). 
                                                
72 Klein (2006) also lists ‘frequency of disturbances’ as a third form of frequency. This concept, how-
ever, is incorporated into the third transaction attribute of uncertainty (compare also Williamson, 1991).  
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In order to elaborate the impact of uncertainty onto institutional arrangements in production, 
Walker & Weber (1984) suggest to distinguish between (i) volume and (ii) technological un-
certainty. Volume uncertainty refers to the fluctuation in demand and the confidence in the 
estimated demand. Technological uncertainty refers to the adaptation to required technology 
to meet changes in demand. Obviously, both these types of uncertainties are not necessarily 
independent of each other. This classification of volume and technological uncertainty has 
been frequently used to characterize transactions (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006). 
High degrees of uncertainty will make transactions more conducive to opportunistic behavior 
in case the transactions require idiosyncratic investments73. An analysis of institutional ar-
rangements must therefore incorporate the interactions between uncertainty and asset speci-
ficity, which are indeed difficult to measure in empirical analyses (Williamson, 1985b, p. 60). 
5.3.3 The contract law perspective of transactions 
The behavioral assumptions and attributes of transactions have an impact on the design of 
institutional arrangements, including the legal design of contracts for a specific transaction. 
The classical categorization of contracts has been introduced by Macneil (1978), who distin-
guishes between: (i) classical contracts, (ii) neoclassical contracts and (iii) relational con-
tracts. Williamson (1985b) has adopted this categorization in his development of transaction 
cost economics, even though he admits that a discrete distinguishing between these forms is 
not always possible as several overlaps exist in practice. 
Classical contracts are designed for a singular transaction between two parties that is timely 
limited and takes place in high numbers within the market between other parties. Classical 
contracts are complete contracts in the sense that both contractual parties negotiate with 
symmetric information and ex-ante define the transaction. Legal enforcement, that is non-
transaction specific as part of the institutional environment, guarantees the fulfillment of con-
tractual obligations, because the characteristics of the transaction and each party’s obligation 
have been described completely, i.e. for every possible ex-post eventuality (Furubotn & Rich-
ter, 2005, p. 156)74.  
Neoclassical contracts are applied for more complex and long-term relationships involving a 
high number of transactions. Here, both contractual parties intentionally negotiate an incom-
                                                
73 If the investments would be non-specific it would be easier to renegotiate the transaction in case of 
unforeseen ex-post changes. 
74 A further development of the classical contract theory is the agency-contract theory, where informa-
tion is taken to be asymmetric after contract conclusion. The agency or principal-agent theory is a 
distinct theoretical branch within the New Institutional Economics and will not be elaborated within in 
the context of the present research objectives. 
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plete contract which enables them to react flexibly upon uncertain circumstances. Due to the 
uncertainty and bounded rationality, it would be too expansive to formulate, control and en-
force a complete contract. Third parties can observe the execution of the contract and are 
therefore able to solve any disputes. Arbitration rather than legal courts are used to settle 
disputes, because they are faster, less expensive and allow continuity of the contractual rela-
tionship. These contracts are therefore also referred to as trilateral contracts  (Williamson, 
1985b, p. 75). 
Relational contracts, similar to neoclassical contracts, are intentionally incomplete and there-
fore allow gaps in the contract. Relational contracts are used in arrangements that exceed 
discrete singular transactions, whereby the contractual parties recognize that it is impossible 
or prohibitively expensive to agree ex-ante on all future contingencies and/or to verify them 
ex-post by third parties in case of disputes. A relational contract is based on the outcome that 
is only observable ex-post by the contractual parties directly involved. It therefore allows the 
parties to utilize their detailed knowledge of their specific situation and adapt to new informa-
tion as it becomes available (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002). Because relational contracts, 
unlike neoclassical contracts, cannot rely on third parties for dispute resolution, they are also 
referred to as bilateral contracts (Williamson, 1985b, p. 76). Due to the explained characteris-
tics, relational contracts are also described as implicit, informal or self-enforcing (Furubotn & 
Richter, 2005, p. 173) 75. 
The threefold framework of classical, neoclassical and relational contracts has later been 
extended by Williamson (1991), who added forbearance as the implicit contract law for inter-
nal organization. Here, firms (hierarchies) are their own court of ultimate appeal and able to 
exercise fiat, which markets cannot.  
As shown in the following Figure  5-2, Williamson (1985b, pp. 72-79) argues that the transac-
tional attributes of asset specificity and frequency are decisive for firms whether to use clas-
sical, neoclassical, relational contracts or forbearance in arranging their business relation-
ships. In this concept, a sufficient degree of uncertainty exists throughout all contractual 
forms. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
75 A special case of relational contracts are symbiotic contracts, whereby both parties pursue the same 
objective, but where a power imbalance exists. The imbalance is leveraged through a system of con-
trol, information and enforcement (Schanze, 1991). 
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Figure  5-2: Efficient contractual governance 
Source: Adopted from Williamson (1985b, p. 79) 
Transactions with non-specific investments can be governed by the market in which classical 
contracts are used for both occasional and recurrent exchange (Williamson, 1985b, p. 73). 
The classical contracts are more or less standardized and experience or advisory of outsid-
ers (e.g. rating agencies, consultants) can be used by everybody. Parties cannot benefit from 
opportunistic behavior, because contracts can easily be enforced and the threat of a hold-up 
problem does not exist. 
Transactions with low frequency that require intermediate or high asset specificity are suit-
able for trilateral governance using neoclassical contracts (Williamson, 1985b, p. 75). The 
limitations of classical contract law associated with the hold-up problem for transactions with 
idiosyncratic investments on the one hand and the high transaction costs for relational con-
tracting on the other hand are given as the reasons for the emergence of trilateral govern-
ance. 
If the frequency of transactions with intermediate or high asset specificity is high enough, the 
higher transaction costs for using relational contracts in bilateral or unified governance will be 
justified. The limited potential of opportunistic behavior in transactions with intermediate as-
set specificity favors bilateral governance with autonomous partners under a strong control 
and incentive regime. Unified governance is a vertical integration of formerly two individual 
parties giving up their autonomy and should be preferred for recurrent transaction involving 
large idiosyncratic investments. Hereby, the high threat of opportunistic behavior is better 
mitigated in a unified system, especially if economies of scale can be utilized to reduce pro-
duction costs (Williamson, 1985b, pp. 76-78). 
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5.3.4 Transaction cost economic approach towards institutional arrangements  
As elaborated in chapter  5.2, an institutional arrangement encompasses the formal or infor-
mal rules that structure specific transactions between economic actors (North, 1990).  The 
two extreme forms of institutional arrangements are markets on the one side and hierarchy 
on the other. Between these two there exist various hybrid institutional arrangements, such 
as long-term contracting, reciprocal trading, regulation or franchising (see next chapter). 
The analysis of institutional arrangements within the theory framework of transaction cost 
economics treats the institutional environment as exogenously given and neglects their im-
pact on the choice of an institutional environment. The key characteristics for describing insti-
tutional arrangements are given by Williamson (1991) as: 
1. Contract law regime refers to application of classical, neoclassical or forbearance con-
tract law. 
2. Incentive intensity describes the motivation to use assets and revenue streams efficiently. 
3. Administrative support (also administrative control) refers to the extent to which internal 
administrative instruments of the organization support (or control) the transaction.  
4. Performance: With reference to Hayek (1945) and Barnard (1938), two forms of adapta-
tion are distinguished. Autonomous adaptation refers to the neoclassical price mecha-
nisms for changes in demand and supply, whereas cooperative adaptation refers to the 
conscious, deliberate and purposeful efforts to adapt internally to the changes in demand, 
supply or technology.  
In later publications, Williamson (2005) reduces the importance of performance as a transac-
tion characteristics of institutional arrangements, because it is a result of the first three. 
The following Table  5-2 gives an overview of the way these attributes characterize the bipo-
lar institutional arrangements of market and hierarchy as well as the hybrids located in be-
tween. 
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 Institutional Arrangement 
Characteristics Hierarchy (Vertical Integration) Hybrid Forms (Spot) Market 
Contract law regime Forbearance Neoclassical/ relational Classical 
Instruments 
Incentive intensity 
Administrative support 
 
Low 
High 
 
Intermediate 
Intermediate 
 
High 
Low 
Performance 
Autonomous Adaptation 
Cooperative Adaptation 
 
Low 
High 
 
Intermediate 
Intermediate 
 
High 
Low 
Duration Perpetual Enduring with limitations Momentary 
Table  5-2: Characteristics of institutional arrangements  
Source: Adopted and expanded from Williamson (1991) 
The institutional arrangement of (spot) markets relies on classical contract law and combines 
high incentives with low administrative control. The performance of markets is characterized 
by high autonomous and low cooperative adaptation.  
In contrast, the institutional arrangement of hierarchy is governed by internal dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms through forbearance contract law, whereby incentive intensity is low and 
administrative control is high. Hierarchy is also referred to as vertical integration, because 
here the firm undertakes production internally by integrating all property rights. The autono-
mous adaptability of hierarchies is low, whereas cooperative adaptability is high. The attrib-
utes of a hybrid institutional arrangement are in between the two extremes and favor neo-
classical or relational contract law.  
A further attribute of an institutional arrangement is introduced by Ruiter (2005) who draws 
the attention to the duration of exchange as a significant attribute and puts it into relationship 
with the applied contract law. He describes the market as an institutional arrangement where 
a classical contract coincides with the exchange to yield a momentary exchange regime. In 
hybrid institutional arrangements, a neoclassical or relational contract support exchange in a 
more recurrent or enduring exchange regime that often has a timely limitation. A hierarchy is 
characterized by the replacement of an externally enforceable contract through internal as-
signment to yield a perpetual authority regime. 
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5.3.5 Hybrid institutional arrangements 
While the dichotomous types of market and hierarchy can be described more precisely, be-
cause they are the two extreme boundaries of institutional arrangements in which transaction 
can take place, the taxonomy of hybrids as alternative institutional arrangements has to be 
presented more openly.  
A flexible definition is given by Ménard (2004; 2005) who describes hybrids as “all forms of 
inter-firm collaboration in which property rights remain distinct while joint decisions are made, 
requiring specific modes of coordination”. They are characterized by (i) pooled resources, (ii) 
relational contracting and (iii) reduced competition due to combination of autonomy and in-
terdependency.  
Hybrid institutional arrangements include equity joint venture, long-term contracting (includ-
ing employment contracts), networks, alliances, franchises, strategic alliances, other long-
term business relationships and even clusters or joint trademarks (Furubotn & Richter, 2005, 
pp. 295, 303; P. G. Klein, 2005; Ménard, 2005; Noorderhaven, 1995).  
Hybrid institutional arrangements will emerge for specific transactions whenever required 
resources and capabilities cannot be bundled efficiently in the market, while vertical integra-
tion within a firm reduces flexibility or incentives (see next chapter). 
Different types of hybrid institutional arrangements can be distinguished by three dimensions: 
(i) number of partners, (ii) scope and (iii) specifications of neoclassical/relational contract law 
regime (Bruce & Jordan, 2007; Child & Faulkner, 2002). The first two dimensions look at 
whether two or several parties are part of the arrangement and whether the scope of joint 
actions is focused (single purpose) or complex. As shown in the following Figure  5-3, the 
latter dimension specifies applied contractual relationships. 
 
Figure  5-3: Contractual dimension of selected hybrid institutional arrangements 
Source: own 
Even though the presented illustrations of hybrid arrangements might be unsatisfying due to 
the lack of a precise definition, the obtained flexibility and vagueness must be accepted as 
new hybrids frequently emerge as a mixture of various ideal types (Noorderhaven, 1995). 
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5.3.6 Heuristic model of institutional arrangements 
Based on the theoretical findings of applying contract law regimes to transactions (see chap-
ter  5.3.3), a core prediction of transaction cost economics is that the institutional arrange-
ments of spot market (M), hybrid arrangements (X) and hierarchies (H) are applied depend-
ing on the asset specificity (k). The following Figure  5-4 abstracts anticipated transaction 
costs for the institutional arrangements market, hybrids and hierarchy as a function of asset 
specificity. 
 
Figure  5-4: Institutional arrangements, transaction costs and asset specificity  
Source: Williamson (1991) 
Formally, the transaction cost functions can be written as M = M(k)+ α for markets,  X = X(k) 
+ β for hybrid institutional arrangements and H = H(k) + γ for hierarchies. If a transaction 
does not require investments in specific assets (k=0), the institutional arrangement of market 
will be preferred due to least transaction costs76: 
M(0)=α < X(0)=β < H(0)=γ 
Due to their different ability to implement coordinative adaptation that is required for asset 
specificity (k), the marginal growth of transaction costs in relationship to asset specificity is 
                                                
76 Williamson also uses the terms ‘governance costs’ (1991) and ‘bureaucratic costs’ (2005). 
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the highest for markets (M), medium for hybrid institutional arrangements (X) and the lowest 
for hierarchies (H):  
       
As a result, the transaction costs for hybrid institutional arrangements are the lowest with 
intermediate asset specificity between k1 and k2 (compare with Figure  5-4). With asset speci-
ficity higher than k2, the hierarchy provides the least transaction costs77. 
So far the presented theoretical framework only attempted to economize transaction costs to 
align institutional arrangements with respect to asset specificity. The other two attributes of 
transaction, i.e. uncertainty and frequency, have so far been left unconsidered. As part of a 
static comparative analysis, Williamson (1991) investigated the impacts of uncertainty, espe-
cially the frequency of disturbances, on institutional arrangements. It is argued that hybrid 
institutional arrangements meet sever problems with increasing uncertainty, because in-
creasing adaptation requirements are costly and time consuming under neoclassical or rela-
tional law regime. As shown in the following Figure  5-5, hybrid institutional arrangements 
might not be appropriate anymore for enduring exchange regimes with high uncertainty, due 
to their failure to adapt adequately.  
 
Figure  5-5: Transaction cost economizing of institutional arrangements with respect to uncer-
tainty 
Source: Williamson (1991) 
                                                
77 For a more formalized theory of vertical integration and transaction cost economics, see e.g. 
Grossman & Hart (1986). 
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The following Figure  5-6 was developed by Williamson (1999) and it displays a heuristic con-
tracting scheme that is based on the attributes of a transaction. If the transaction involves no 
idiosyncratic investments to a non-trivial degree, the spot market will be chosen. If the trans-
action requires idiosyncratic investments and no contractual safeguards are provided, an 
unrelieved contractual hazard will be expected, whereby a farsighted contractual party will 
charge a price with a high risk premium. It may also be possible that no contractual party can 
be found at all due to anticipated high uncertainty. If the transaction requires idiosyncratic 
investments and contractual safeguards (neoclassical contracts, relational contracts or for-
bearance) are in place, the transaction will use either hybrid institutional arrangements or 
internal organization.  
 
Figure  5-6: Heuristic contracting scheme 
Source: Adopted from Williamson (1999) 
Due to high transaction costs78 for internal organization, Williamson (1999) argues that “in-
ternal organization is usefully thought of as the organization form of last resort: try markets, 
try hybrids, and have recourse to the firm only when all else fails”.  
5.3.7 Existing empirical support for transaction cost economics 
In comparison to industrial organization or the theory of the firm, the theoretical framework of 
transaction cost economics has been subject to extensive empirical analyses. Today, there 
exits a vast number of empirical studies to support the basic tenets of transaction cost eco-
nomics.  Early empirical work was carried out in specific industry sectors, e.g., coal burning 
power plants (Joskow, 1985, 1988, 1990), natural gas supply (Masten & Crocker, 1985) or 
shipbuilding (Masten et al., 1991). 
                                                
78 Williamson uses the term ‘bureaucratic costs’, thus emphasizing that the transaction costs accrue 
within the firm. 
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An influential survey on empirical research in transaction cost economics was conducted by 
Shelanski & Klein (1995). More recent aggregations of empirical studies can be found for 
example at David & Han (2004), Klein (2005), Geyskens et al. (2006) and Carter & Hodgson 
(2007).  
Given the strong empirical support, it is very persuasive to use transaction cost economics 
as the theoretical framework for analyzing institutional arrangements of the MSWC plants. 
For that purpose, its application to (i) public ordering in general and (ii) the unique character-
istics of the MSWC infrastructure will be discussed in the next two chapters. 
5.3.8 Application to public ordering 
5.3.8.1 General 
 Although not explicitly said, the standard theoretical framework of transaction cost econom-
ics, as presented so far, is primarily concerned with transactions between private firms. The 
question is now whether or under what conditions, the concept can be expanded to transac-
tions involving the public sector and the political systems. Looking back at the historical evo-
lution of transaction cost economics, the necessity to raise this question is rather surprising, 
because much of the theoretical foundations are the result of the public policy analysis of 
market failure problems (Williamson, 1971).  
In comparison with the vast number of theoretical studies on transaction cost economics re-
garding institutional arrangements in the private sphere, there are only very few theoretical 
approaches to extend the model to public procurement (Genugten, 2005; Glachant & 
Saussier, 2006). 
As stated early, there exist thematic linkages between public choice theory and transaction 
cost economics, and Furubotn & Richter (2005, p. 477) argue that Williamson’s transaction 
cost economic approach also applies to institutional arrangements for political relationships. 
One expansion of transaction cost economics to public bureaucracies and policies has been 
done by Williamson (1999). Hereby, in addition to the transactional attributes of asset speci-
ficity, uncertainty, frequency and duration (see chapter  5.3.2), public transactions are further 
ascribed by the attribute of probity, referring to the need for acting with strong moral princi-
ples and honesty. This extension of Williamson has only very limited applicability to the 
analysis of institutional arrangements for the MSWC projects, because it focuses on sover-
eign public transactions such as redistribution, regulation, foreign policy or judiciary. Transac-
tions for the procurement of public infrastructure and service delivery are explicitly excluded 
(Williamson, 1999). 
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5.3.8.2 Applying the heuristic model 
Two important constraints have to be considered when applying the transaction cost eco-
nomic framework to the public sector. The first constraint concerns the application of contract 
law theory to transactions where one party is from the public sector. In many countries, for-
malized public procurement law is very stringent and restricts the selection of contractual 
partners79. Therefore, the informal institutions as part of institutional arrangements might play 
a smaller role. In addition, public procurement law might restrict the application of relational 
contracting for transactions. Also, the private parties might not have the same incentives to 
apply relational contracts, because no advantage will result from “informal good behavior”, if 
the transaction partners are chosen purely on formal aspects. As a result of public procure-
ment restrictions, hybrid institutional arrangements that include public partners will more 
likely rely on neoclassical contracts than on relational contracts, therefore leading to higher 
transaction costs. 
The second constraint concerns transaction costs for hierarchical production within the public 
sector. In case the incentives are lower within the public sector (for example because higher 
efficiencies are less rewarded internally than in the private sector), the transaction costs will 
be comparatively higher.  
The following Figure  5-7 shows the impact of higher transaction costs on hybrid arrange-
ments and hierarchy in the public sector. 
                                                
79 Such restrictions are e.g. (i) required open tendering, (ii) contract award to lowest price or (iii) prohi-
bition or limitations in negotiating ex ante or ex post. 
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Figure  5-7: Change of transaction costs for institutional arrangements in the public sector 
Source: Own, based on Williamson (1991) 
The model indicates that the order of selecting institutional arrangements remains the same 
in relation to asset specificity. The major difference is that lower transaction costs for (i) hy-
brid arrangements in comparison to market and (ii) hierarchy in comparison to hybrid ar-
rangements will come into effect with higher asset specificity (the points move to k1’ and k2’ 
respectively). It is interesting to observe in this theoretical model, that the distance between 
k1 and k1’, representing the change in asset specificity, is larger than the distance between k2 
and k2’. Depending on the increase of transaction costs for public hybrids (X’) it is even pos-
sible that the point k2 does not move at all or that it moves to the left (see appendix 4). 
For other attempts to apply the theoretical concept of transaction cost economics to the pub-
lic sector (especially policy aspects) see e.g. Bryson & Ring (1990), Hart (2003), Dollery 
(2001), Obermann (2007) and M. A. Nelson (1997). 
5.3.8.3 Privatization taxonomy and institutional arrangements 
As elaborated in chapter  5.3.5, there exists a wide range of applicable institutional arrange-
ments to structure transactional exchange between different parties. The terminology usually 
changes when institutional arrangements are discussed with a public organization acting as 
the principal of the transaction. Here, the various forms of privatization are used to describe 
institutional arrangements for public ordering. 
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The following Figure  5-8 shows the taxonomy of different privatization forms and their alloca-
tion to the institutional arrangements of hierarchy, hybrid and market. Public administration80 
and formal privatization are referred to as the institutional arrangement of hierarchy, whereas 
functional privatization and partial material privatization are hybrid institutional arrangements. 
Depending on the contract duration, full material privatization is either a hybrid institutional 
arrangement (using long-term contracts) or a market arrangement (using short-term con-
tracts in a spot market)81. 
 
Figure  5-8: Privatization taxonomy and institutional arrangements 
Source: own 
Public administration 
An internal production (vertical integration) by the public sector within its own bureaucratic 
and administrative organization is called public administration. Often a discrete unit (e.g. cost 
centre, bureau of public works) is established to separate the production from other public 
entities. The legal system in some countries (e.g. Germany) even allows the outsourcing of 
production into a public company which operates under public law.  
                                                
80 Also: public bureaucracy 
81 It should be that the presented taxonomy of institutional arrangements and privatization forms ap-
plies only to transactions, in which the public sector remains the principal of contracted tasks and ser-
vices.  
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Public administration is often also-called “internal outsourcing” or “commercialization”, be-
cause here various functions are usually reorganized and restructured in a separate unit with 
the adaptation of management techniques from the private sector (see e.g. Kessides, 1993, 
p. 24). 
Formal privatization 
Formal privatization describes the transfer of production from the public administration to a 
legally independent entity under private law which remains under 100% public ownership. 
This institutional arrangement is still considered a hierarchy, because production continues to 
be done within the public domain (principal and agent are within the same extended public 
sphere). The objectives of a formal privatization often comprise fiscal and labor-related is-
sues, improved commercial management structures as well as reduced (but by far not abol-
ished) political influences. Formal privatization is often implemented before creating another 
hybrid institutional arrangement (see B. Weber et al., 2006, pp. 57-59). 
Functional privatization  
Functional privatization is understood as the timely limited transfer of formerly public produc-
tion by a public administration or formally privatized public company to an independent com-
pany under 100% private ownership. Basically, all forms of contractual relationships between 
a public principal and a private agent, where the responsibility of production returns to the 
public sector after the completion of the contract, fall under this category. For such functional 
privatization it is irrelevant whether only single goods and services (e.g. construction works) 
or complex and integrated tasks (e.g. Design-Build-Finance-Operate) are transferred (Alfen 
& Kleiss, 2003). Due to the relational characteristics of the timely limited contract and the 
bilateral dependencies between public principal and private agent such functional privatiza-
tion is categorized as a hybrid institutional arrangement. 
Partial material privatization 
The permanent formation of a joint venture company under shared public and private owner-
ship is called partial material privatization. The respective distribution of ownership can range 
between the two extremes of 1% to 99% (Alfen, 2007). In this hybrid institutional arrange-
ment, which is often also-called horizontal partnership, both parties pool their resources for 
an unlimited period of time to jointly produce the publicly ordered goods and services. 
Full material privatization 
Full material privatization describes the permanent transfer of production to a 100% privately 
owned company. Hereby, all assets that are required for the production are owned by the 
private agent. These assets are either newly developed by the private sector or they have 
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been initially under public ownership and were transferred to the private company at a later 
stage. 
The full material privatization can be categorized as a hybrid arrangement whenever a long-
term contract for a high number of transactions exists between the public principal and the 
private agent (enduring exchange regime)82. In case of short-term contracts for each individ-
ual transaction in a spot market, such institutional arrangement can be classified as a market 
arrangement.  
5.3.9 Critical comments on the transaction cost economic approach 
In the past two decades, the body of theory that is embraced by new institutional economics 
became a distinct school of economics and received strong followings (Ménard & Shirley, 
2005). Especially the discipline of transaction cost economics has been used by a vast num-
ber of scientists for analyzing a wide range of institutional and organizational aspects in the 
economy.  
No theory, however, exists without shortcomings and one must also be aware of the limita-
tions imposed by transaction cost economics (for a review of criticism see Furubotn & Rich-
ter, 2005, p. 195). The most severe criticism is formulated by the assertion that economic 
actors rather aim at minimizing only their own transaction costs, whereas the total transaction 
costs are only of subordinate interest to them. Therefore, the individuals might often search 
for the institutional arrangement that shift transaction costs to the other party without neces-
sarily implementing the most efficient one (Dollery, 2001). 
It is important to bear in mind the criticism to transaction cost economics when applying the 
economic concept to exploring institutional arrangements in real-world environments. Trans-
action cost economics provides however a very valuable framework for a positive analysis of 
transactions that involve idiosyncratic investments (Mühlenkamp, 1999), and therefore it can 
be regarded as one pillar to pursue the objectives of the present research. 
Many concepts that have been developed to measure and model transaction costs and their 
effects to institutional arrangements are truncated because they leave out the interrelation-
ships with production costs and revenues (see e.g. Williamson, 1991). Therefore, a further 
comparative analysis of institutional arrangements for the MSWC must not only focus on 
transaction costs, but also on production costs. Hereby, the aspects of unit costs in relation 
to plant size (economies of scale) and location of production must be considered (see chap-
ter  3.4).  
                                                
82 Such arrangements are similar to long-term supply contracts between private parties. An analysis of 
such hybrid institutional arrangements can be found e.g. at Joskow (1985) or Masten & Crocker 
(1985). 
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Another criticism is related to behavioral aspects. Although the impacts of bounded rationality 
and opportunistic behavior are fundamental elements of transaction cost economics, the the-
ory widely disregards other aspects of human nature. Ghoshal & Moran (1996) argue that 
transaction cost economics is not suitable as a normative theory, because highly relevant 
issues of culture, learning and trust within organizations are generally neglected (see also 
Dyer, 1997). However, they acknowledge the potential strengths as a positive theory if care-
fully applied within specific contexts83. This criticism is taken very seriously for this research 
and therefore an elaboration on different stakeholders in the MSWC projects is done in the 
next chapter (see below). 
5.4 Application of transaction cost economic approach to MSWC 
Williamson (1985b, p. 41) argues that “any problem that can be posed directly or indirectly as 
a contracting problem is usefully investigated in transaction cost economizing term”. Based 
on this insight, the theoretical framework of transaction cost economics is now applied to the 
MSWC by (i) determining the attributes of the transaction municipal solid waste combustion 
and by (ii) elaborating on the characteristics of applicable institutional arrangements. 
Before applying the theoretical framework, it is important to define the single transaction for 
the analysis within the MSWC. Based on the general definition of an individual transaction as 
a transfer of a good or service across a technological interface (see chapter  5.3.1), a single 
transaction within the MSWC is defined as a single unit of municipal waste to be treated at 
an MSWC plant. The smallest transactional unit is usually a container (e.g. 20Mg) that is de-
livered by a truck or other vehicle. The physical transfer across the technological interface 
takes place when the waste is unloaded from the truck into the waste bunker. The accurate 
size of the transaction, i.e. the weight of the bulk waste, is determined by weighing machines 
at the gate of an MSWC plant84. 
5.4.1 Attributes of the transaction MSWC 
5.4.1.1 Asset specificity 
The asset specificity of the MSWC plants is comparatively high in two respects: First, site 
asset specificity is very high, because it is very expensive to dismantle existing facilities and 
to rebuild them at another location. Also the planning approvals restrict the location of the 
plant. Secondly, the physical asset specificity is also comparatively high. The MSWC plants 
are usually built to treat residual waste from households or commercial sources with specific 
                                                
83 Williamson (1996) directly responded to their critique: “Transaction cost economics is an empirical 
success story. Ghoshal and Moran should come to terms with that.”  
84 A long-term waste treatment contract could therefore easily include tens of thousands of transac-
tions. 
Theoretical framework for institutional arrangements 
102 
characteristic (e.g. NPV, moisture content, chlorine concentration, etc.). The redesigning for 
thermal treatment of other waste types (e.g. RDF, industrial waste or medical waste) or for 
burning other fuels (e.g. coal or biofuel) would be very costly and time consuming. 
The other two types of asset specificity, i.e. human asset specificity and dedicated assets, 
are evaluated as low to medium. Human resources that are required for operating an MSWC 
plant need special training and experience. In the medium run, however, it is likely that new 
employees will be found to replace former staff if necessary. From a technical point of view, 
assets of the MSWC plant are not dedicated to a specific principal, because the characteris-
tics of waste from different municipalities are very similar.  
5.4.1.2 Frequency 
Two different forms of frequency are differentiated: First, the frequency of transactions can 
be interpreted as the number of transactions between the public principal and the client 
(owner of an MSWC plant). This frequency depends on the municipal waste generation rates 
within the municipality, which in turn depends largely on the number of households and 
commercial organizations (see also chapter  2.4.2). Obviously, the transaction frequency for 
smaller municipalities is much lower than for larger municipalities. The frequency can be in-
creased, if municipalities bundle their demand in the so-called inter-communal cooperations 
(see below). 
The second form of frequency refers to the number of transactions among all partners within 
the boundary of an economy. In this context, it is very important to analyze the administra-
tive, legal and geographic borders of the waste management system. In many countries, 
there are laws restricting the transportation of waste across regional or national levels. 
5.4.1.3 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is differentiated between volume and technological uncertainty. The latter is 
comparatively high, if new technology has not been tested over longer periods of time. In the 
beginning of modern waste combustion in the 1960s and ‘70s, the technological uncertainty 
was relatively high. Nowadays, these uncertainties are much lower, especially if a supplier of 
machinery equipment possesses a track record or if operators have a larger number of hori-
zontally integrated the MSWC plants, among which knowledge can be shared. 
Volume uncertainty reflects changes in demand, i.e. anticipated changes in waste generation 
rates. Also uncertainty with respect to waste characteristics (e.g. NCV) must be considered 
in this context. A generalized proposition about the uncertainty in MSWC cannot be made as 
it depends on the specific institutional environment. 
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5.4.1.4 Conclusion 
The attribute of asset specificity of the transaction the MSWC expects that hybrid institutional 
arrangements or hierarchy are preferred to the institutional arrangement of market. In theory, 
the preference between hybrids and hierarchy rather depends on the attributes of frequency 
and uncertainty than on degree of asset specificity (site and physical asset specificity are 
almost equal among different transactions). Based on the theoretical framework of transac-
tion cost economics, comparatively high frequency of transaction (e.g. in large municipalities 
with high aggregated waste generation volumes) and high uncertainty (e.g. unpredictable 
changes in waste law or technological uncertainty) would support the institutional arrange-
ment of hierarchy. 
The next chapter will present an overview of theoretically applicable institutional arrange-
ments for the MSWC projects. 
5.4.2 Institutional arrangements for MSWC 
The description and characterization of institutional arrangements for the MSWC can be de-
rived from the classification of institutional arrangements within the privatization context (see 
chapter  5.3.8.3). This approach is appropriate, because the public sector is responsible for 
ensuring an integrated municipal waste management system and it is therefore the principal 
for the MSWC infrastructure and services (see chapter  1). In theory, the public sector (usu-
ally the municipality) can therefore choose between hierarchical institutional arrangements of 
internal production, various hybrid institutional arrangements and market arrangement. 
Within the infrastructure sector of waste management85 a sector-specific taxonomy has 
emerged and is widely used to describe the various applicable institutional arrangements 
(see e.g. Berenyi, 2006; Cointreau-Levine & Coad, 2000; Kusenbach, 2002; Lee, 1997; 
Wagner, 2000). This taxonomy will be adopted with only minor changes in the further analy-
sis of this research. The following Figure  5-9 shows the seven most relevant institutional ar-
rangements in the waste management sector and their allocation with respect to the privati-
zation taxonomy. 
                                                
85 The taxonomy is very similar to the water sector, but differs partly to the sectors of public real estate 
and road infrastructure. 
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Figure  5-9: Institutional arrangements with waste management taxonomy  
Source: own 
Four important attributes have been identified to describe and characterize different institu-
tional arrangements for the MSWC (see also chapter  5.4.1): 
1. Asset ownership indicates whether the public principal or the private agent is the owner 
of assets. This issue is very important due to the high asset specificity of the MSWC 
plants. 
2. Duration specifies the time frame of the institutional arrangement during which the trans-
actional exchange takes place. 
3. Operation defines the distribution of rights and responsibilities for technically operating 
the assets. 
4. Demand risk allocation identifies which transactional partner assumes the volume uncer-
tainty, i.e. who bears the positive and negative effects of changes in waste combustion 
quantities and qualities.  
Based on these elaborated attributes, the most significant and theoretically applicable institu-
tional arrangements for the MSWC can now be modeled and described below. Hereby, only 
the principal institutional arrangements for the MSWC are outlined. A further degree of de-
tails and separation is not necessary at this stage. 
Public administration 
Every hierarchical institutional arrangement within the public sector that operates under pub-
lic law can be classified as public administration. Based on the institutional environment, i.e. 
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aspects of the public law, different organizational and legal forms of public administration 
might be available86.  
The institutional arrangement of public administration is characterized by public ownership 
and operation of assets for an unlimited period of time. All demand risks are borne by the 
public sector. An important feature of public administrations is the fact that they cannot go 
into bankruptcy.  
Public company 
The hierarchical institutional arrangement of public company87 is identical to formal privatiza-
tion (see chapter  5.3.8.3). Hereby, the public sector founds a legally independent company 
under private law which owns and operates the MSWC plant for an unlimited period of time. 
Similar to the institutional arrangement of public administration, all demand risks are internal-
ized within the public sector. Even though the public company enjoys more operational 
autonomy than the public administration, production continues to be done within the sphere 
of the public sector and it is therefore classified as hierarchy.  
Operations model 
In the operations model the technical operation of the MSWC plant is outsourced to a private 
company for a longer, but limited period of time (usually 10-20 years). The assets remain 
under the ownership of the public principal, which also carries all demand risks. Due to the 
long-term mutual dependency between public principal and private client, any arrangement is 
referred to as a hybrid arrangement under which the technical operation of an MSWC plant is 
outsourced for a longer period of time88.  
A special form of the operations model exists if the same private company builds an MSWC 
plant and after transferring ownership of assets to the public principal, operates the facility 
over a longer period of time89. 
(Design)-Build-Operate-Transfer 
As the name Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) implies, this hybrid institutional arrangement en-
compasses the construction of an MSWC plant by a private company, which operates it for a 
                                                
86 E.g. in Germany, there exist three different options. See chapter  6.1.4. 
87 Also referred to as state-owned-enterprise 
88 In case of an outsourcing of other value chain elements (i.e. design or construction), as done in the 
institutional arrangement of public administration or company, the same level of mutual dependencies 
doesn’t exist between public and private.  
89 Also-called: Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) 
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limited period of time90. During the contractual period, which usually lasts for 15 to 25 years, 
the assets are owned by the private agent and will be transferred at the end of the contrac-
tual period to the public principal. The private agent also usually finances the assets and re-
ceives compensation during the operational phase that can be based on different applicable 
payment structures. 
In case the entire MSWC life-cycle also including its design is transferred to the private 
agent, this institutional arrangement will be called Design-Build-Operate-Transfer (DBOT). In 
both cases, however, the public agent specifies the capacity of the MSWC plant and carries 
all demand risks.  
Public-private joint venture 
In the hybrid institutional arrangement of public-private joint venture the assets of the MSWC 
are jointly owned and operated for an unlimited period of time by a public and private entity91. 
The public entity could either be a municipality or a public company under private law. A typi-
cal characteristic of this institutional arrangement is that commercial and technical risks in-
cluding demand risks are shared between both partners. Specific characteristics of the risk 
sharing mechanism are specified in the shareholder agreement. 
There are two options for the creation of a public-private joint venture. First, the public and 
private partners can jointly found a special purpose company, which develops the MSWC 
plant. Another option for its formation is the sale of shares of a formerly publicly owned com-
pany to a private partner (Bognetti & Robotti, 2007).  
Private company 
In the hybrid institutional arrangement of private company, the assets of an MSWC plant are 
owned and operated by a private company for an unlimited period of time. Hereby, the pri-
vate company owning the MSWC plant has signed one or multiple long-term waste treatment 
contracts with public municipalities that are usually tendered under open competition. The 
aggregate quantity of all waste treatment contracts guarantees a minimum capacity utiliza-
tion of the MSWC plant to secure investments. The waste treatment contracts usually have a 
                                                
90 The transfer of the entire life-cycle to the private agent for a limited period of time is also-called “con-
tractual public private partnership” (Alfen, 2007; European Commission, 2004). In the real estate sec-
tor, this institutional arrangement is called “public-private partnership”. 
91 A public-private joint venture is also-called “institutional public-private partnership” (Alfen, 2007; 
European Commission, 2004). In the waste management sector, this institutional arrangement is 
called “public-private partnership”. 
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duration of 10 to 20 years and normally guarantee minimum waste quantity and qualities92. In 
this institutional arrangement, the total capacity of the plant is specified by the private owner, 
which therefore bears overall demand risks. Due to the enduring exchange regime of the 
long-term waste treatment contracts, the private client and public principal remain mutually 
dependent on each others. 
Spot market 
The theoretical institutional arrangement of spot market is partly similar to private company, 
because the assets of an MSWC plant are fully owned and operated by a private company 
for an unlimited period of time. In contrast with private company, however no enduring ex-
change regime exists between the public principal and the private agent due to the lack of 
any long-term contract. The short-term (sometimes implicit) contracts embrace only single 
transactions and the contractual specifications change constantly. In a private spot market 
the public principal could constantly choose among different private MSWC plant for every 
single transaction. There exists no prior agreement concerning time, quantity, quality or price 
of waste deliveries. 
                                                
92 Another option is that the municipality obliges itself to deliver residual municipal exclusively to the 
contracted MSWC.  
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5.5 Stakeholder Analysis 
5.5.1 General 
In order to analyze institutional arrangements, it is important to obtain a profound under-
standing of the stakeholders involved and their interests. According to the sociological con-
cept of methodological individualism (Schumpeter, 1908; M. Weber, 1922) and the stake-
holder approach (Freeman, 1984), it is emphasized that the objectives stakeholders matter.  
Within the research contexts, stakeholders are any organization or individuals that are af-
fected by a MSWX project. 
As shown in the following the following Figure  5-10, following major stakeholders have been 
identified and will be analyzed in the following section: citizens of households, politician, bu-
reaucrats, public and private companies, financiers, manufacturers and suppliers, as well as 
consultants. 
 
Figure  5-10: Stakeholders of MSWC projects and possible linkages 
Source: own 
5.5.2 Politicians 
Politicians are elected and active members of the government. They have the decision mak-
ing power to enact laws, regulations, enforcement rules or other formal elements of the insti-
tutional environment. With this power they shape the framework in which society and econ-
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omy function. Because politicians are elected by all citizens, politicians aim at maximizing 
their votes (Downs, 1957). 
Similar to other individuals, politicians behave mostly rationally and pursue personal pecuni-
ary as well as non-pecuniary objectives93. Depending on personal preferences, they want to 
use their positions to maximize power, reputation, popularity as well as their income. Also the 
objective to shape society according to their personal normative believes (e.g. “creation of a 
better society and environment”) is part of politician’s utility functions. 
Depending on the political structure of the state, politicians are usually present at three lev-
els: (i) national, (ii) regional and (iii) municipal level. For each level there exist different elec-
tions, in which different issues can have an impact on voters’ choices. Besides general envi-
ronmental issues, more detailed aspects of municipal waste management usually only have 
an impact on municipal political level, where they could become an important “battlefield” for 
political struggle. Costs and fees for waste management frequently become a political issue, 
especially if prices for mandatory waste management are already comparatively high or if 
they are about to be increased. 
There are frequent conflicts between political objectives at different government levels. Eco-
nomic or environmental objectives could be different at national and municipal levels. For 
example, municipal politicians are often more interested in reducing the unemployment rate 
or in increasing tax revenues and purchasing power within their own municipality, regardless 
of their impacts at regional or national levels. They might therefore prefer local public waste 
management companies and might want to protect them against competition from outside.  
The NIMTOO (not in my term of office) phenomenon can often be observed in politics and it 
also has relevance to municipal waste management. Hereby, politicians might want to delay 
decisions that, from an objective point of view, might be necessary or preferable within the 
legislative period. They might fear the loss of votes, if unpopular decisions were made, such 
to cut the budget, to increase waste management fees or to determine the location of an 
MSWC plant.  
Informal networks and relationships with other stakeholders play an important role for politi-
cians. Especially after politicians retire from official politics, these informal contacts are often 
used for personal benefit, such as obtaining a lucrative position in a public or private com-
pany. Therefore, it can be assumed that political decisions, such as the decision on the se-
lection of an institutional arrangement for the MSWC, could be influenced by anticipated ob-
jectives after their term in power.  
                                                
93 Especially at municipal level often only leading positions (e.g. mayor) receive compensation for their 
work. Other politicians (e.g. members of municipal parliaments) receive only marginal financial com-
pensation and therefore non-pecuniary objectives prevail. 
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Especially municipal politicians could have strong incentives to increase their influence on 
public waste management companies (see below). Their formal controlling power over com-
panies as part of institutional arrangements as well as informal relationships could be used 
for assigning well paid positions or contracts to selected persons (Crounauge & Wester-
mann, 2003, p. 77). Memberships of the board of larger companies are also very lucrative for 
politicians (as also for private persons), because they provide additional income. 
5.5.3 Bureaucrats 
Government bureaus are the organizations controlled and regulated by politicians through 
which political objectives can be implemented. Bureaucrats are the individuals who work in 
bureaus and unlike politicians they are not elected94. Government bureaus are usually char-
acterized by a clear division of power among hierarchical offices in a formalized, rigid and 
linear career system. Formal and informal networks play an important role for bureaucrats 
within their organization as well as with other organizations and individuals in politics, and 
public or private companies.  
In contrast with public and private companies, government bureaus are characterized by 
nonmarket and non-competitive nature of their output, which in turn shapes the output of the 
market. Bureaucrats are usually risk averse, because there usually are only limited rewards 
for possible profits from taking these risks.  
Within the context of the municipal waste management, government bureaus include, for 
example, national and regional environmental ministries or municipal waste management 
authorities. Depending on the political assignments, their responsibilities include the devel-
opment of environmental policies (see chapter  4.3.2), the design of waste management 
strategies, as well as their enforcement. 
There are different theoretical approaches to understand and analyze bureaucracies. These 
theories are part of the public choice framework which has developed parallel to new institu-
tional economics (see e.g. Buchanan, 2003; Mueller, 2003).  
The budget-maximizing model of bureaucracy is an influential theory and was developed by 
Niskanen (1968; 1971) who argues that rational bureaucrats primarily aim at maximizing the 
total budget of the bureau. In this way they can increase their power. Under the assumption 
that (i) there exists a known demand for the output of the bureaus, (ii) only the bureaucrats 
know the true cost function of their output and (iii) the bureau makes a take or don’t-take 
proposal to politicians, Niskanen (1975) formally showed that the result is an excess in out-
put and required budget.  
                                                
94 The head of a bureaucracy who is chosen for a specific legislative period is regarded as a politician 
and not as a bureaucrat. 
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The budget-maximizing model has been advanced by other theorists who made changes to 
the assumptions. Miller & Moe (1983) showed that the excess in output and budget will be 
lower or possibly even zero, if the demand for the output of the bureaus is only known to the 
politicians and thus the bureaucrats do not have the power to make take or don’t-take pro-
posals95. 
A more recent theory of bureaucracy was developed by Dunleavy (1991). His bureau-
shaping model of bureaucracy can be understood as an enhancement of the budget-
maximizing model and is based on the assumption that rationally acting bureaucrats primarily 
want to maximize their personal utility rather than that of the bureau. Their utility function is 
not only based on power (i.e. budget), but also on the nature of their work. Bureaucrats might 
prefer to do appealing work instead of running large agencies that involve extensive and rigid 
formalities. Also in this case, bureaucrats are risk averse and therefore often favor the out-
sourcing of different works. By this they can pursue careers in more exiting and newly struc-
tured bureaus, where they continue to enjoy employment securities in combination with deci-
sion making power and influence. 
Some researchers have challenged the assumptions and conclusions from theoretical mod-
els of self-interest seeking bureaucrats. They argue that bureaucrats have professional moti-
vations comparable to those in private companies and that their efforts might even lead to a 
better outcome than in profit-maximizing firms (Francois, 2000). 
Waste management bureaus and their bureaucrats are often identified with the implemented 
waste management infrastructure or provided services, even if services are contracted out to 
private companies. Often households do not possess sufficient information about the institu-
tional arrangement and will complain to the bureaucrats if they face problems (whether ob-
jectively justified or not). This bias might explain why many bureaucrats prefer public waste 
management provision, as it allows them to have a direct control and actively influence out-
put levels. 
5.5.4 Public service providers 
Public service providers are entities owned by the public sector, the respective civil society. 
In municipal waste management, these entities are either public waste administrations that 
act under public law or they are public companies that provide services as legally independ-
ent entities under private law (see chapter  5.3.8.3).  
It could be argued that public administrations (and to a certain extent also public companies) 
are some kind of bureaus as well, because they are controlled by politicians who employ 
                                                
95 See also Mueller (2003, pp. 365-368) for a review of extensions of Niskanen’s budget-maximizing 
model. 
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them to implement their objectives. The decisive differentiation from bureaus is that these 
public service providers produce a physical output of specific goods in the market. These 
goods are often related, but not just constrained, to public infrastructure, such as waste 
management or public transportation96.  
Public service providers play an important role within the context of municipal waste man-
agement, as they can be found for example as public waste collectors, transportation com-
panies or publicly owned and operated the MSWC plants (see chapter  5.4.2). Many public 
waste companies not only provide services for municipal waste management but also ac-
tively engage in the management of commercial waste (Bruch, 2004). 
The dependence of public companies on political influences, which determines their degree 
of decision making freedom with respect to internal organization and management, differs 
according to the chosen legal form under which they operate. Formally, privatized public 
companies that are governed by private law usually enjoy more independence by political 
influences and public constraints, such as labor law or budgetary constraints.  
Even though public entities are likely to be threatened by lower efficiency, i.e. higher produc-
tion costs, compared to private companies, Benz & Frey (2007) argue that some characteris-
tics of public governance have potential advantages in comparison to corporate governance. 
These include: (i) fixed compensation of management, (ii) division of power, (iii) rules of suc-
cession and (iv) institutionalization of competition for leadership within the organization. 
Especially at municipal level, publicly owned entities are used as policy instruments (Bernier 
& Simard, 2007) and present important vehicles to implement political objectives. For exam-
ple, public waste management companies create local jobs within and outside the organiza-
tion and generate taxes. Even though public entities should primarily aim at maximizing the 
utility of a citizen97, they could also earn profits as quasi-monopolistic producers if the de-
mand were high. If the institutional environment allows, such profits will be frequently used to 
subsidize other loss-making but politically wanted activities and programs. 
There exist frequently substantial information asymmetries between public service providers 
and politicians controlling them. Especially public companies can be very large and politi-
cians possibly not have the adequate time, resources, capabilities or incentives to efficiently 
carry out the supervising responsibilities.  
                                                
96 In reality, public companies can be found in many more markets outside the physical infrastructure. 
97 Often referred to as a citizen value. 
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5.5.5 Citizens 
Citizens live in households and generate different forms of waste as a result of their con-
sumption. Because consumers wish to maximize their free available income and their utility, 
they are interested in low taxes and low waste management fees. 
In addition to the role of waste generators, citizens are also affected by externalities of waste. 
Depending on the individual’s impact, they are interested in the implementation of an envi-
ronmentally friendly waste management system. Their attitude towards the environment can 
differ strongly across nations, cultures, traditions or development levels and plays an impor-
tant role in determining the requirements of a waste management system.  
The attention given by the public to issues of waste management and their awareness of 
such issues change with time and the infrastructure development level. The following Figure 
 5-11 is based on the issue-attention cycle model that was developed by Downs (1972). 
Hereby, the attention of the citizen is categorized into (i) pre-problem stage, (ii) alarmed dis-
covery, (iii) euphoric enthusiasm, (iv) realizing the costs, (v) decline of interest and (vi) a final 
post-problem stage.  
 
Figure  5-11: Issue-attention cycle for public interest 
Source: adapted from Downs (1972) 
In many countries with an advanced waste management infrastructure (e.g. Germany), the 
public interest has reduced in the recent past after an intense period of infrastructure devel-
opment, followed by realization of the required costs (i.e. high waste management fees).  
While most citizens agree on the necessity to implement a waste management system that 
reduces negative externalities resulting from waste generation, they often oppose the devel-
opment and operation of waste management facilities, such as landfill-sites, MSWC plants or 
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composting facilities, in their immediate vicinity. Such objectively justified or unjustified oppo-
sition is known as NIMBY (not in my backyard) effect and plays a major role in the develop-
ment of MSWC plants98.  
Besides being waste generators, consumers of waste management services or otherwise 
affected by waste infrastructure, citizens are also individual voters in democratic societies99 
and elect politicians who define waste management policies (see above). Environmental sub-
jects, including waste management, could have a significant impact on individual vote deci-
sions. Especially at municipal elections, the satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with waste man-
agement services, its costs or anticipated NIMBY projects can become a crucial issue during 
the election campaigns. It can, however, be expected that citizens possess only bounded 
rationality, because transaction costs are very high for collecting and analyzing the neces-
sary data and information. If an individual is willing to bear these transaction costs, the per-
sonal utility will be very low and positive external effects very high. 
While most citizens should be interested in a cost-effective waste management system, 
some individuals and groups will also benefit from high expenditures, e.g. advanced (expen-
sive) technology, higher wages or continuous advisory contracts. These individuals hence 
prefer a more costly system and will try to influence politicians and bureaucrats in their deci-
sion making (see Olson Jr, 1965). 
5.5.6 Private companies 
There exist mainly two sorts of private companies, which frequently possess larger stakes in 
the development and operation of the MSWC plants. These are energy companies and 
waste management companies100. Similar to all private companies, they aim at maximizing 
the return on their investment and at increasing their shareholder value. But as elaborated 
below, both pursue different subordinate objectives, due to different core competencies and 
different abilities to generate added value through vertical or horizontal integration. 
                                                
98 See Elliot (1998), Groothuis & Miller (1994), and Inhabler (1992) for more about sociological aspects 
of waste management infrastructure implementation. 
99 Dictatorships are excluded from the analysis. 
100 There exist also large utility companies, e.g. Suez, that incorporate both, energy generation and 
waste management services. The German energy company RWE, in contrast, has sold most of its 
waste management business and only operates a few MSWC plants nowadays. 
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5.5.6.1 Energy companies 
In many countries, energy companies101 are strongly engaged in the market for MSWC102. 
While a majority of energy companies are completely privately owned, some are still partly or 
fully owned by the public sector. 
The original competitive advantage of energy companies that motivated most of them to ex-
pand into the field of MSWC, was created by their expertise in the development and opera-
tion of other power plants, e.g. coal burning plants. The traditional technical and managerial 
competencies that exist within energy companies are outstanding and could be very benefi-
cial if adequately adapted to the unique technical and operational requirements of the MSWC 
plants. Not all energy companies were successful in doing so and some of them have al-
ready exited the market (e.g. RWE). 
Most energy companies participating in the MSWC own a portfolio of plants that are horizon-
tally integrated and jointly managed within strategic business units. Energy companies often 
use existing locations of power plants with other input material to develop an MSWC plant in 
its direct neighborhood103. Thus they can capitalize on existing transport infrastructure, avail-
able operational personnel and energy distribution networks. Also, the public acceptance of 
the MSWC plants in the vicinity of existing industrial facilities tends to be higher. 
The strong financial capacity of most energy companies makes it easy for them to finance 
new MSWC projects from their own balance sheets. Thus, transaction costs are reduced and 
the project development phase can be shortened in comparison to other modes of finance, 
such as structured project financing. Furthermore, the expected total return on investment 
(ROI) is much higher for balance sheet financing. 
Energy companies also possess a wide range of social networks with a wide geographic cov-
erage across various infrastructure fields. Such social networks are very helpful when enter-
ing new geographic markets (within a state or outside). 
The positive external effects of the MSWC (see chapter  3.3.2) are also a strategic reason 
due to which energy companies have recently increased their activities in this market. Thus, 
they not only diversify the sources of energy production, but also increase their percentage of 
energy production from regenerative, i.e. non-fossil, sources. 
A competitive disadvantage of energy companies as owners of the MSWC infrastructure in 
comparison with waste management companies is their reduced capacity and experience in 
marketing and optimizing waste stream management. They do not possess the same capaci-
                                                
101 Also: utilities 
102 E.g. e.on, Vattenfall (Germany), Covanta (USA), Keppel (Singapore) and Veolia (France). 
103 See e.g. case study TRV Buschhaus in chapter  6.3.9. 
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ties to offer full waste management services that are often required for commercial, i.e. non 
municipal, clients. Also, they usually do not want to get involved in logistical activities and 
therefore will have to ally with waste collection and transportation companies in case a public 
or private client wishes to outsource the whole waste management value chain. 
In markets, where networks of energy distribution (mainly electricity, district heating systems) 
are not unbundled from energy production, failure in competition can be a threat due to the 
natural monopoly of network industries and integration of downstream or upstream value 
chain elements (see chapter  4.2). 
5.5.6.2 Waste management companies 
As compared to the energy sector, there are a high number of private companies in the 
waste management market. While smaller waste management companies usually focus re-
gionally and onto one element of the waste management value chain (e.g. waste collection 
and transportation), larger waste management companies often vertically integrate the entire 
value chain and operate in larger geographic markets. Thus they can better benefit from their 
professional expertise in all waste management aspects as well as from their formal and in-
formal social networks. The customers of private waste management companies are munici-
palities and/or private commercial or industrial clients 
Similar to all private companies, waste management companies also aim at maximizing 
shareholder value by increasing of market share and receiving adequate return on invest-
ment. In many developed countries, especially in Northern America and Europe, the market 
for private waste management has experienced an accelerating process of concentration 
since the 1990s. Nowadays, there exist many large companies, such as Onyx (Veolia, 
France), SITA (Suez, France), Remondis (Germany), Cleanaway (Australia) or Waste Man-
agement (USA). Also, private equity funds have recently showed increasing interest in waste 
management companies and add fresh capital into the market for new capital intensive pro-
jects and further support the market consolidation. 
The macroeconomic impacts of these concentration processes are judged very differently by 
politicians, antitrust agencies, lobbying groups, as well as researches. On the one hand, it 
could be argued that only bigger companies are able to integrate the entire value chain, in-
creasing efficiencies and adding value to customers. Also only these large companies have 
the organizational and financial capabilities to expand into new markets, increasing competi-
tion. Pessimists (see e.g. J. Fischer, 1999), on the other hand, focus on the negative macro-
economic effects due to regionally reduced competition and the potential threat of carteliza-
tion or setting of predatory prices. 
Even bigger waste management companies do not possess the same financial capabilities 
as energy or utility companies. For larger capital investment, such as MSWC plant, they have 
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to rely more often on bank loans or structured finance products. While external financing has 
a variety of advantages, it also increases the time required for project development and 
transaction costs. 
5.5.7 Manufacturers and Suppliers 
Manufacturers and suppliers design and produce the various components necessary for the 
MSWC plants. Their objective is to sell their products at highest prices. In the last decade, a 
consolidation of manufacturers and suppliers can be observed in the market for the MSWC. 
In Europe, the largest market for the MSWC equipment worldwide, numerous mergers and 
acquisitions have reduced their number, and by 2007, three large companies (AE&E incl. 
VonRoll, Martin and Lentjes) dominate the market. Through licensing, their market share is 
also high in other countries (e.g. Japan, Singapore and USA). 
Unlike for example in the real estate sector, where large and medium size construction com-
panies have started to provide the entire project life-cycle for commercial as well as for public 
buildings (see e.g. K. Fischer, 2007), most manufacturers and suppliers focus on their tradi-
tional core businesses of designing manufacturing. They can be categorized as compara-
tively risk averse as their exposure to the MSWC plants is usually timely limited to the legal 
guarantee period104. 
More recently, however, some manufacturers and suppliers in the MSWC started to access 
their strategies and tendencies for expansion into other elements of the value chain can 
slowly be observed. Larger manufacturers have introduced plans to expand by offering op-
erational and maintenance services, and some are even eager to cover the whole project 
life-cycle including financing (see case study from Singapore in chapter  7). While their moti-
vation is mostly driven by strategic and financial considerations to become more independent 
of cyclical changes in demand, they face problems in implementing their strategies. The main 
reasons are their weak financial capabilities to commit equity into long-term projects as well 
as their very limited experiences and capacities in the very complex business of operating 
MSWC plants. 
5.5.8 Financiers 
The development of MSWC projects is very capital intensive (see chapter  3.4.2.2) and there-
fore project developers (either public or private) rely on external financial resources. In the 
vast majority of MSWC projects, public or private banks provide debt in form of loans for fi-
                                                
104 In Germany: two years for equipment and five years for civil works (see BGB). 
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nancing the capital costs. In some markets, e.g., in the USA, the bond market is also used to 
raise debt for financing capital costs 105. 
As shown by Trescher (2007) for the German market, financiers have only limited impact on 
the evolvement and development of an institutional arrangement, because they usually be-
come involved in the project after an institutional arrangement was initially shaped. Their in-
vestment decision is based on a thorough analysis of the project’s risk profile that also de-
pends on the institutional arrangement. In this respect, financiers can play an important role 
in analyzing and controlling the (contractual) rules between stakeholders within an institu-
tional arrangement. 
5.5.9 Consultants and researchers 
Consultants are frequently hired by the other stakeholders to give advice on various techni-
cal, commercial or legal issues. Similar to politicians, bureaucrats and companies, consult-
ants and advisors also have their own individual norms, beliefs and objectives. There is al-
ways the potential threat that consultants recommend what their clients wish (or that consult-
ants are chosen on the basis of their likely output, which is effectively the same). The con-
sultants may also favor institutional arrangements which create higher and continuous de-
mand for advisory and planning services. 
Researchers can be put into the same category as consultants. Even though their degree of 
freedom regarding objectives and neutral behavior is likely to be higher than that of consult-
ants, researchers are not totally independent from other stakeholders and interest groups. As 
the public sector is a large sponsor of R&D projects, the bureaucrats who administer R&D 
budgets have incentives in preferring research projects that are not in contradiction to their 
own interests. Such preferences are likely to be observed at public and private companies as 
well that frequently sponsor research projects. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has elaborated the theoretical framework for institutional arrangements for 
MSWC. They are structured by a set of formal as well as informal rules and can take the 
shape of a hierarchy, various hybrid forms or a market. 
Transaction cost economics enjoys extensive empirical support and can be used as a posi-
tive theory to explain the emergence of different institutional arrangements which possess 
different contract law regimes, incentive intensity, administrative support, performance and 
duration. According to the theoretical model, institutional arrangements are chosen by indi-
viduals with bounded rationality to minimize transaction costs that are the functions of asset 
                                                
105 A comprehensive overview of financiers and available financing forms for infrastructure develop-
ment can be found e.g., at Merna & Njiru (2002) or Weber, Alfen & Maser (2006). 
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specificity, uncertainty and frequency. Among these, the alignment to asset specificity is 
most significant. One of the main conclusions is that hierarchies will most likely evolve if 
transactions require idiosyncratic investments, whereas market arrangements mostly emerge 
for transactions with low (or none) asset specificity. The various hybrid forms lie between 
these two extremes. High uncertainty in turn, supports the choice of hierarchies. 
Later on, the theory of transaction cost economics was extended to the public ordering and it 
was shown that its main assertions are equally valid, even though minor restrictions concern-
ing contract law regime and incentive intensity in public hierarchies exist. In this context, in-
stitutional arrangements were described by using the privatization taxonomy. Public admini-
stration and formal privatization are hierarchies, functional and partial material privatization 
are hybrid arrangements and full material privatization can either be a hybrid or market ar-
rangement depending on the duration of contractual relationships. 
By showing that transaction cost economics is also valid for the public ordering its further 
application to the MSWC is justified. It was shown that comparatively high site and physical 
asset specificity of MSWC transactions supports to the emergence of hybrid or hierarchical 
arrangements. The selection between them is likely to be based on the other two transaction 
attributes of frequency and uncertainty, which depend on project specific factors that cannot 
be generalized for the entire infrastructure sector. Based on the taxonomy of waste man-
agement industry and literature, the following institutional arrangements for the MSWC were 
modeled and described: public administration and public company (hierarchy); operations 
model, DBOT, public-private joint venture and private company (hybrid arrangements); and 
spot market. 
The second corner stone of the theoretical framework was formed by an identifying and ana-
lyzing major stakeholders in MSWC projects. The stakeholders act opportunistically with 
bounded rationality and pursue different pecuniary and non-pecuniary objectives that influ-
ence the emergence of institutional arrangements. Politicians are important stakeholders to 
be found at several levels: at macro-level some strongly influence the institutional environ-
ment, while at municipal level others have an important impact on the selection of an institu-
tional arrangement. Their decisions are steered by the aim to maximize votes in elections at 
their political level and in different terms. The political decisions are implemented by bureau-
crats who act risk averse in a non-competitive environment. The budget-maximizing model 
and the bureau-shaping model of bureaucracies show that bureaucrats aim at maximizing 
their budget (i.e. power) as well as their personal utility. The citizens are important stake-
holders as well and assume different roles as voters, waste generators and local residents 
being affected by externalities of MSWC. Their objectives of low waste management fees, 
environmentally friendly waste treatment and objections against MSWC in their vicinity 
(NIMBY) sometimes contradict each others.  
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Depending on the institutional arrangement, different public and private entities can also be 
stakeholders. Such public entities include public administrations or public companies, which 
operate under more or less strong political influence. While normatively aiming at maximizing 
the social welfare, they sometimes also earn considerable profits for the public budget or 
cross-subsidies. Private entities are primarily waste management companies and large en-
ergy companies that principally aim at maximizing return on investments and at increasing 
shareholder values. Other stakeholders in the MSWC projects include manufacturers and 
suppliers, financiers and consultants. 
 
Figure  5-12: Determinants of institutional arrangements 
Source: own 
The above Figure  5-12 illustrates the key findings from the theoretical analysis: institutional 
arrangements align to the attributes of the transaction and are formed by stakeholders with 
different objectives and incentives. In the presented framework, the production characteris-
tics and the institutional environment are treated as exogenous factors. 
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6 Empirical study in Germany 
6.1 Background 
6.1.1 Historical development of waste management in Germany106 
Until the 1960s, most municipal waste was disposed of in one of the 40,000 small and simple 
dumps that were scattered all around Germany. The strong and continuous growth in indus-
trial production and private consumption in post-war Germany resulted in a steady increase 
of waste volumes that demanded new solutions to overcome the chaotic situation (Knauer & 
Ooyen, 1979; Schenkel, 2003). 
The first waste disposal act (AbfG) was passed in 1972 and had the objective to restructure 
and improve waste disposal. As a result, most small dumps were closed and replaced by 
larger landfills that fulfilled minimum environmental standards. By 1980 there existed around 
530 landfills, 22 MSWC plants and 15 composting plants (Bilitewski et al., 1996, p. 4; UBA, 
2005a).  
The strategic change from simple waste disposal towards the waste hierarchy was initiated 
with the establishment of a new waste act in 1986. Hereby, waste avoidance became the 
primary objective on top of recycling and disposal (see also waste hierarchy in chapter  1.1). 
In 1991, the so-called “Green Dot System” was established on the basis of the Packing Ordi-
nance (VerpackV), imposing a mandatory fee on all packaging materials depending on their 
type and weight. While the fee should primarily provide an incentive for the producers to 
avoid or reduce packaging materials, it is also collected to finance the private company “Dual 
System Germany GmbH” to run a collection and recycling system in parallel to the residual 
waste management system under public responsibility. The success of the Green Dot Sys-
tem remains disputed, mainly due to limited public participation and unsolved free rider prob-
lems. 
In the beginning of 1990s, the fear of a “state of waste emergency”107 was very much present 
in the political and public discussion. The major reasons were unchanged high volumes of 
generated waste and lack of sufficient treatment and disposal capacities. To solve the antici-
pated problems, many regional waste management plans were elaborated and advised the 
development of new treatment and disposal facilities. As a result, many new composting fa-
cilities, MSWC plants and  sanitary landfill sites were constructed (Petersen, Malte, & 
Herrmann, 1999).  
                                                
106 Unless specifically stated, the developments before 1990 reflect only the West German situation. 
107 German: Müllnotstand 
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In 1996, the so-called “Circular Economy and Waste Management Act “ (KrW-/AbfG)108 was 
legislated and had a far-reaching impact on the further development. Among others, one 
principal innovation was the extension of producer’s responsibility for their waste, excluding 
most commercial and industrial waste from the responsibility of municipalities. The law also 
specifically allowed the transfer of municipal waste management tasks and services to pri-
vate companies (see chapter  6.1.3.1).  
Another important milestone in municipal waste management in Germany was the introduc-
tion of TASi regulation109. From June 1, 2005, this administrative regulation requires that all 
the municipal waste must be treated prior to its disposal in landfill sites. The regulation had 
two effects. The first one was the construction of new or the expansion of existing MSWC 
plants or MBT plants. The second (and unintended) effect was that many landfill sites con-
siderably reduced their prices prior to June 2005 in order to sell as much available capacity 
as possible. This “price dumping” caused severe economic problems to many MSWC plants. 
The year 2005, the total waste amount of 332m Mg was generated in Germany (see Figure 
 6-1). Most of the waste came from construction and demolition works, while municipal waste 
only contributed 14.0%.  
 
Figure  6-1: Waste composition in Germany by weight 
Source: German federal statistical office (2005) 
 
                                                
108 Long title: Act for Promoting Closed Substance Cycle Waste Management and Ensuring Environ-
mentally Compatible Waste Disposal 
109 In German: Technische Anleitung Siedlungsabfall 
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As shown in the following Figure  6-2, the total waste amount has almost remained constant 
during the last decade. It must be constituted that the avoidance of waste, which should en-
joy the highest priority in the waste management pyramid, is not apparent (Bidlingmaier, 
2007). 
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Figure  6-2: Municipal waste generation, 1996-2005 
Source: German federal statistical office (2005) 
By the year 2020, Germany aims at achieving a zero-landfilling policy by enhancing waste 
reduction, reuse, separation, recycling and treatment (UBA, 2005b). For MSWC this policy 
implies that the residuals (slag and fly ash) must be recycled (e.g. as construction material). 
6.1.2 History of MSWC in Germany 
There exists a long history for MSWC in Germany. The first simple MSWC facility on the 
European mainland was built in Hamburg in the year 1896 (Stadtreinigung Hamburg, 
1996)110. The oldest MSWC plants that are still in operation were built in the 1960s and are 
mostly located in densely populated areas, such as Berlin, Essen or Stuttgart.  
                                                
110 At that time there was a cholera epidemic in Hamburg and the neighboring areas refused to take 
waste from the city to prevent a spread of the disease. 
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Ever since the number of MSWC plants grew steadily to a total number of 65 the year 2007. 
The following Figure  6-3 indicates when the existing plants commenced operation111. There 
has been only a small jump in the number of plants in 2005, the year since the TASi regula-
tion requires the treatment of all the residual municipal waste prior to its disposal.  
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Figure  6-3: Accumulated number of MSWC plants in Germany  
Source: Own survey (2007) 
At an early stage, MSWC plants had only insufficient flue-gas treatment systems compared 
to modern standards and hence caused severe pollution in their vicinity due to high emis-
sions of organic and inorganic substances112. Due to technological advances and new air 
pollution laws113, all MSWC plants have later made high investments to upgrade and improve 
their flue-gas treatment systems. In comparison with other sources, toxic emissions from 
MSWC plants are nowadays negligible (see chapter  3.3.1). However, this history of MSWC 
remains present in the minds of the people leading often to a very low social acceptance, 
even though this is unjustified from an objective point of view. The development of new 
MSWC plants therefore often faces strong public objection. 
                                                
111 Data on cumulated MSWC capacities is not available, as dates of expansions were not recorded. 
112 Many pollutants, such as dioxins, were often unknown before.  
113 The latest air immission law was 17. BImSchV and came into effect in 1990. 
Empirical study in Germany 
126 
6.1.3 Institutional environment 
The following Figure  6-4 indicates informal as well as formal institutions that shape the insti-
tutional environment for MSWC in Germany:  
 
Figure  6-4: Institutional environment for MSWC in Germany 
Source: own 
The shear number of different institutions makes it practically impossible to reproduce them 
and present the complex interactions among them. Therefore, only the most decisive formal 
and informal institutions that influence the development of institutional arrangements for the 
MSWC in Germany are shortly presented below. 
6.1.3.1 Formal institutions 
Waste legislation 
The waste legislation in Germany is composed of various laws, ordinances, regulations and 
statutes at different governance levels. The following Figure  6-5 illustrates the hierarchical 
structure of the legislation for municipal waste management in Germany: 
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Figure  6-5: Legal framework for municipal waste management in Germany 
Source: adapted from (Pschera, 2003, p. 79) 
The European Union formulates the coordinative framework for circular economy and waste 
management in its Member States. Most important corner stones of municipal waste legisla-
tion at the European level are the waste directive (75/442/EWG114), the landfill directive 
(99/31/EC) and the waste incineration directive (2000/76/EC).  
The EU law is translated at federal level into national laws that are supplemented by numer-
ous ordinances and administrative regulations. The “Circular Economy and Waste Manage-
ment Act“ (KrW-/AbfG) forms the framework of German waste legislation since 1996 (see 
chapter  6.1.1). Most important supplements are the waste storage ordinance (AbfAblV), the 
packaging ordinance (VerpackV) and the technical regulation for waste storage of municipal 
waste (TASi). 
Every federal state in Germany has to issue a state waste act (e.g. LAbfG NRW) which 
translates the KrW-/AbfG into state law. However, federal states (like municipalities) do not 
have the legal competence to enact any regulation or restrictions that specify the framework 
for waste avoidance or management of different waste streams.  
Based on §29 KrW-/AbfG, federal states are obliged to develop regional waste management 
plans every five years. These are either planned for the entire federal state or for its individ-
ual administrative districts. The plans can determine the development of specific waste 
treatment and disposal facilities as well as assign municipalities to use them. The federal 
state is allowed (but not obliged) to enact the waste management plan so that its implemen-
                                                
114 To be replaced soon by 2006/12/EC. 
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tation becomes mandatory. Only some states have actually enacted their waste manage-
ment plans, which caused numerous legal disputes with municipalities. In future, it can be 
expected that waste management plans are developed for monitoring and information pur-
poses rather than for centralized planning (Schink, 2001). 
At the lowest level of communal law, municipalities (or inter-municipal associations – see 
chapter  6.1.4.1) issue statutes that are based on the relevant state law. The statutes reflect 
and define the local implementation of waste management services (collection, treatment 
and disposal) and the calculation of waste management fees. 
Public responsibility for municipal waste 
The German constitution (§28(2) GG) guarantees all municipalities115 “the right to regulate all 
local affairs on their own responsibility”. Because the municipal waste management is re-
garded as a local affair, it falls under municipal responsibility. Furthermore, §15(1) KrW-
/AbfG assigns the municipalities to implement a waste management system within their juris-
diction. According to §16(1-2) KrW-/AbfG, municipalities can transfer the entire waste man-
agement value chain or different parts of (such as MSWC) to third parties under private own-
ership. Such transfer, however, does not free municipalities from their ultimate obligation to 
ensure a functioning waste management system (§16(1) KrW-/AbfG). 
6.1.3.2 Informal institutions 
As elaborated in chapter  5.1, informal institutions, such as social networks or bureaucratic 
norms, can have a decisive impact on the development of institutional arrangements. They 
are difficult to observe or to model and unlike formal institutions, differ among individual insti-
tutional arrangements and must not be generalized. Therefore, informal institutions within the 
research context can only be named or be described very abstractly116. 
With respect to municipal waste management, informal institutions include individuals’ (and 
society’s) willingness to follow voluntarily the waste hierarchy (see psychological externalities 
in chapter  4.3.5) or the acceptance of the construction of new waste treatment or disposal 
facilities.  
One important impact of informal institutions onto institutional arrangements for the MSWC 
are normative attitudes towards public provision of infrastructure as well as the extent to 
which public companies should get engaged in economic activities. It can often be observed 
that politicians and citizens in Germany agree on enhanced public production. Initiatives or 
                                                
115 The term “municipalities” is used as a synonym for the two communal forms of county (Landkreis) 
and city (kreisfreie Stadt). 
116 See to case studies for examples of specific informal institutions. 
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strategies to privatize public companies are often heavily discussed in national and local me-
dia117. 
As compared to other developed countries, corruption levels are relatively high in Germany. 
Among developed countries, Germany ranks the lower half of the global corruption index 
(Transparency International, 2007). Unfortunately, the waste industry (under public as well as 
private provision) has not remained unaffected by corruption and one of the largest corrup-
tion scandals in the recent German history was disclosed after the development of the 
MSWC Cologne (Leyendecker, 2005). 
6.1.4 Legal options for institutional arrangements in Germany 
As shown in the following Figure  6-6, there exist different legal options under which institu-
tional arrangements can be established in Germany. All options for the hierarchical institu-
tional arrangement of public administration act under public law. The options for the hierar-
chical institutional arrangement of public company as well as hybrid and market institutional 
arrangements act under private law. 
 
Figure  6-6: Legal options for institutional arrangements in Germany 
Source: own 
The institutional environment in Germany possesses a special attribute with respect to taxa-
tion. All legal entities under public law do not have to add value added tax (VAT)118 to the 
fees that they charge their citizens. However, the effects on the competition with companies 
under operating under private law are rather low are therefore neglected during the further 
                                                
117 One recent example is this anticipated sale of 49.9% of Stadtwerke Leipzig to a strategic private 
partner. 
118 Currently at 19% (2007). 
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analysis due to two reasons. First, the MSWC plants are very capital intensive (only 14% are 
labor cost, see chapter  3.4) and private companies can balance the charged VAT for waste 
treatment against the VAT paid for capital investments, labor cost or disposal fees. Secondly, 
the exclusion of VAT applies only to the calculation of waste management fees for house-
holds. For the treatment of residual municipal waste from commercial sources, the MSWC 
plants that operate under public law have to charge VAT as well . 
6.1.4.1 Legal options under public law 
Regiebetrieb 
At the Regiebetrieb (authority-operated entity) all tasks and services are provided within the 
public authority, e.g. municipal waste authority. It is neither organizationally, economically nor 
legally independent. The managerial responsibilities could be spread among diverse depart-
ments (e.g. waste management, finance, environment) or could be concentrated to one of 
them (Crounauge & Westermann, 2003, pp. 36-38). Because of the lack of financial inde-
pendence, the Regiebetrieb is rarely found for any tasks or services requiring larger capital 
investments. 
Eigenbetrieb 
Also the Eigenbetrieb (independent authority-entity) has no legal sovereignty. In contrast with 
the Regiebetrieb, it enjoys economic and organizational independence from other bureaus or 
offices within the public sector, such as waste management bureaus. It has its own and 
separated management, personnel and accounting system  (Crounauge & Westermann, 
2003, pp. 99-116). An Eigenbetrieb for the MSWC could be established within every public 
authority responsible for household waste management, i.e., either within a municipality or 
inter-municipal association. 
Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts 
Another hierarchical arrangement for internal provision of the MSWC infrastructure within the 
public sector is the establishment of an Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts (public-law com-
pany). On the basis of the public municipal law119 it is organizationally as well as legally inde-
pendent from other public bureaus or administrations. However, the municipality is still fully 
liable for all its financial activities and therefore usually strongly involved in all decision mak-
ing processes120 (Kusenbach, 2002, pp. 27-28). 
                                                
119 In German: Gemeindeordnung 
120 In contrast, a municipality has only limited liability for a public company under private law. 
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The Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts can be referred to as a commercialization of public ac-
tivities, because it enjoys organizational freedom and often adopts strategic and operational 
processes known from the private sector. Usually, it also has to develop a publicly available 
annual report which contributes to improved transparency and control mechanisms. 
Inter-municipal associations 
Under German law, different independent municipalities have the possibility to cooperate for 
the provision of infrastructure or services by establishing an inter-municipal association 
(IMA). It is a legally independent body and its members agree on the IMA’s rights and re-
sponsibilities in a formal statute (Hirschinger, 2002). The member municipalities are allowed 
to transfer their own legal obligations for infrastructure provision, such as waste manage-
ment, to an IMA. However, the member municipalities remain fully liable for any financial 
losses and the shares of each member’s liabilities are specified in the founding statute.  
One has to distinguish between a single-purpose IMA, which is specifically established for 
bundling the demand in waste treatment, and a multiple-purpose IMA, which is established to 
provide several or all elements of the waste management value chain (e.g. collection, trans-
portation, treatment and disposal). In both cases, however, the IMA has the same options as 
any municipality in choosing from the different institutional arrangements between hierarchy 
and market.  
In the context of this research, only single-purpose IMAs that have hierarchically integrated 
the development and operation of an MSWC plant within their own organization are regarded 
as the institutional arrangement of public administration121. 
6.1.4.2 Legal options under private law 
There exist four basic legal options under private law that can be used to structure institu-
tional arrangements for MSWC122: 
1. Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (limited liability company) 
2. Aktiengesellschaft (stock company) 
3. Offene Handelsgesellschaft (open trading company) 
4. Kommanditgesellschaft (limited partnership) 
Once a decision is made to found a company under private law, the selection among these 
options is mostly made based on tax reasons. However, there exist also differences in con-
                                                
121 There are also cases in Germany, where municipalities jointly tendered the treatment of their waste 
without forming an IMA (see e.g. case studies Pirmasens or Rothensee).  
122 Combinations between them also exist, e.g. GmbH & KG, and KGaA 
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trol and reporting issues. Normally, the owners of companies under private law have only 
limited financial liability (see e.g. Hirschinger, 2002; Wagner, 2000, p. 200). 
6.2 Quantitative study 
6.2.1 Methodology 
The objective of the quantitative survey is to get an empirical verification of theoretically 
elaborated institutional arrangements for developed market of MSWC in Germany. For that 
purpose, a self-completion questionnaire was developed to collect information in eight cate-
gories (see copy of the questionnaire in appendix 6): 
(A) Personal information about respondent; 
(B) General information about MSWC; 
(C) Legal ownership structure; 
(D) Separation of ownership and operation; 
(E) Vertical and horizontal integration; 
(F) Waste treatment contracts; 
(G) Energy recovery; 
(H) Financing. 
The structure and contents of the questionnaire were discussed with two senior researchers 
and one representative of the industry associations. Before its distribution, the questionnaire 
was tested at two MSWC plants during personal interviews.  
The three most relevant public and private associations within the German market of MSWC 
and waste management gave their formal support to the survey and content of the question-
naire. These associations are: 
1. ITAD – Interessensgemeinschaft der thermischen Abfallbehandlungsanlagen in Deutsch-
land (Interest Group of Thermal Waste Treatment Facilities in Germany) 
2. VKS - Verband kommunale Abfallwirtschaft und Stadtreinigung (Association of municipal 
waste management and city cleaning) 
3. BDE - Bundesverband der Deutschen Entsorgungswirtschaft (Federation of the German 
Waste Management Industry) 
The survey was undertaken in Germany during the first half of the year 2007, covering all 
MSWC plants under operation at that time123. The self-completion questionnaire was filled in 
mostly by the commercial managers or CEOs of these MSWC plants, who also had the op-
tion to answer anonymously. The high response rate of 86% (answers from 56 out of 65 
                                                
123 Two MSWC plants under construction were not covered. 
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plants) could only be achieved through the formal support of the above mentioned interest 
groups and very time consuming follow-up through personal phone calls124. For those nine 
MSWC plants that did not participate in the survey, basic information (size, year of com-
mencement, legal form and ownership) was gathered from secondary sources (e.g. internet 
presentations and annual reports). 
6.2.2 Capacities 
By June 2007, a total number of 65 MSWC plants were in operation in Germany with an ag-
gregated annual nominal capacity of 17.5 Mg/a (for a list and location of all 65 MSWC plants, 
see appendix 5). As shown in the following Figure  6-7 their capacities range from 40,000 to 
740,000 Mg/a with an average capacity being 269,000 Mg/a. 
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Figure  6-7: Nominal capacities of MSWC plants in Germany  
Source: Own survey (2007) 
6.2.3 Legal forms for asset ownership 
The following Table  6-1 provides an overview of the legal forms under which the assets of 
MSWC plants in Germany are owned. Altogether 15 plants are owned by entities under pub-
lic law, whereas 50 are owned by entities under private law.  
 
 
                                                
124 MSWC plants receive questionnaires or survey requests on a monthly basis. 
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Number 
of plants 
Aggregated 
capacities [Mg]
Mean  
capacity [Mg] 
δ 
Regiebetrieb 0 0 0 0 
Eigenbetrieb 6 1,760,000 293,333 237,227 
AöR 4 1,107,000 276,750 179,264 
Public 
law 
IMA 5 732,500 146,500 47,618 
GmbH 43 11,185,300 260,123 157,272 
AG 5 2,355,000 471,000 187,963 
KG 1 130,000 130,000 0 
Private  
law 
OHG 1 225,000 225,000 0 
Sum 65 17,494,800 269,151 171,141 
Table  6-1: Legal forms for asset ownership 
Source: Own survey (2007) 
In case of the institutional arrangement “operations model”, whereby asset ownership and 
operation are separated, the legal form of the operations company can differ from the legal 
form of the asset ownership. This is especially the case whenever the assets are owned by 
an entity under public law125. 
6.2.4 Quantitative overview of institutional arrangements for MSWC in Germany 
The following Figure  6-8 illustrates the distribution of institutional arrangements with respect 
to their share of the total employed capacity of 17.5m in Germany. As it can be seen, the 
institutional arrangement of public-private joint venture has the largest capacity share with 22 
plants (39.7%), followed by private company (9 plants, 16.6%), public administration (11 
plants, 14.9%), public company (12 plants, 14.7%) and operations model (7 plants, 10.1%). 
The institutional arrangement of (D)BOT is only represented by 4 plants and a capacity share 
of 4.0%. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
125 Out of 14 MSWC with asset ownership under public law, 2 MSWC apply the institutional arrange-
ment “operations model” (compare  
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Figure  6-8: Distribution of institutional arrangements for MSWC in Germany 
Source: Own survey (2007) 
On an average each MSWC plant has three long-term contracts with public entities with an 
average duration of 16.9 years. The minimum waste guarantees secure the average usage 
of 73.3% (range: 30-90%) of the total capacities. In 2006, however, an average of 81% 
(range: 60-100%) of the total plant capacities had been used for treating municipal waste 
from long-term contractual partners. 
A detailed qualitative analysis of all MSWC plants under the institutional arrangement of pri-
vate company showed that they possess an average number of three long-term contracts  
(range: 1-8) with an average duration of 16.1 years and a minimum guaranteed capacity us-
age of 81.0% (range: 70-100). These statistics prove, that none of these MSWC plants oper-
ate under the institutional arrangement of sport market, in which no long-term contracts or 
minimum waste guarantees exist. 
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6.2.5 IMAs and institutional arrangements 
As shown in the following Table  6-3, there exist 19 MSWC plants, in which an inter-municipal 
association (IMA) has a decisive influence on the development of institutional arrange-
ment126:  
Institutional arrangements with IMA Number of MSWC plants  
Single-purpose IMA 4 
Hierarchy 
Public Company 5 
Operations model 5 
(D)BOT 3 Hybrid 
Public-private joint venture 2 
Sum 19 
Table  6-3: IMAs and institutional arrangements 
Source: Own survey (2007) 
In four cases, a single purpose IMA was formed specifically for the development and opera-
tion of an MSWC plant (see also chapter  6.1.4.1 and Table 6-2). In five other cases, the IMA 
produces in the hierarchical arrangement of a public company. 
In ten cases, the hybrid institutional arrangements of operations model, (D)BOT or public-
private joint ventures are implemented. It is interesting to note that 71% (5 out of 7) of opera-
tions model and 75% (3 out of 4) of all (D)BOT models are institutional arrangements with an 
IMA as the principal for waste treatment services127.  
6.2.6 Horizontal integration 
In case of 30 MSWC plants at least one shareholder is an owner of more than one MSWC 
plant. The cumulated capacity of these plants is 8.0m Mg which represents 45.9% of the na-
tional market. The largest shareholders are:  
 
 
 
                                                
126 The institutional arrangement of private company is not covered in this analysis. Here, IMAs (like 
any other public body) frequently sign long-term contracts with private MSWC plants.  
127 The reason for that is speculative. One reason might be, that IMAs usually have fewer resources 
than large public bureaucracies and therefore cannot operate an MSWC in a hierarchical arrange-
ment.  
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Company Number of 
MSWC plants 
owned 
Capacity* 
[T Mg/a] 
Total market 
share 
Share of hybrid 
institutional  
arrangements 
BKB AG (e.on) 8 1,750 10.0% 14.2% 
Remondis 7 1,100 6.3% 8.9% 
Sotec128 4 590 3.4% 4.8% 
MVV 3 790 4.5% 6.4% 
Vattenfall Energy 
Europe 3 600 3.4% 4.9% 
*as per share of ownership in particular MSWC plants 
Table  6-4: Horizontal integration of MSWC plants in Germany 
Source: Own 
As shown in Table  6-4, there exist only two large private companies (BKB and Remondis) 
owning a relatively high number of MSWC plants in Germany. While BKB, a subsidiary of the 
energy company e.on, mostly owns the majority or all shares of these plants, the independ-
ent waste management company Remondis mostly owns only 49% of the shares of these 
plants as part of public-private joint ventures129. The accumulated capacities of Sotec, MVV 
and Vattenfall are relatively low in comparison to the largest MSWC plants (e.g. MSWC 
Ruhleben is owned by the City of Berlin and has a capacity of 520,000 Mg/a, see chapter 
 6.3.2). 
In Germany, there is only one municipality owning shares of more than one MSWC plant. 
The Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg owns 100% of MSWC “Stellinger Moor”, which op-
erates under public law, and also owns 25% of MSWC “Rugenberger Damm” as part of a 
public-private joint venture with Vattenfall and EWE. 
The following Figure  6-9 indicates how the respondents evaluate the benefits of horizontal 
integration: 
                                                
128 Sotec is already owned to 51% by BKB. In 2008 it will be under 100% ownership of BKB. 
129 The accumulated capacity of MSWC plants with BKB and Remondis as shareholder is 2,900T Mg/a 
and 2,200T Mg/a (16.6% and 12.6% market share), respectively. 
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Figure  6-9: Evaluation of the benefits of horizontal integration (response rate: 25/30)  
Source: Own survey (2007) 
6.2.7 Vertical integration 
There are 29 MSWC plants, which are vertically integrated through ownership with other ac-
tivities of the waste management value system (see chapter  2.3). In these cases, at least 
one shareholder of the MSWC plant also owns a waste management company that offers 
services for waste collection, transportation or disposal. The following figure indicates the 
evaluation of vertical integration by the respondents with respect to generating possible 
competitive advantages: 
2.6
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0 1 2 3 4 5
Better usage of capacities through
waste stream management
Better access to 
commercial waste sources
Higher sales at spot market
 
Figure  6-10: Evaluation of vertical integration (response rate: 23/29)  
Source: Own survey (2007) 
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An analysis of the German waste management market by Fischer (1999) showed, that strong 
market concentration in the waste management activities of waste collection and transporta-
tion took place since the beginning of 1990s. Even though such market concentration is nec-
essary to a certain extent in order to gain sufficient financial strength to invest in new or exist-
ing MSWC plants, a further market concentration through vertical integration should be ob-
served very carefully by anti-trust agencies (compare also with chapter  4.2.3). 
6.2.8 MSWC treatment prices 
As shown in the following Figure  6-11, the prices for waste treatment at MSWC plants in 
2006 had strong variations and ranged from 70 €/Mg in Lower Saxony to 340 €/Mg in Bava-
ria. These prices mostly reflect the prices paid according to long-term contracts, but not the 
price level for smaller quantities at the spot market.  
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Figure  6-11: Prices for MSWC treatment in 2005 by federal states  
Source: EUWID (2006) 
The respondents of the annual survey conducted by the information service EUWID expect 
that the price for MSWC will be determined at around 120 to 130 €/Mg in the near future 
(EUWID, 2006). The price level will depend mostly on the development of additional capaci-
ties for MSWC as well as for substitute waste treatment technologies (see chapter  2.3.4). 
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6.3 Qualitative study 
6.3.1 Methodology for data collection and analysis 
As elaborated in chapter  1.5, multiple case studies were undertaken to illustrate institutional 
arrangements for MSWC and to explore the reasons for their development. The case studies 
are developed from quantitative and qualitative data that has been derived from personal 
interviews, statistics and publications.  
The development of a standardized interview structure for all case studies was rejected, be-
cause the nature of the cases was expected to be very different. A more flexible approach 
with open questions was therefore applied to pursue the exploratory objectives. 
In order to focus on the important characteristics, the illustrations must abstract the institu-
tional arrangements to a certain degree. Minor details, such as the establishment of compa-
nies for tax purposes, will not be included in the discussion and visualization.  
The data analysis was done iteratively and took place along with the quantitative and qualita-
tive data collection. A descriptive framework based on narrative elements was chosen as the 
preferred strategy for analyzing the multiple case studies, because it helps to identify the 
causal links for the emergence of institutional arrangements (Bryman & Bell, 2003, pp. 440-
442; Yin, 2003, pp. 114-116 ). The descriptive framework applied to each case study con-
sists of three elements:  
1. The background contains historical information about the MSCW, its technical character-
istics, specific elements of the institutional environment and introduces the main stake-
holders. 
2. The arrangement describes the relationships between the most relevant stakeholders 
and their formal, and as much as possible informal, agreements. It also contains a or-
ganization diagram, which illustrates the main stakeholder and interdependencies. 
3. The following discussion contains the explanation building for the emergence and catego-
rization of the particular institutional arrangement. Reasons for the evolvement of the par-
ticular institutional arrangement are identified by examining at how the major stake-
holders could achieve their objectives and by elaborating on the impacts of specific 
events or developments. 
According to (Eisenhardt, 1989b) the chosen narrative analytic strategy is well suited to meet 
the defined research objectives, because it ensures in-depth familiarity with each case and 
therefore allows unique patters of each institutional arrangement  to emerge. 
There exist several constraints that influence the collection and validation of data in the con-
ducted case study research. A major constraint is confidentiality. Many contracts and other 
formal or informal agreements are inaccessible to outsiders, because they contain informa-
tion that must not be available for competitors. However, due to the high number of personal 
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interviews and legally required information policies of the public sector it was possible to col-
lect sufficient information for describing and exploring the case studies. Another constraint is 
the time lapse. Most institutional arrangements were established many years ago and the 
decision makers involved are not anymore available for interviews. Also the perception of 
stakeholders about the institutional arrangements might have changed over a period of time. 
Stakeholders might recall the development of a particular institutional arrangement differently 
today than before its establishment.  
Based on the quantitative findings for MSWC in Germany and advisory by senior research-
ers, representative cases studies were selected for every institutional arrangements applied. 
For the institutional arrangement of public-private joint ventures altogether three cases were 
selected to illustrate different ownership structures and developments. 
Following case studies from Germany have been chosen and presented: 
Case study # Name, Location Institutional arrangement 
Case study 1 Ruhleben, Berlin Public administration 
Case study 2 Kassel  Public company 
Case study 3 Weisweiler, Eschweiler Operations model 
Case study 4 Pirmasens (D)BOT 
Case study 5 Niederrhein, Oberhausen Public-private joint venture 
Case study 6 Rothensee, Magdeburg Public-private joint venture 
Case study 7 Zorbau Public-private joint venture 
Case study 8 Buschhaus, Helmstedt Private company 
Table  6-5: List of case studies 
The following Figure  6-12 indicates the location of the case studies: 
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Figure  6-12: Location of case studies in Germany 
Source: own 
The nature of institutional arrangements required the cases to be studied in different depths. 
Therefore, the data collection and case study design were done with a sufficient degree of 
flexibility, which allowed exploring particular issues that emerge during the analysis.  
6.3.2 MSWC Ruhleben, Berlin 
6.3.2.1 Background 
With 3.4m inhabitants, the City of Berlin is the largest municipality in Germany, and similar to 
Hamburg and Bremen, has the legal status of a federal state. Thus, there is no differentiation 
between the municipality and the federal state concerning the responsibility for municipal 
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waste management services130. The year 2005, a total amount of 966,000 Mg of residual 
municipal waste was generated and collected in Berlin (SLB, 2006).  
In the year 1951, the public company ”Berliner Stadtreiningungsbetriebe“ (BSR) was founded 
in West-Berlin. It united with “Stadtreinigung Berlin” from East-Berlin in 1992 and has ever 
since served the entire city. BSR is owned by the City of Berlin, it operates under public law 
and since 1994 it has the legal status of the Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts (see chapter 
 6.1.4.1). It is therefore legally and organizationally separated from other public companies 
and bureaus in Berlin (e.g. public transportation). 
Within the City of Berlin, the operations and services of BSR encompass: 
1. Waste collection and transportation, 
2. Waste treatment and disposal, 
3. Street cleaning incl. winter services, and 
4. Cleaning and maintenance of public green areas and parks. 
Due to severe land scarcity within formerly walled West-Berlin and the desire to become 
more independent from the GDR, the City of Berlin started very early the development of an 
MSWC plant within its own administration to treat growing amounts of municipal residual 
waste. In 1967, the MSWC plant with one line started to operate in the northern district of 
Ruhleben and was extended several times afterwards. To comply with advanced emission 
standards, the installation of a modern flue-gas treatment system was finalized in 1989 
(Park, 2004, p. 184). Today, the MSWC Ruhleben has a nominal capacity of 520.000 Mg/a131 
and employs around 200 people for operation, maintenance work and administration. Cur-
rently, a modernization of the old machinery is planned and by the year 2011 four combus-
tion lines will be replaced and upgraded.  
6.3.2.2 Arrangement 
The MSWC Ruhleben in Berlin is owned by the City of Berlin and its public company BSR, 
which operates under public law. Herein, it forms an independent business unit to allow an 
organizational separation from other activities of BSR. All capital and operational expendi-
tures are accumulated in a cost centre and balanced by BSR along with the costs of all busi-
ness units (BSR, 2005). The treatment costs at the MSWC Ruhleben are included in the cal-
culation of the waste management fees that households have to pay to the City of Berlin.  
                                                
130 Legal basis is the KrW-/AbfG Bln from 1999. 
131 The remaining municipal waste, generated in Berlin, is treated in other MT or MBT. Most of them 
are jointly owned and operated by the City of Berlin and private companies (e.g. ALBA). 
Empirical study in Germany 
145 
A long-term power purchasing agreement (PPA) for transmitting process steam was signed 
with the adjacent private power plant “HKW Reuter West”, where the thermal energy is con-
verted into electricity and heated water for the municipal district heating system. 
The following Figure  6-13 illustrates the most important relationships among the relevant 
stakeholders of the MSWC Ruhleben: 
 
Figure  6-13: Stakeholders and their relationships at MSWC Ruhleben 
Source: own, based on personal interviews (2007) 
Because all investment and operation expenditures are included into the waste fee calcula-
tion for households in Berlin, there exist practically no commercial risks for BSR (Holthusen, 
2002). In order to assess and improve commercial performances, several public and private 
management programs and tools have been applied, such as participating in benchmarking 
programs or the introduction of balanced scorecard (Kempin & Zahn, 2007).  
6.3.2.3 Discussion 
The MSWC Ruhleben in Berlin is a representative case study for the hierarchical arrange-
ments of public administration. Its main characteristics include the ownership and operation 
within the administration of Berlin and the legal status based on public law. It was built as 
one of the first MSWC plants in Germany and has always been under public ownership and 
operation. Because of the continuous large amounts of municipal waste generated within the 
City of Berlin, there exist almost no demand risks for this large MSWC plant.  
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Due to the high demand for waste treatment in Berlin, the assets of MSWC Ruhleben are 
highly dedicated to one customer, i.e. the City of Berlin. Therefore the third dimension of as-
set specificity, i.e. dedicated assets, are comparatively high132, favoring a hierarchical institu-
tional arrangement. Transaction costs for this arrangement are comparatively low and the 
potential hazard of opportunistic hold-up does not exist. The realization of economies of 
scale in combination with high asset specificity therefore gives the reason for the develop-
ment of a hierarchical arrangement. 
The power among political parties has frequently changed in Berlin and none of them favored 
hybrid arrangements for the MSWC plant or other business units of BSR. Apart from transac-
tion cost economic considerations, an additional reason for choosing a hierarchical institu-
tional arrangement might be that the political influence can easily be exercised through the 
public administration. As Berlin continues to suffer from severe economic problems, any po-
tential profits from the MSWC could be used at least to cross-subsidize different operations 
within BSR (e.g. winter service, park maintenance) that would not otherwise be possible at 
the background of Berlin’s weak financial situation.  
There is always the potential threat that production costs for the production in hierarchical 
arrangements, especially under public ownership, are comparatively higher. In the presented 
case study, for example, no competition exists and commercial risks are in the end borne by 
the citizens due to the possible adjustment of waste management fees. On the other hand, 
politicians and the higher management of BSR have started different initiatives to improve 
the efficiency of the plant by introducing management methods from the private sector.  
6.3.3 MSWC Kassel 
6.3.3.1 Background 
The MSWC Kassel was built by the City of Kassel (190,000 inhabitants) and is located adja-
cent to a closed coal burning power plant. At the time of commencement in 1968, it was or-
ganizationally integrated into the administration of the public municipal cleaning department 
and was operated by the municipal power company. With the introduction of a new air emis-
sion law in 1990 (17. BImSchV), an upgrading of the flue-gas cleaning system became le-
gally mandatory. The required decision making processes within the different administrative 
and political levels in the City of Kassel were rather complicated and slow. The mandatory 
deadline of December 1, 1996 for meeting the new emission requirements neared and it 
seemed unlikely that the upgrading would be achievable within the existing hierarchical insti-
tutional arrangement of public administration. 
                                                
132 Site asset specificity and physical asset specificity are always high for every MSWC plant. Com-
pare chapters  5.3.2.1 and  5.4.1.1. 
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Therefore, in October 1995 the City of Kassel decided to formally privatize the MSWC Kassel 
and to bundle all existing assets into the special purpose company “MHKW Kassel GmbH”. 
With this transfer into a company under private law, the MSWC became more independent of 
the municipal budget and free from various administrative restrictions. After the formal priva-
tization the investment decisions could be taken more rapidly and the flue-gas cleaning sys-
tem was eventually upgraded before exceeding the legal deadline. Between the years 1997 
and 1999 a total amount of 150m € was invested to renew large parts of the machinery (e.g. 
firing unit, boilers and energy recovery). Today, the MSWC plant has a rather small nominal 
capacity of 150,000 Mg/a (for NCV of 11,077 kJ/kg)133 and generates electricity with its own 
steam turbine as well as hot water for the municipal district heating system. 
6.3.3.2 Arrangement 
The majority of 97.5% of “MHKW Kassel GmbH” is owned by Kasseler Verkehrs- und Ver-
sorgungs-GmbH (KVV), a holding company under private law that is fully owned by the City 
of Kassel. The remaining minority share of 2.5% belongs to the City Kassel itself. The com-
mercial management is done by KVV, for which it receives financial compensation. The op-
erational personnel is provided by “Städtische Werke Kassel GmbH”, a public utility company 
of the City of Kassel with which also a long-term power purchase agreement was signed. 
There exists a long-term waste delivery contract between the MSWC Kassel and its owner, 
the City of Kassel. In addition to that, the two municipalities Marburg-Biedenkopf and 
Schwalm-Eder also signed long-term contracts for treating altogether 75,000 to 100,000 
Mg/a of residual municipal waste after June 2005. None of these contracts required a public 
tendering, because the contractual relations exist between public entities or companies that 
are publicly owned134. The following Table  6-6 indicates how capacities were used in 2006: 
Municipality or IMA Capacity at MSWC [Mg/a] 
Kassel 75,400 
Marburg-Biedenkopf 36,300 
Schwalm-Eder 54,700 
Sum 166,400 
Table  6-6: Capacities used at MSWC Kassel in 2005 
Source: HMULV (2005) 
                                                
133 The NCV of delivered wastes is much lower. In the year 2005, 174,000 Mg could therefore be 
treated. 
134 In the future, such “in-house” contractual agreements might not been allowed under EU procure-
ment law. 
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The contracts of the two municipalities Marburg-Biedenkopf and Schwalm-Eder with the 
MSWC Kassel to treat their waste after 2005 were already signed in the year 1998 and will 
run for 15 years until 2020. The prices were determined on the basis of cost calculations 
from the year 1998 and include price adjustment mechanisms for diverse parameters. In the 
central waste management plan of the Federal State of Hessen135, the ministry of environ-
ment allocated the waste from the municipalities Marburg-Biedenkopf and Schwalm-Eder to 
be treated at MSWC Kassel. The two municipalities were therefore strongly urged by the 
administration to sign long-term contracts with the MSWC Kassel to ensure that legal re-
quirements will be fulfilled by 2005. In exchange, the ministry gave permission to operate the 
existing landfill site “Oppermann” until 2005, which is jointly owned by the two municipalities 
in the form of an IMA. 
The following Figure  6-14 illustrates the most important relationships among the stakeholders 
of the MSWC Kassel: 
 
Figure  6-14: Stakeholders and their relationships at the MSWC Kassel 
Source: own, based on personal interviews (2007) 
There exist strong relationships among the companies that are owned by the City of Kassel. 
The public waste management company “Stadtreiniger Kassel” delivers waste from house-
                                                
135 In Hessen, the waste management plan is made for the entire state and not for regional administra-
tive areas (Regierungspräsidium). 
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holds to the MSWC plant and also actively acquires waste from private waste generators to 
be treated at the MSWC Kassel. There is also a strong personal interdependence between 
the stakeholders, e.g. the managing director of the MSWC plant is responsible for all energy 
production facilities within KVV and its subsidiaries.  
The available access capacities that are not used by the three contracted municipalities 
amount currently to around 5-10% and are sold at the spot market to generate additional 
income for the MSWC Kassel. In 2005, an EBIT of 5.2m € was earned and transferred to the 
mother company KVV (KVV, 2005).  
6.3.3.3 Discussion 
The MSWC Kassel is a representative case study for the hierarchical institutional arrange-
ment of public company. Key characteristics comprise the ownership and operation in a com-
pany that is publicly owned and it operates under private law.  
The initial hierarchical arrangement of public administration can be explained from a historic 
perspective, because the MSWC Kassel was built in 1968 as one of the first MSWC plants in 
Germany and at that time all waste management services were delivered by the public sector 
throughout Germany. The formal privatization of the MSWC plant and therefore the change 
to hierarchical institutional arrangement of public company was primarily motivated by gain-
ing more flexibility and independence from the public budget. This became necessary, be-
cause a change in the institutional environment towards enhanced emission standards re-
quired large capital investments that were difficult to implement under the institutional ar-
rangement of public administration due to budgetary and organizational constraints. 
The City of Kassel in this institutional arrangement benefits from the generation of profits that 
can be used to leverage losses of other KVV subsidiaries136. The energy branch of KVV 
benefits from an environmentally friendly, reliable and cost-effective source of thermal and 
electrical energy that it can sell to its customers137. The personal and organizational relations 
between the MSWC Kassel and other public companies owned by the City of Kassel under 
the umbrella of KVV create trust and can therefore be very helpful in finding a consensus for 
investment decisions needed. 
For the two municipalities Marburg-Biedenkopf and Schwalm-Eder, the long-term contracts 
with the MSWC Kassel provided a solution for the treatment of their waste that became le-
gally necessary since June 2005. The usage of the MSWC Kassel by the two municipalities 
                                                
136 E.g. the public transport company KVG made financial loss of 14.4m € in the year 2005 (KVV, 
2005). 
137 The energy market has been liberalized in Germany and smaller energy companies are experienc-
ing severe competitive pressure. 
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was favored by the regional environmental ministry and therefore included in the central 
waste management plan. The signing of the long-term waste treatment contracts was sup-
ported by formal and informal relationships between the various public stakeholders involved. 
6.3.4 MSWC Weisweiler 
6.3.4.1 Background 
The MSWC Weisweiler is located next to the coal burning power plant Weisweiler in the vi-
cinity of the City of Aachen in the Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia. The coal burning 
power plant operates since 1955 and is owned by RWE, one of the largest energy compa-
nies in Germany.  
By the end of 1980s, the City of Aachen (250,000 inhabitants) and the county of Aachen 
(300,000 inhabitants) began to search for a solution to cope with growing waste amounts. 
The availability of existing landfill capacities was limited and the development of a new land-
fill site was very difficult due to the lack of a suitable location. In 1991, both municipalities 
founded the special purpose company “Abfallwirtschaft Kreis und Stadt Aachen GmbH”138 
(AWA) to jointly develop the future waste infrastructure development project.  
In 1992, the regional waste management plan for the administrative district of Cologne was 
published and it predicted strong growth of municipal waste volumes. The residual waste 
quantities for the City of Aachen and the County of Aachen where estimated with 120,000 
Mg/a and 160,000 Mg/a respectively by the year 2000139. Assuming a capacity buffer of 15% 
and an average plant availability of 80%, the waste management plan recommended the 
development of an MSWC plant at Weisweiler with a capacity of 400,000 Mg/a by the year 
1996 (Regierungsbezirk Köln, 1992, pp. 94-95,109).  
Based on these estimations and the pressure from the district presidency to develop an 
MSWC plant, AWA started negotiations with RWE to jointly develop an MSWC plant with a 
nominal capacity of 360,000 Mg/a. An agreement was made under which AWA would own 
and finance the MSWC plant, while a contract would be assigned to RWE for technical op-
erations of the facility for a period of 20 years. According to the agreement, AWA would de-
liver sufficient waste quantities and bear all demand risks.  
The planning approval was applied for in May 1993. After undergoing various processes, 
which included a public hearing with 16,000 public objections (Claus, 2000, p. 100), the con-
struction of the MSWC plant could start in June 1994.  
                                                
138 Each one owned 50% of the equity. 
139 Excluding commercial waste, the quantities were estimated to be 105,000 Mg/a each. In 2006, the 
actual waste quantity treated for the City of Aachen and the County of Aachen were only approx. 
58,000 Mg each (Aachen, 2007, p. 34). 
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Already during the construction period it became evident that the demand estimations were 
too high. This was mainly caused by the introduction of the new waste law KrW-/AbfG in 
1996 (see chapter  6.1.3), which excluded commercial waste from the responsibility of the 
public sector. To find a solution for the excess capacities, AWA started negotiations with the 
private waste management company R+T Entsorgung GmbH (R+T), that promised to ac-
quire waste from public and private sources in the open market. At that time, R+T was owned 
by RWE Umwelt GmbH and Trienekens GmbH, which later merged into Trienekens AG140.  
For the partnership between AWA and R+T, the special purpose company “MVA Weisweiler 
GmbH & Co. KG” was founded in 1997141, at which each company held 50% of the shares. 
The agreement has a duration of 20 years and specified that both partners would have to 
guarantee a minimum waste delivery of 145,000 Mg/a. The internal price is to be based on 
LSP calculation (see chapter  3.4.2), whereby R+T would not pay more than 112€/Mg until 
June 2005 (implementation of TASi regulation), because of low competitive pricing of landfill 
sites. 
The construction of the MSWC Weisweiler was completed in 1996, but due to various techni-
cal problems during the trial phase, it took more than one year before regular operation 
started in June 1998. The demand was low during the initial years and in 1999, a total 
amount of only 290,000 Mg was combusted at plant.  
During 2000 and 2001, Trienekens AG actively pursued the acquisition of AWA and subse-
quently MSWC Weisweiler. Even though the City of Aachen and the County of Aachen 
agreed to sell, the sale was rejected by the courts. At the same time, one of the largest cor-
ruption scandals in German history became public. It was proven that Mr. Trienekens paid 
bribes for the participation in the MSWC Cologne. Therefore, many other regional MSWC 
plants, including Weisweiler, came under investigation. Unlawful agreements or anticompeti-
tive behavior could never been proven at the MSWC Weisweiler, even though the negative 
impacts of the scandal continue to be present142.  
One outcome of the scandal was the takeover of Trienekens AG by RWE GmbH in 2002. 
The 50% of the shares of the MSWC Weisweiler including all contractual agreements with 
AWA were integrated into RWE Umwelt West GmbH (RUW). 
                                                
140 Trienekens and RWE held 50% each, with W. Trienekens have one more share. 
141 For tax and financing purposes, also the company MOENA GmbH & Co. KG was founded, who 
formally owns the MSWC and leases it back. 
142 Accusations were made against AWA and the mayor of Aachen, because the supplier Babcock did 
not have to pay penalties for the delayed start of operation. The company was also an important spon-
sor for the local soccer club. 
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In the same year 2002, the municipality Dueren (270,000 inhabitants) searched for options to 
implement a new waste management strategy, because capacities of its own landfill site 
were limited. With the support and pressure of the district presidency it was decided that 
Dueren would also participate in the MSWC Weisweiler and deliver its waste to the facility. 
Because a shareholding at AWA was not possible without public tender (with unclear out-
come), the City of Aachen and the County of Aachen as well as the Municipality of Dueren 
founded the IMA “Zweckverband Abfallwirtschaft West” (ZEW). Most public municipal waste 
management services (incl. collection, transportation and treatment) were transferred by its 
three members to ZEW, to which the City of Aachen and the County of Aachen sold its 
shares of AWA143. 
In 2005, RWE made the strategic decision to refocus on its core competencies of energy 
production and withdrew from the waste management business144. In November 2005, RUW 
was sold for 112m € to the public utility company Stadtwerke Krefeld AG (SWK), which is 
owned by the City of Krefeld and renamed it into “Entsorgungsgesellschaft Niederrhein mbH“ 
(EGN). The contract with RWE for technical operation of MSWC Weisweiler until 2017 re-
mained unaffected. 
In 2005, there was a dispute between the MSWC Weisweiler and RWE about the cost calcu-
lation for the operations contract (details are not publicly disclosed). An arbitration court fi-
nally solved the disagreement.  
Currently, the MSWC Weisweiler operates under favorable market conditions due to the high 
demand for waste treatment capacities after the introduction of TASi regulation. In 2006, a 
total amount of 401,214 Mg was treated, of which 184,858 Mg (46%) came from the area of 
ZEW (Aachen, 2007). 
6.3.4.2 Arrangement 
Today, public stakeholders own 100% of the assets of the MSWC Weisweiler. The assets 
are shared between AWA, which is owned by the inter-municipal association ZEW and the 
public waste management company EGN that is owned by the City of Krefeld. 
The following Figure  6-15 illustrates the most important relationships among the stakeholders 
of the MSWC Weisweiler: 
                                                
143 The City of Aachen and the County of Aachen still own 3.125% each of AWA to avoid real estate 
purchase tax.  
144 Later, RWE also sold its water business (e.g. Thames Water). 
Empirical study in Germany 
153 
 
Figure  6-15: Stakeholders and their relationships at MSWC Weisweiler 
Source: own, based on personal interviews (2007) 
For the operation of the MSWC Weisweiler, a contract exists with RWE Power, which owns 
and operates a coal burning power plant at the same location. The operations contract has a 
duration of 20 years (1997-2017) and assigns the responsibility for operating the plant to 
RWE with its own technical personnel. All investment decisions including the specification of 
maintenance works are still done by the MSWC Weisweiler that also bears all commercial 
(esp. demand) risks. The payments to RWE are based on the LSP calculation plus a 5% 
premium. In addition to the technical operations contract, there also exists a long-term power 
purchase agreement between the parties.   
The cooperation of AWA and EGN is based on the initial contract that was signed in 1997 
between AWA and R+T. The core element of the contract specifies that each company bears 
demand risks of up to 145,000 Mg/a. The capacities of AWA are used for treating waste from 
ZEW’s municipal members, whereas EGN has long-term waste treatment contracts with 
Heinsberg, Rhein-Erft-Kreis and other municipalities. All capacities above 290,000 Mg/a are 
jointly marketed to public and private waste generators at market prices. Since 2005, waste 
from the Netherlands is also treated at the MSWC Weisweiler, showing that the market is 
becoming more international. 
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6.3.4.3 Discussion 
The institutional arrangement for the MSWC Weisweiler is classified as the hybrid institu-
tional arrangement of operations model. The key characteristics include the public asset 
ownership while operation is outsourced to the private company for a limited period of time.  
The development of the institutional arrangement was driven by various and complex factors. 
Based on the central waste management plan of the administrative district Cologne, the City 
and County of Aachen were strongly encouraged to develop an MSWC plant, for which the 
private company RWE seemed to be a suitable partner. RWE could provide a suitable loca-
tion next to its coal burning power plant, it had expertise in the operation of power plants and 
could employ synergies in operation and energy production. At that time, RWE also pursued 
an aggressive strategy to expand into the waste management business. The close relation-
ships between RWE and many local municipalities, which still own more than 20% of 
RWE145, were of great advantage during the development of the institutional arrangement.  
With the sale of RWE Umwelt West GmbH (RUW) to the public utility company Stadtwerke 
Krefeld AG (SWK), the MSWC Weisweiler is an interesting case for the transfer of private 
ownership to public ownership146. The objectives of SWK in this institutional arrangement are 
to expand in the profitable waste management market, especially after the implementation of 
TASi regulation in June 2005. Hereby, EGN acts in direct competition with private companies 
and contributes to the annual profits of SWK147. Recently, such return of functionally privat-
ized tasks and services back to public sector can increasingly be witnessed at other waste 
management value chain elements (Keppler, 2007).  
Another outcome of the case study is the negative economic effects of centralized waste 
management planning. In this case, bureaucrats tended to overestimate waste quantities to 
ensure adequate development of capacities. Commercial considerations obviously played 
only a subordinate role after ensuring adequate treatment capacities, because waste 
streams could be assigned to without competition.  
Altogether, the presented case study illustrates impressively how dynamically institutional 
arrangements can change over a period of time and how informal institutions play a very 
important role in their emergence.  
                                                
145 The percentage is decreasing constantly since 1990s with many municipalities selling their shares. 
146 In many cases, it is the way around, i.e. formerly public assets are sold to private companies. 
147 In 2005, SWK generated total net profits of 10.3m € (20.5m € without retained earnings) which was 
distributed to public budget of the City of Krefeld. After SWK Energie (25.5m € earnings), EGN is the 
second most profitable business within SWK and contributed 9.9m € to the total net profits. SWK Mo-
bil, responsible for public transportation in Krefeld, incurred a loss of 18.8m € in the same period 
(Krefeld, 2005).  
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6.3.5 MSWC Pirmasens 
6.3.5.1 Background 
The IMA “Zweckverband Abfallwirtschaft Suedwestpfalz” (ZAS) was founded in 1987 by the 
six municipalities Pirmasens, Germersheim, Südwestpfalz, Suedliche Weinstrasse, Landau 
and Zweibruecken. It is located in the Federal State of Rhineland-Palatinate and the year 
2006 the combined population of 460,000 inhabitants generated approx. 75,000 Mg of resid-
ual municipal waste (ZAS, 2006). Among other obligations, founding statute of ZAS defined 
the tasks to plan, build and operate an MSWC plant in Pirmasens. The ZAS was formed with 
a strong political support and under the leadership of the regional environmental ministry 
which was highly concerned about insufficient waste treatment and disposal capacities in the 
state at that time148.  
Even though the statute of ZAS explicitly permitted that any task could be accomplished by 
contracting private parties, the political decision makers of IMA members initially decided that 
the MSWC Pirmasens would be developed, built, financed and operated within its own or-
ganization and with own resources. Other options, such as the development of a public-
private joint venture were also discussed, but not pursued. 
In 1988, technical advisors were selected to plan an MSWC plant with three combustion lines 
and a nominal capacity of 264.000 Mg/a. The tendering for three major parts of (i) firing unit 
incl. boiler, (ii) flue-gas treatment and (iii) energy recovery started in 1989 and contracts were 
awarded in 1990. Ten months later, in 1991, the planning approval processes officially 
started on the basis of the specified technology. The following procedures took place with 
extensive participation of citizens, interest groups and bureaucracies, and in 1993, the pro-
ject was finally approved. Due to considerable reductions in expected waste quantities, the 
ZAS decided to reduce the nominal capacity of the MSWC plant to approx. 168,000 Mg/a 
(7,000 h/a; NCV = 10,500 kJ/kg; 2 combustion lines x 12Mg). 
In the beginning of the 1990s, municipal elections took place in the Federal State of Rhine-
land-Palatinate and political power was shifted in some municipalities that are members of 
the IMA. Due to changed political interests, the members of ZAS decided in 1995 to find a 
private partner that would be assigned the task of construction, financing and operation of 
the MSWC plant for 17 years.  
6.3.5.2 Arrangement 
Following an EU-wide tendering based on VOL/A-tendering procedures, the contract was 
awarded in December 1995 to SOTEC (Saarberg Oekotechnik) GmbH. Its alternative offer 
was the most economic one mainly due to higher guaranteed availability of 8,000 hours/a 
                                                
148 The landfill site in Pirmasens became close to its capacities at that time. 
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that increases capacity to 180,000 Mg/a (10,500 kJ/kg). At that time, Saarbergwerke AG was 
a public enterprise and owned by the Federal State of Saarland (26%) and the German Fed-
eral Republic (74%). In 1998, SOTEC was sold along with other non-coal based operations 
of Saarbergwerke AG to the private company RAG Saarberg AG, which was renamed in 
2004 to STEAG Saar Energie AG. In 2006, STEAG Saar Energie sold 49.9% of SOTEC to 
the private energy company BKB AG149 (see also case studies Rothensee and Buschhaus). 
Today, SOTEC owns and operates six MSWC pants as well as one RDF power plant. 
The contract between ZAS and SOTEC included following major specifications: 
1. SOTEC had to finance, build and operate the MSWC plants with a nominal capacity of 
180,000 Mg/a (10,500 kJ/kg) on the land provided through a land lease contract by ZAS; 
2. The specification of the official planning approval notice applied and SOTEC had to ac-
cept all design specifications; 
3. All existing contracts between ZAS and suppliers had to be taken over by SOTEC; 
4. The operation had to start on 01.01.1999 with duration of 25 years until 31.12.2023; 
5. SOTEC had to pay and finance all the planning costs that had occurred during the devel-
opment phase by ZAS with a value of 12.8m €;  
6. SOTEC will receive regular payments from ZAS consisting of (i) basic payment (fixed), (ii) 
work payment (variable component based on actual throughput) and (iii) residual disposal 
payment (variable); 
7. ZAS is obliged to deliver all residual municipal waste that is generated within the IMA to 
the MSWC plant Pirmasens and will also aim at selling excess treatment capacities to 
third-party public or private waste generators.  
Initially it was anticipated that the utility company Stadtwerke Pirmasens GmbH, which is 
mostly owned by the ZAS member City of Pirmasens, would be involved in the operation of 
the MSWC plant and that it would hold 25.1% of the SPC’s shares. Their primary objective 
was to secure a reliable and cost-effective source of energy for the local district heating sys-
tem and electricity supply. The other members of ZAS, however, finally objected to such an 
arrangement and eventually this consideration was not pursued anymore. Today, there ex-
ists a power purchase agreement between the MSWC Pirmasens and Stadtwerke Pir-
masens, under which all the revenues will be transferred directly to ZAS. 
The following Figure  6-16 illustrates the most important relationships among the stakeholders 
of the MSWC Pirmasens: 
                                                
149 By 01.01.2008 the remaining 50.1% of SOTEC are sold to BKB. 
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Figure  6-16: Stakeholders and their relationship at MSWC Pirmasens 
Source: own, based on personal interviews (2007) 
Even though a majority of the plant’s design was already specified in the planning approval 
notification, SOTEC was still able to optimize some technical aspects. It could do so only to a 
limited extent, because it had to take over also the existing contracts from ZAS for firing unit, 
flue-gas treatment and energy recovery. SOTEC independently procured all other facilities, 
most importantly civil works as well as control and monitoring system. With its own internal 
management team, SOTEC also managed and coordinated all required planning and super-
visory work.  
To use the existing excess capacities of MSWC Pirmasens, ZAS signed an inter-communal 
waste treatment agreement with the IMA “Zweckverband Abfallwirtschaft Kaiserlautern” 
(ZAK), which lasts until 2018. Additionally, it also signed waste treatment contracts with sev-
eral private waste management companies, which have durations of up to 5 and 13 years. 
From 2007 onwards, ZAS and ZAK pay the same prices, while prices for private waste gen-
erators continue to be market based. 
The following Table  6-7 provides an overview of the usage of capacities in 2006: 
Source Quantity [Mg/a] Average price €/Mg 
ZAS 77,310 192.98 
ZAK 32,517 139.90 
Diverse (delivered by private waste man-
agement companies) 
73,512 139.15 
Sum 183,339  
Table  6-7: Waste treatment at MSWC Pirmasens in the 2006  
Source: ZAS (2006) 
Empirical study in Germany 
158 
In this institutional arrangement, the technical operation of the MSWC plant by SOTEC is 
separated from the waste stream management which continues to be done by ZAS. The 
public principal ZAS therefore bears all commercial risks that are related to demand 
changes. The practical experience has shown that this separation is a potential source of 
dispute between ZAS and SOTEC in case of unplanned operational interruption concerning 
waste from sources outside the ZAS. 
6.3.5.3 Discussion 
The MSWC Pirmasens is a representative case study for the hybrid institutional arrangement 
of (Design)-Build-Operate-Transfer. Its main characteristics are the integration of the life-
cycle elements of construction, financing and operation and their transfer to a private com-
pany for a limited period of time. In this case, the majority of design work was not integrated 
into the outsourcing package, because the public principal ZAS initially planned to establish 
the MSWC plant within its own hierarchy. The development of MSWC Pirmasens under pub-
lic leadership of ZAS can be explained with a high degree of uncertainty during the planning 
approval and the expectation that the assets would mostly be dedicated to ZAS due to an-
ticipated high waste generation volumes. 
When the contract was awarded, SOTEC was still operating under public ownership as part 
of the public STEAG Saar Energie AG, respectively public RAG group. Its material privatiza-
tion took place in sequences in 2006 and 2008. The case MSWC Pirmasens therefore illus-
trates the shift from the hierarchical institutional arrangement of public company to the hybrid 
institutional arrangement of (D)BOT. However, the initial institutional arrangement already 
contained significant elements of the hybrid (D)BOT, because of the integration of life-cycle 
elements and its outsourcing to a third party in open competition. 
On the whole, through the case study of MSWC Pirmasens different reasons for the emer-
gence of this particular institutional arrangement could be identified. The change of political 
objectives and normative attitudes towards private sector participation after local elections in 
the municipalities of ZAS was the main reason for the shift from a planned hierarchical ar-
rangement within ZAS towards the search for an external partner based on an (D)BOT con-
tract. The sale of the formerly public company SOTEC to the private company BKB (e.on) is 
part of restructuring of the German energy market and the reason for the fulfillment of all cri-
teria for the hybrid institutional arrangement of (D)BOT.  
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6.3.6 MSWC Oberhausen 
6.3.6.1 Background 
The MSWC Oberhausen is located in the City of Oberhausen and with a nominal capacity of 
up to 700,000 Mg/a, it is one of the largest and oldest waste treatment plants in Europe. In 
1968, the IMA ”Zweckverband Gemeinschafts-Müllverbrennungsanlage Niederrhein“ with its 
members Duisburg, Oberhausen, Dinslaken, Moers and Voerde made the decision to trans-
form the old power plant of Concordia Bergbau AG into an MSWC plant. Operation started in 
1972 after converting three existing boilers according to technical requirements for combus-
tion of residual municipal waste. The public utility company “Energieversorgung Oberhausen 
GmbH“ (evo), which is owned by the City of Oberhausen, was assigned to the technical op-
eration of the MSWC plant and receives energy produced as part of a power purchasing 
agreement. 
In 1984, the MSWC plant was formally privatized with the establishment of the special pur-
pose company ”Gemeinschafts-Müllverbrennungsanlage Niederrhein GmbH“ (GMVA). The 
public shareholders of the SPC were Duisburg (59%), Oberhausen (25%) and the three cities 
of Dinslaken, Moers and Voerde within the County of Wesel (together 16%). In the beginning 
of the 1990s, the County of Wesel developed its own MSWC plant in Ansdonkshof with a 
capacity of 235,000 Mg/a to handle the expected growth of waste generation. With the com-
mencement of operation in 1997, the authorities of the County of Wesel obliged its three cit-
ies Dinslaken, Moers and Voerde to treat their residual municipal waste at MSWC Ans-
donkshof. 
In 1996, the MSWC Oberhausen experienced severe commercial pressure. The demand for 
waste treatment decreased dramatically due to enactment of the new waste law KrW-/AbfG 
(see chapter  6.1.3), which reduced the demand for the treatment of residual municipal waste 
from commercial sources. The non-delivery of waste by the three shareholding cities Dinsla-
ken, Moers and Voerde added to a further decrease in demand.  
In 1996, a contract was signed with the private waste management company Trienekens 
GmbH to deliver 150,000Mg/a of residual municipal waste from commercial sources to be 
acquired from tertiary sources. Primarily due to competition with cheap landfill sites, the reve-
nues from treated commercial municipal waste mainly covered only the variable costs. Even 
though most of the capacities were used, the MSWC Oberhausen made continuously finan-
cial losses. In the three years from 1998 to 2000, the operational losses accumulated to 
more than 35m €. Bankruptcy of the SPC  was only avoided through the financial guarantees 
from the Cities of Oberhausen and Duisburg (Duisburg, 2001). Because only the unavoidable 
maintenance works were implemented at that time, the operational reliability of the plant was 
seriously threatened.  
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Due to this unsatisfying commercial and operational situation, the shareholders of MSWC 
Oberhausen decided in 2000 to restructure asset ownership and operation. The minority 
shareholders Dinslaken, Moers and Voerde sold their shares to Oberhausen and Duisburg, 
which then searched for a strategic private partner to acquire 49% of the MSWC plant. After 
running through a time consuming EU-wide tendering process that was strongly influenced 
by German antitrust authorities and regional courts, the shares were eventually sold in De-
cember 2001 to Rethmann Oberhausen GmbH (now: Remondis Oberhausen), a subsidiary 
of the largest German waste management company Rethmann (now: REMONDIS)150. 
6.3.6.2 Arrangement 
Today, the special purpose company “GMVA Niederrhein GmbH” owns and operates the 
MSWC Oberhausen. Its shareholders are the Cities of Duisburg and Oberhausen (together 
51%) and the private waste management company Remondis (49%). 
In this arrangement, Remondis has technical as well as commercial management control of 
MSWC Oberhausen and appoints two out of three executive directors. Along with the acqui-
sition of shares, Remondis had to provide a parent company guarantee for the existing and 
future debt of MSWC Oberhausen as well as an investment plan for the implementation of 
necessary maintenance and upgrading works. 
In December 2001, i.e. shortly before the sale of shares to Remondis, long-term waste 
treatment contracts were signed with the Cities of Oberhausen and Duisburg. Additionally, 
there exists another long-term waste treatment contract with the County of Kleve, which 
dates back to the year 1996. These three waste treatment contracts are forfeited and to-
gether guarantee around 60% utilization of the plant at a nominally fixed price (price adjust-
ment mechanisms apply). Remondis bears the remaining demand risks and is therefore re-
sponsible for acquiring residual municipal waste from tertiary public and private sources151. 
The following Figure  6-17 illustrates the most important relationships among the stakeholders 
of MSWC Oberhausen: 
                                                
150 In June 2001, the federal antitrust authority (Bundeskartellamt) initially approved the sale to the 
preferred bidder Trienekens. REMONDIS appealed the decision and a regional court (Kartellsenat 
OLG Düsseldorf) overruled the antitrust decision in September 2001 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2003, p. 
217). However, in 2005, the sale of other MSWC plants of Trienekens/ RWE to Remondis was ap-
proved by antitrust authorities and courts (see also case study Weisweiler in chapter  6.3.4). 
151 There exist for example waste treatment contracts with the municipalities of Coesfeld (35,000 
Mg/a) and Steinfurt (90,000 Mg/a).  
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Figure  6-17: Stakeholders and their relationships at MSWC Oberhausen  
Source: own, based on personal interviews (2007) 
After becoming a shareholder, Remondis restructured most operational and managerial ac-
tivities according to the requirements of a professional industrial organization. Since the year 
2006, the MSWC Oberhausen is in a healthy financial position (Duisburg, 2005). 
As part of the relationships between the stakeholders, a power purchase agreement was 
signed between MSWC Oberhausen and public utility company Energieversorgung Ober-
hausen AG (evo). Before the sale of shares to Remondis, evo was assigned to a contract for 
the commercial management and technical planning of the MSWC Oberhausen and there-
fore possesses strong linkages with the management and shareholders152.  
In 1998, Remondis already acquired a stake of 49% of ‘Wirtschaftsbetriebe Oberhausen 
GmbH’ (WBO), the public company that manages municipal waste in the City of Ober-
hausen. The existing personal relationships were regarded as helpful by the stakeholders for 
the cooperation at MSWC Oberhausen. 
6.3.6.3 Discussion 
The MSWC Oberhausen is a representative case study for the hybrid institutional arrange-
ment of public-private joint venture. Its main characteristics are the joint ownership and op-
eration of an MSWC plant for an unlimited period of time. The case study also illustrates the 
transition from the hierarchical institutional arrangement of public company to the hybrid insti-
tutional arrangement of public-private joint company through the sale of shares. 
                                                
152 The contract was signed in 1988 and will officially run until 2008. However, since 2001 all man-
agement decisions are taken by Remondis. 
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The sale of shares of MSWC Oberhausen to a private company was primarily motivated by 
severe financial and operational problems that put pressure on the public budgets of its pub-
lic owners Duisburg and Oberhausen. The participation of the private waste management 
company Remondis was primarily motivated by its strategic decision to expand vertically its 
existing value chain into the waste treatment. Remondis anticipated profitable business op-
portunities at MSWC Oberhausen and realized them by introducing incentive based man-
agement organization and restructuring of operations. 
6.3.7 MSWC Rothensee 
6.3.7.1 Background 
The City of Magdeburg is the capital of the Federal State of Saxony-Anhalt and has around 
230,000 inhabitants. The local utility company “Städtische Werke Magdeburg” (SWM) was 
founded in 1993 by the City of Magdeburg (54%) and the private energy companies VEBA 
(29%) and VEW (17%). The year 2000, the merging and restructuring of VEBA and VEW 
resulted in the creation of e.on AG and Gelsenwasser AG, which now hold 26.67% and 
19.33% of SWM, respectively. 
In 1997, a working group was formed between SWM and VEBA with the name “star” (SWM 
thermische Abfallbehandlung Rothensee) which had the objective to jointly develop an 
MSWC plant in Rothensee, a well located old industrial area in Magdeburg. Due to the lack 
of waste treatment facilities in the City of Magdeburg and many surrounding areas it was 
clear, that high demand for MSWC would exist after the enforcement of TASi regulation in 
June 2005. In the following years, star undertook a number of feasibility studies to assess 
technical and commercial potential and a business plan was prepared. 
In October 2001, the working group star was further formalized and the special purpose 
company (SPC) „Müllheizkraftwerk Rothensee GmbH” (MSWC Rothensee) was contractually 
founded between SWM and BKB, a subsidiary of the energy company e.on AG153. This SPC 
continued the business development and marketing efforts of star and participated in a num-
ber of public tenders for waste treatment in the region. At the same time, the MSWC plant 
started to take shape and planning approval processes were initiated in June 2002. 
After winning public tenders in December 2002, the first long-term waste treatment contracts 
with a total amount of 110,000 Mg/a were signed between MSWC Rothensee and the three 
municipalities Magdeburg, Ohrekreis and Boerdekreis. Only eight months after initiating the 
processes, planning approval was received in February 2003 and the construction of two 
combustion lines with a nominal capacity of 300,000 Mg/a could start in March 2003. 
                                                
153 For more details about BKB, see also case study Buschhaus in chapter  6.3.9 
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Meanwhile, the MSWC Rothensee successfully continued to acquire more long-term waste 
treatment contracts with public authorities as well as private waste generators. Soon it be-
came clear that the demand would exceed the capacities under construction and therefore 
two more lines with an additional capacity of 330,000 Mg/a were developed. Planning ap-
proval for this expansion was received in January 2005 and the construction started shortly 
afterwards.  
The operation of the first two lines commenced in time on June 1, 2005, the starting day of 
TASi enforcement. The construction of the additional two combustion lines was finished in 
June 2007, and with a nominal capacity of 630,000 Mg/a, MSWC Rothensee is today one of 
the largest MSWC plants in Germany (compare  6.3.7), producing heat and electricity for 
around 40,000 people. 
6.3.7.2 Arrangement 
The MSWC Rothensee is owned and operated by the SPC “Müllheizkraftwerk Rothensee 
GmbH”. The equity of the SPC is shared between the private company BKB (51%) and SWM 
(49%), the majority of which is publicly owned. The total capital investment of around 250m € 
was financed through loans from its shareholders and the two banks Helaba and Commerz-
bank.  
The following Figure  6-18 illustrates the most important relationships among the stakeholders 
of the MSWC Rothensee: 
 
Figure  6-18: Stakeholders and their relationships at MSWC Rothensee 
Source: own, based on personal interviews (2007) 
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Management decisions are jointly made within the organization of MSWC Rothensee, for 
which BKB appoints the technical executive manager and SWM the commercial executive 
manager. Today, around 300 people are employed by the SPC, 20 of which were transferred 
from SWM. 
As shown in the following Table  6-8, a comparatively high number of long-term waste treat-
ment contracts have been signed with the municipalities or IMAs after winning public tender-
ing processes: 
Municipality or IMA Capacity at MSWC [Mg/a]154 
Magdeburg 74,000 
Ohrekreis 23,000 
Bördekreis 13,000 
Aschersleben-Stassfurt 23,000 
Schönebeck 12,500 
Peine, Gifhorn, Wolfenbuettel together 107,000 
Anhalt-Mitte 24,000 
Jerichower Land 28,000 
Bitterfeld 25,000 
Stendal 23,000 
Bernburg 15,000 
Sum 367,500 
Table  6-8: Public long-term waste treatment contracts of MSWC Rothensee 
Source: NUM (2004a) , LVwASA (2005), personal interviews (2007) 
All municipalities and IMAs are from the Federal States of Lower Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt. 
Concerning the largest waste treatment contract between MSWC Rothensee and the City of 
Magdeburg it is important to note, that 62% of contracted waste quantities were forfeited in 
2006 (Koehli & Zuleger, 2006).  
There exists a long-term power purchase agreement for produced heat and electricity be-
tween MSWC Rothensee and its shareholder SWM, which owns the heat distribution net-
work in the City of Magdeburg and possesses 100% market share.  
6.3.7.3 Discussion 
The MSWC Rothensee is a representative case study for the hybrid institutional arrangement 
of public-private joint venture. The private company BKB and mostly publicly owned SWM 
jointly formed an SPC to develop, finance, build and operate the MSWC Rothensee. It is 
classified as a hybrid institutional arrangement, because the City of Magdeburg is an impor-
                                                
154 Actual quantities can exceed given min. capacities. 
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tant shareholder of MSWC Rothensee and has also signed the largest individual waste 
treatment contract, which (as a further sign of common objectives) has been forfeited to re-
duce risk patterns and financing costs. 
Initially, the development of this public-private joint venture was driven by the close relation-
ships between the energy company e.on and the City of Magdeburg in their joint sharehold-
ing of the local utility company SWM. On this existing basis of trust and cooperation, MSWC 
Rothensee was developed in a way, that both BKB and SWM could pursue their objectives. 
BKB could primarily increase the German market share in its core business of MSWC 
through organic growth. The major objective of SWM was to expand local business opera-
tions in energy production, which improved their commercial performance and reduced the 
problem of over staffing (20 employees could be transferred internally from SWM to MSWC 
Rothensee). 
The public-private joint venture of the MSWC Rothensee benefits from the technical and 
managerial expertise of BKB in developing, constructing and operating MSWC plants. On the 
other hand, it benefits from SWM who provided a suitable development location, an easily 
accessible energy distribution network for district heating and electricity, as well as important 
local knowledge and contacts with local political and administrative decision makers. From a 
commercial point of view, MSWC Rothensee is currently very successful and in the year 
2006 generated a net profit of 16.1m€ (Magdeburg, 2007, p. 58). 
Strong political and administrative support for the development of MSWC Rothensee could 
be witnessed from the City of Magdeburg and the Federal State of Saxony-Anhalt, which 
ensured fast planning approval and favorable regulatory environment155. Their objective was 
not only to ensure that municipal waste is treated in time and in accordance with TASi regu-
lation, but also to develop an MSWC plant in an economically weak region which provides 
desperately needed jobs and taxes.  
Even though classified as public-private joint venture, the MSWC Rothensee also shows 
some characteristics of the institutional arrangement of private company. The main similarity 
is that a comparatively high number of municipalities and IMAs have awarded long-term 
waste treatment contracts to MSWC Rothensee on the basis of public competition.  
6.3.8 MSWC Zorbau 
6.3.8.1 Background 
SITA Deutschland GmbH (below named: SITA) is among the largest private waste manage-
ment companies in Germany and is owned by the French utility company Suez. SITA has 
                                                
155 E.g. Saxony-Anhalt changed law and allowed municipal waste transportation across borders. 
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operations in municipal as well as commercial waste management. In 2006 it employed 
3,500 people with a turn-over of 470m €. 
Since the beginning of 1990s, SITA is also active in Eastern Germany where it participates in 
municipal waste management services in different institutional arrangements. Based on the 
market situation in the south of Eastern Germany, where almost all municipal waste was dis-
posed of in landfill sites before 2005, SITA actively started to develop and own MSWC plant. 
Through market research activities it was known that many municipalities and IMAs in the 
region would tender long-term contracts for treating their residual municipal waste after June 
2005. 
To develop an MSWC plant, SITA approached different manufactures, and in May 2001 a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed with VonRoll (Switzerland)  to design and 
construct a facility with a nominal capacity of 300,000 Mg/a. Even though SITA did not own 
any MSWC plants in Germany at that time, it could benefit from the expertise of its mother 
company Suez Environment, which owns and operates more than 60 MSWC plants through-
out Europe.  
During the initial project development, SITA planned to develop an MSWC plant at a location 
near the City of Zeitz in the Federal State of Saxony-Anhalt. With the technical specifications 
of the MOU, the official planning approval processes were initiated at that location. Mean-
while, SITA started participating in various public tenders for residual municipal waste treat-
ment in the region. However, the location in Zeitz became unavailable due to different cir-
cumstances. Being under immense time pressure because of ongoing tendering procedures, 
SITA was able to find another strategically well located site near the small City of Zorbau, 
which had been developed by the municipality for industrial development. The municipality 
and its politicians strongly supported the project, because the technology was environmen-
tally friendly and it promised investments, jobs and taxes to this economically weak area.  
By the year 2002, SITA had won two public tenders from the two IMAs “Sachsen-Anhalt Süd” 
(ZAW-SAS) and “Südwestsachsen” (ZAS) to treat exclusively their residual municipal waste 
after the legal deadline of June 2005. Together, these two contracts were expected to have 
an average volume of 150,000 to 170,000 Mg/a. In August 2002, SITA was also chosen as 
the preferred bidder for a public tender of the IMA “Zweckverband Restabfallbehandlung 
Westsachsen” (ZRO) that had specified treatment volumes of up to 120,000 Mg/a (see also 
Table  6-9 below). The waste quantities of these three IMAs together were sufficient to justify 
investments in an MSWC plant with the anticipated capacity of 300,000 Mg/a. If the construc-
tion had started in the second half of 2002, there would have been a comfortable schedule to 
commence operation prior to first waste deliveries in June 2005. 
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However, for the public tender of ZRO, also Stadtwerke Gera AG submitted a proposal 
ranked behind156. Stadtwerke Gera AG is a public utility company under private law and is 
owned by the City of Gera. With approximately 105,000 inhabitants, Gera is the largest of 
seven municipalities within ZRO. The City of Gera initially supported a hierarchical institu-
tional arrangement for residual municipal waste treatment of ZRO. The other members, how-
ever, favored an open competition, in which Stadtwerke Gera AG could participate as a bid-
der.  After SITA was announced preferred bidder for the public tender of ZRO, Stadtwerke 
Gera AG and another bidder made use of their rights and raised a formal objection against 
the decision. Being under time pressure to start the construction and not knowing the out-
come of the legal dispute, SITA and Stadtwerke Gera AG came to terms and mutually 
agreed to jointly own and operate the MSWC Zorbau (see arrangement below). In exchange, 
SITA obtained a share of 25.1% of Entsorgungs-Logistik-Thüringen GmbH (Elogo), of which  
the rest 74.9% are owned by Stadtwerke Gera AG. Elogo owns and operates a waste trans-
fer station and transports the waste for ZRO to the treatment facility. Meanwhile, Stadtwerke 
Gera AG and the other bidder withdrew their objection157, and SITA eventually signed the 
waste treatment contract with ZRO in June 2003. Even though the construction started with a 
considerable delay, it went into operation in time due to tremendous efforts of all participants.  
6.3.8.2 Arrangement 
The MSWC Zorbau is owned and operated by the special purpose company (SPC) “SITA 
Abfallverwertung GmbH”. The SPC’s equity of 6m€ is shared between SITA (74.9%) and 
Stadtwerke Gera AG (25.1%). SITA has signed three long-term contracts with IMAs coming 
from different Federal States (see Table  6-9), organizes the waste stream management and 
sells excess capacities at the market. SITA pays a fixed price for the operation and availabil-
ity of the plant and therefore bears all demand risks.  
Municipality or IMA Capacity at MSWC Duration 
ZRO Ostthüringen (7 members) 40,000 – 120,000 Mg/a 10 years 
ZAS Südwestsachsen (4 members) max. 84,000 Mg/a 15 years 
ZAW-SAS Sachsen-Anhalt Süd (2 members) max. 90,000 Mg/a 15 years 
Table  6-9: Public long-term waste treatment contracts of MSWC Zorbau 
Source: personal interviews with IMAs (2007) 
Stadtwerke Gera AG is responsible for most of the administrative activities of the SPC (e.g. 
accounting and financial reporting), for which it receives a fixed compensation. The technical 
                                                
156 Among others, also MSWC Leuna submitted a proposal. 
157 The trial went to the second instance. The second bidder eventually withdrew its objection due to 
the reduction of available capacities at its own MSWC plant after winning other tenders. 
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and commercial risks of the operation are shared. A long-term power purchase agreement 
(PPA) was signed with a public-private energy company “Energieversorgung Gera GmbH” 
that is jointly owned by the City of Gera (50.1%) and Suez (49.9%) 
The following Figure  6-19 illustrates the most important relationships among the stakeholders 
of the MSWC Zorbau: 
 
Figure  6-19: Stakeholders and their relationships at MSWC Zorbau 
Source: own, based on personal interviews (2007) 
The costs for project development, planning and construction summed up to around 120m € 
and were initially financed by the balance sheets of SITA. After successful commissioning of 
the plant, i.e. after all technical and commercial risks of the construction phase overcome, a 
structured project finance was arranged by KBC Bank (for more information about the financ-
ing see Savage, 2006). 
6.3.8.3 Discussion 
The MSWC Zorbau is a representative case study for the hybrid institutional arrangement of 
public-private joint venture. Key characteristics are the development, ownership and opera-
tion of the MSWC plant by a company that is jointly owned by public and private sharehold-
ers for an unlimited period of time. The public-private joint venture has signed long-term con-
tracts for waste treatment that secure the asset specific investments. 
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Even though the City of Gera and Suez (mother company of SITA) already collaborated at a 
local level since 1991 through their joint ownership of “Energieversorgung Gera GmbH”, this 
relationship had only marginal impact on the emergence of the final institutional arrange-
ment. 
The described institutional arrangement also shows some characteristics of the institutional 
arrangement of private company, because the MSWC plant was initially planned and devel-
oped by an independent private company and the public participation only evolved at a later 
stage. 
The MSWC Zorbau is an interesting case for exploring the development of institutional ar-
rangements, because it reveals that institutional arrangements do not necessarily emerge as 
the result of a planned and structured process between the stakeholders (see for example 
the case study of MSWC Rothensee in chapter  6.3.7). Even though the public-private joint 
venture was not initially pursued by SITA, this institutional arrangement was the only practi-
cal way to gain investment security within the constraints of the time schedule. For the public 
utility company Stadtwerke Gera AG, the MSWC Zorbau is an opportunity to participate in 
the profitable waste management market and to employ existing excess resources.  
The separation of technical and commercial management between SITA and Stadtwerke 
Gera has the effect, that all capital investment decisions are thoroughly analyzed from tech-
nical as well as financial point of views. Because Suez is listed at the US stock exchange, 
the commercial management (under responsibility of a manager appointed by Stadtwerke 
Gera) is quite influential due to obligations in fulfilling Sarbane-Oxley certification require-
ments. 
6.3.9 MSWC Buschhaus 
6.3.9.1 Background 
In the year 1985, Braunschweigische Kohlenbergwerke (BKB), a subsidiary of e.on energy 
(at that time part of VEBA), built the coal burning power plant “Buschhaus” near the City of 
Helmstedt in the Federal State of Lower Saxony. This is the last of nine coal burning plants, 
which BKB operated in the region since 1909. 
Due to the decline of the coal mining industry in the region it is planned to terminate the coal 
burning business of BKB by the year 2017. As a consequence, the management of BKB 
started to explore new business fields in the beginning of 1990s. After conducting several 
feasibility studies, one promising opportunity seemed to be the entering into the MSWC busi-
ness. The location next to the Buschhaus coal burning plant was favorable due to synergies 
with electricity generation and public acceptance.  
At the same time, the City of Brunswick (approx. 40km away from Buschhaus and within the 
same administrative region) started searching for new waste management solutions. Its own 
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landfill site in Watenbüttel approached its full capacity and the development of a new site 
was very difficult due to the lack of a suitable location and public objections. In 1995, negotia-
tions between BKB and the City of Brunswick resulted in a waste treatment contract, which 
encompassed the combustion of 136,000 Mg/a for a duration of 30 years from 1999 onward. 
For waste delivery, the City of Brunswick built a transfer station at its old waste disposal site 
for the waste transportation by rail to Buschhaus.  
With the existence of the long-term contract with the City of Brunswick as well as through its 
participation in other ongoing public tendering processes, BKB had sufficient investment con-
fidence and continued to pursue the development of the MSWC Buschhaus. Planning ap-
proval for the project was received in 1996, and the construction of two combustion lines with 
capacities of 2 x 175,000 Mg/a started in November 1996.  By 1997, two more contracts 
were signed with the City of Helmstedt and the County of Hanover. Altogether, about 70% of 
the capacities of the MSWC Buschhaus were now guaranteed with public long-term con-
tracts. 
The construction was completed in 1998 and the operation of the two combustion lines 
started in January 1999. In the following years, various other municipalities in the region ten-
dered the treatment of their waste for the time after June 2005, when the TASi regulation 
came into effect. BKB successfully bid for some of these contracts and therefore decided to 
expand capacities. In 2005, a third line was added. Today, with a total nominal capacity of 
525,000 Mg/a, the MSWC Buschhaus is a comparatively large waste treatment plant and 
produces a maximum of 45MW of electrical energy. 
In 2000, the European Commission inspected the contract between the City of Brunswick 
and MSWC Buschhaus. Even though the contract complied with the German procurement 
law, it was ruled that the tendering process did not comply with the EC directive on public 
procurement of services (92/50/EEC), mainly because the contract was awarded under a 
negotiated procedure and without EU-wide publication. After several years of legal dispute 
and to avoid penalties from the EC, the prime minister of Lower-Saxony, the mayor of Bruns-
wick and the CEOs of e.on Energy as well as BKB agreed to amicably annul the contract in 
2005. Consequently, the waste treatment contract was tendered again in an EU-wide compe-
tition, which was won by the competing waste management company Remondis that devel-
oped another new MSWC plant in the region at that time.  
6.3.9.2 Arrangement 
MSWC Buschhaus is owned by the private company BKB AG that is part of the e.on group. 
The following Figure  6-20 illustrates the most important relationships among the stakeholders 
of the MSWC Buschhaus:  
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Figure  6-20: Stakeholders and their relationships at MSWC Buschhaus 
Source: own, based on personal interviews (2007) 
MSWC Buschhaus was privately planned and developed by BKB, and the financing was se-
cured by the mother company e.on. The construction was divided into several lots and con-
tracted to different suppliers. 
The following Table  6-10 indicates the minimum waste treatment volumes that are based on 
long-term contracts between public waste authorities and MSWC Buschhaus: 
Municipality or IMA Capacity at MSWC [Mg/a] 
Brunswick158 136,000 
Helmstedt 25,000 
IMA Region  Hanover 102,000 
IMA Nordharz 52,000 
Salzgitter 30,000 
Wolfsburg 65,000 
Goslar 37,000 
IMA Celle, Municipality Uelzen 50,000 
Sum 497,000 
Table  6-10: Public long-term waste treatment contracts of MSWC Buschhaus 
Source: NUM (2004a; 2004b; 2004c) , LVwASA (2005), personal interviews (2007) 
                                                
158 By 2008, the waste will be delivered to Stassfurt. 
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All municipalities and IMAs are from the Federal State of Lower-Saxony, except for IMA 
Nordharz, which comes from the neighboring Federal State of Saxony-Anhalt. The duration 
of these contracts varies from 5 to 15 years and maximum waste quantities can considerably 
exceed the minimum amounts159. All contracts include price adjustment mechanisms that are 
different among each others. For contracts with municipalities that included waste transporta-
tion, BKB frequently allies with private waste management companies, such as Sulo (for-
merly Cleanaway). 
There also exist linkages between e.on (the owner of BKB) and some municipalities that 
have contracts with MSWC Buschhaus. Through complicated holding structures, these mu-
nicipalities (including City of Brunswick, County of Helmstedt and County of Hanover) hold 
35.4% of “e.on Avacon”, a regional multi-utility company from in the Federal States of Lower-
Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt with its head office in Helmstedt.  
6.3.9.3 Discussion 
The MSWC Buschhaus is a representative case study for the hybrid institutional arrange-
ment of private company. Key characteristics are the development, ownership and operation 
of the MSWC plant by an independent private company that has signed long-term contracts 
for waste treatment with several municipalities and IMAs. 
The most significant factors for the development of this institutional arrangement were the 
motivation of BKB to expand into the business field of MSWC, and the ability to contract suf-
ficient waste treatment volumes for a long period of time that justified the capital investments. 
With its core competence in developing and operating large power plants, BKB possessed 
sufficient internal experience and resources to develop a location next to an existing coal 
burning plant, which provided synergies in energy production and faced comparably little 
public resistance.  
For the municipalities and IMAs, on the other hand, MSWC Buschhaus offered sufficient ca-
pacities for treating their residual municipal waste. By signing long-term waste treatment con-
tracts with the private company, they ensured their compliance with TASi regulation after 
June 2005. 
The historical and regional roots of BKB as well as the existing formal and informal networks 
between e.on and some regional municipalities were surely advantageous during the devel-
opment phase of MSWC Buschhaus160. Without political and bureaucratic support it would 
                                                
159 E.g. the contract of IMA Hanover specified amounts of up to 138.000 Mg/a (aha, 2005, p. 17). 
160 Similar local networks are also evident at other MSWC locations with the institutional arrangement 
of public company: RWE/ MSWC Essen; EnBW/ MSWC Stuttgart; Vattenfall/ MSWC Borsigstrasse 
(Hamburg). 
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have been very unlikely to achieve the right timing and sequencing of project preparation, 
planning approval and tendering of long-term waste treatment contracts that are necessary 
for such big capital investments.  
Starting with MSWC Buschhaus, BKB successfully met its objective to initiate a structural 
transformation that prepared for the future after coal burning. Today, BKB is the largest 
owner and operator of MSWC plants in Germany (see chapter  6.2.6) and has been estab-
lished itself as the waste treatment competence center within the e.on group161. With MSWC 
Buschhaus and further MSWC plants of BKB, the energy giant e.on was able to pursue its 
strategy in expanding electricity generation from non-fossil fuels that reduces greenhouse 
gas emissions.  
6.4 Summary 
The presented empirical analysis on the MSWC in Germany aimed at meeting two objec-
tives: First, to verify the theoretically elaborated institutional arrangements in this developed 
market (research objective 4), and secondly, to explain the multifaceted reasons for their 
emergence (research objective 5).  
Prior to the empirical analysis, the existing institutional environment for municipal waste man-
agement in Germany, which is treated as exogenously given, has been briefly presented. It 
was shown that the institutional environment is formally governed by a hierarchical waste 
legislation, in which municipalities are ultimately responsible for ensuring the implementation 
of municipal waste management services. MSWC has long been an important element of 
municipal waste management and since June 2005, the treatment of all residual municipal 
waste is legally required by TASi regulation. By 2007, there existed a total number of 65 
MSWC plants with an aggregated nominal capacity of 17.5m Mg that treated an estimated 
76% of residual municipal waste in Germany.  
There are four legal options available under public law for the hierarchical institutional ar-
rangement of public administration in Germany. These are Regiebetrieb, Eigenbetrieb, AöR 
and special purpose IMA, which differ in their legal and organizational dependence on the 
owning municipality. All other institutional arrangements function under private law, and there 
exist various legal options, most importantly GmbH and AG, exist.  
To verify the theoretically elaborated institutional arrangements, a survey was undertaken for 
collecting quantitative data from all MSWC plants in Germany. The response rate of the sur-
vey was very high with 86% and the missing data was collected from secondary sources. 
The results verified the existence of all hierarchical and hybrid institutional arrangements for 
                                                
161 By April 2008, the coal burning and MSWC business of BKB will be separated. All MSWC activities 
will be bundled in the newly created “e.on Energy from Waste”.  
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MSWC in Germany, but showed, that the institutional arrangement of spot market is not ap-
plied. The institutional arrangement of public-private joint venture enjoys the largest applica-
tion with 22 plants and with a market capacity share of 39.7%, followed by private company 
(9 plants, 16.6%), public administration (11 plants, 14.9%), public company (12 plants, 
14.7%) and operations model (7 plants, 10.1%). The institutional arrangement of (D)BOT is 
least frequently applied and are represented only by 4 plants with a capacity share of 4.0%. 
The quantitative analysis revealed that inter-municipal associations (IMAs) are shareholders 
in 19 cases, in 4 cases of which the hierarchical institutional arrangement of special purpose 
IMA is applied. Furthermore, IMAs are the public principal in 5 out of 7 operations models 
and 3 out of 4 (D)BOTs. 
In the survey, a significant number of MSWC plants showed horizontal as well as vertical 
integration. Altogether 30 MSWC plants (45.9% of the total market capacity) are horizontally 
integrated through shareholders who own at least one other MSWC plant. However, with the 
largest private company BKB owning fully or partly only 8 out of 65 MSWC plants (10.0% of 
market share), no dominant market concentration exists yet. Vertical integration with other 
activities in the waste management value system was verified for 29 MSWC plants.  
The eight case studies of Berlin (Ruhleben), Kassel, Weisweiler, Pirmasens, Oberhausen, 
Magdeburg (Rothensee), Zorbau and Buschhaus were selected to illustrate the characteris-
tics of the quantitatively verified institutional arrangements as well as to explore the reasons 
for their emergence. An overview of the multiple case studies with their main characteristics 
can be found in the following Table  6-11. 
The MSWC Ruhleben is the only MSWC plant in Berlin and operates under the hierarchical 
institutional arrangement of public administration. High demand for waste treatment in Ger-
many’s largest municipality causes highly dedicated assets to one customer, which increases 
total asset specificity. The emergence of a hierarchical institutional arrangement can there-
fore be explained from a transaction cost economic point of view.  
The MSWC Kassel is a representative case study for the hierarchical institutional arrange-
ment of public company, that emerged from a public administration through formal privatiza-
tion in 1995. The change of hierarchical institutional arrangement was primarily motivated by 
gaining more flexibility and independence from the public budget, without which the large 
capital investments for legally required upgrading of the flue-gas treatment system were not 
achievable. Today, the public owner of the MSWC plant benefits from high earnings that are 
used to cross-subsidize other public services. 
The case study MSWC Weisweiler exemplifies the hybrid institutional arrangement of opera-
tions model, the emergence of which was influenced by complex factors. In the beginning, 
the reason to outsource the technical operation for a period of 20 years to a private energy 
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company was primarily motivated by the deployment of synergies with a neighboring coal 
burning power plant. The case study also concluded that centralized waste management 
planning and changes in the institutional environment resulted in the development of severe 
excess capacities. To solve the subsequent financial problems, a private waste management 
company temporarily took over 50% of the shares of the MSWC Weisweiler. However, today 
100% of the assets are again owned by the public sector, which can be explained by 
changes in the strategy of a private energy company that caused withdrawal from waste 
management sector as well as the strategy of a public utility company to expand its profitable 
business of waste management. The case study also reveals that informal institutions, 
mainly personal networks among various stakeholders, play a decisive role in the emergence 
and transformation of institutional arrangements. 
The MSWC Pirmasens represents the hybrid institutional arrangement of (D)BOT. The 
change of political objectives and normative attitudes of political decision makers towards 
private sector participation in MSWC have been identified as the major reasons for its emer-
gence. In addition to that, the privatization of a publicly owned company as part of the re-
structuring of the German energy market, led to the development of the currently existing 
institutional arrangement. 
The MSWC Oberhausen is one out of three case studies for the hybrid institutional arrange-
ment of public-private joint venture. It has emerged through the sale of 49% of the shares of 
a public company, which was motivated by the search for a solution to overcome severe fi-
nancial and operational problems. The strategic decision of a private waste management 
company to expand its value chain as well as the deployment of its existing financial and 
managerial capacities are further reasons for the emergence of this public-private joint ven-
ture. 
The MSWC Rothensee is the second case study for the hybrid institutional arrangement of 
public-private joint venture. In this case, a joint venture was specially founded by a public and 
private company to develop, own and operate a new MSWC plant. The collaboration 
emerged on the basis of existing formal and informal relationships between the public and 
private stakeholders. The development of the institutional arrangement was supported by 
local knowledge and contacts of the public partner as well as by the expertise in technical 
development and operation of MSWC plants of the private partner. 
The MSWC Zorbau is the third case study for the hybrid institutional arrangement of public-
private joint venture. Here, the institutional arrangement did not primarily emerge as the re-
sult of a planned and structured process between the public and private stakeholders. In-
stead, the participation of a public utility company emerged as the only practical solution for 
gaining investment security for a private waste management company, which pursued the 
strategic objective to expand its value chain in Germany. 
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The MSWC Buschhaus is a representative case study for the hybrid institutional arrange-
ment of private company. The MSWC plant is independently developed, owned and operated 
by a private energy company, which has signed several long-term waste treatment contracts 
with various municipalities and IMAs. The emergence of the institutional arrangement was 
primarily motivated by new business field development of the private energy company that it 
needed to strategically compensate for closing of coal burning activities. Verifiable formal 
and informal contacts of the private company to politicians at municipal and regional levels 
also supported the development of this institutional arrangement. 
The different paths for the development and transformation of institutional arrangements can 
be found in the following Figure  6-21. 
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7 Empirical study in Singapore162 
7.1 Background  
The Republic of Singapore is an island state in South-East Asia. Around 4.2m people live in 
an area of 697 km² and make Singapore to one of the most densely populated states in the 
world. With a GDP per capita of approx. 34,000 US$ in 2007, Singapore ranks among the 
most developed countries in Asia (IMF, 2007).   
Singapore enjoys the reputation of being a “green and clean” city. However, continuous so-
cial and economic achievements of the past decades came along with environmental prob-
lems, such as the high amounts of generated waste by households, commerce and industry. 
In 2006, a total amount of 2.56m Mg of waste was generated, of which 57% came from resi-
dential households and 43% from commercial and industrial sources. With an average of 610 
kg per year and capita, municipal waste generation rates are at the same levels as in other 
developed countries (compare Figure  2-6). 
The following Figure  7-1 indicates the development of waste generation and treatment in 
Singapore during 1995 to 2006: 
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Figure  7-1: Waste treatment statistics in Singapore 1995-2006 
Source: NEA (2007) 
                                                
162 This section is derived from Kleiss & Alfen (2007). 
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7.2 Waste Management 
7.2.1 Waste collection 
In the past, all activities of the waste management value chain were exclusively provided by 
the public sector in Singapore. This started to change in the year 1999, when the collection 
of household waste was progressively privatized. For the duration of five years163, conces-
sions for household waste collection in all nine districts were sequentially tendered to pri-
vately owned and licensed companies. The dominant criterion for the evaluation of bids was 
the proposed fixed household waste management fee, which is based on the type of prem-
ise164 and includes waste collection, transportation and treatment. As for the year 2007, four 
private companies share the market for household waste collection in Singapore. Because 
the bids were done independent of one another, waste collection fees differ among the con-
cession areas depending on local factors, especially population density165. The household 
collection fees are fixed for the entire concession period and will only be revised if the treat-
ment fees at the MSWC plants are changed by National Environment Agency (NEA, see be-
low). Changes in inflation or consumer price indexes (including fuel prices) do not allow an 
adjustment of these household collection fees. 
While private waste collectors receive fixed revenues based on their concession agreement 
with NEA166, they pay waste treatment fees at the MSWC plants that depend on the weight of 
collected waste. Therefore, the private collecting companies bear most market risks and 
have strong economic incentives to promote waste reduction and recycling. As a result, the 
waste collectors started to separate recyclables from the collected waste and actively sup-
port public waste reduction and recycling promotion programs. 
All commercial and industrial entities are free to choose from any licensed waste manage-
ment company. They can bilaterally negotiate prices for any waste management service 
(Upadhyaya, 2006, p. 30). 
7.2.2 Waste treatment 
Due to the growing amounts of municipal waste and severe land scarcity in the densely 
populated island of Singapore, the disposal of untreated waste in landfill sites is not a suit-
able option (Bai & Sutanto, 2002). During the beginning of the 1970s, the Ministry of Envi-
                                                
163 The first round of contracts had a duration of 5 years.  Since the second round of contracts, the 
duration has been increased to 7 years. 
164 Premises are distinguished between flats, landed residential, market stalls and different trade 
premises. 
165 The waste collection fees are fixed and range between 4.31 S$ and 7.35 S$ for flats per month. 
166 Revenues will only change if the number of premises changes in the concession area, and not if 
waste quantities per premises change. 
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ronment and Water Resources (MEWR) therefore started to support the MSWC to reduce 
waste disposal quantities. The MEWR opened its first MSWC plant in Ulu Pandan in 1979, 
and by 2000, a total number of four MSWC plants were in operation (see the following Table 
 7-1). 
Name of MSWC Year Combustion 
lines 
Nominal capacity167 Gate fee 
Ulu Pandan 1979 4 1,100 Mg/day 81 – 87 S$/Mg* 
Tuas 1986 5 1,700 Mg/day 77 S$/Mg 
Senoko 1992 6 2,400 Mg/day 81 S$/Mg 
Tuas South 2000 6 3,000 Mg/day 77 S$/Mg 
* based on daytime 
Table  7-1: Existing MSWC plants in Singapore  
Source: NEA (2007) 
The following Figure  7-2 shows the locations of MSWC plants in Singapore. 
 
Figure  7-2: Locations of MSWC plants in Singapore 
Source: own 
These four MSWC plants are publicly developed, owned and operated by MEWR and there-
fore apply the institutional arrangement of public administration. Because the MSWC Ulu 
Pandan is approaching its design lifespan, it was decided to replace it with a new MSWC 
                                                
167 In Singapore, waste treatment capacities are given as daily capacities.  
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plant next to an existing one in the industrial zone of Tuas South. For this new MSWC plant, 
MEWR and its implementing agency NEA envisaged the usage of a market or hybrid institu-
tional arrangement (see chapter  7.4). 
In the beginning of 2000s, NEA launched a National Recycling Programme, which relied 
strongly on voluntary and educational measures (see chapter  4.3.2.1 for theoretical analysis 
of education and appeal measures). In the future, additional waste minimization and reduc-
tion policies might be implemented by NEA to achieve the ultimate goals of zero waste and 
zero landfill (Yeo, 2007). Therefore, the aggregate capacities for the MSWC will slowly be 
reduced in Singapore and the new MSWC plant will have lower capacities than MSWC Ulu 
Pandan.  
7.3 Institutional environment 
Formal institutions 
Due to the size of Singapore, the formal institutions for waste management are compara-
tively straightforward. The Environmental Public Health Act (chapter 95) from the year 1987 
regulates most important issues concerning waste management and was last revised in 
2002. The Environmental Pollution Control Act (chapter 94A) specifies air pollution control 
issues for all industrial and commercial premises including the MSWC plants.  
In July 2002, the National Environment Agency (NEA) was formed under the Ministry of the 
Environment and Water Resources (MEWR) and is responsible for the development and 
implementation of environmental policies. As part of the NEA, the Waste Management De-
partment within the Environmental Protection Division is in charge of operating the four pub-
licly owned MSWC plants as well as the Semakau off-shore landfill and the waste transfer 
station (see Table  7-1). The Waste Management Department is also responsible for licens-
ing, controlling and regulating private waste collectors as well as future private MSWC plants 
(see case study below). 
In the beginning of the 2000s, the Ministry of Finance Singapore (MoF) started to pursue a 
new strategy that aims at increased participation of the private sector in infrastructure devel-
opment and operation. In the year 2002, it issued guidelines and standard procurement pro-
cedures for so-called “Public Private Partnerships” (PPP), which are derived from similar poli-
cies in Victoria State, Australia. The guidelines and procedures emphasize the creation of 
maximum value for money through the application of output specification, appropriate risk 
allocation and life-cycle integration. By the year 2003, four projects are awarded under the 
PPP program, among them are a desalination plant and a water treatment plant (MoF, 2007). 
Informal institutions 
The political landscape of Singapore is dominated by the People’s Action Party (PAP), which 
has won all general elections since 1959. This political one-party rule affects almost all public 
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as well as commercial areas. Similar to other small countries or city economies, there exist 
intense informal networks among PAP’s members, bureaucrats, media, as well as public and 
private companies. Hereby, the investment company Temasek Holdings that is owned by the 
Government of Singapore and headed by the President’s wife, plays a leading role through 
its ownership in various enterprises. 
However, in comparison to many other countries in the region, the public bureaucracy is very 
effectively organized and implements multiple principles of meritocracy (Quah, 2007). Cor-
ruption levels in Singapore are among the lowest in the world, ensuring a transparent, reli-
able and enforceable legal system168 (Transparency International, 2007). 
7.4 Case study: MSWC Tuas South II 
7.4.1 Methodology 
The case study of the MSWC Tuas South II is carried out to pursue the fifth research objec-
tive, i.e. to illustrate institutional arrangements for the MSWC and to explore the reasons for 
their development in the developed market of Singapore. As it will be shown, the case study 
possesses a strong revelatory character, because the failure to create a market based insti-
tutional arrangement and finally applied hybrid institutional arrangement could be observed 
and analyzed for the first time in the developed economy (Yin, 2003, p. 42). Because of its 
revelatory character and in contrast with the multiple-case study in Germany (see chapter  6), 
this case study will be carried out in more detail. Hereby, stakeholder relationships, output 
specifications, payment mechanism and risk allocation will be described in-depth. 
The process of knowledge creation was iterative and started with interviewing the technical 
and commercial advisors of NEA by using open questions. After the basic information about 
the background, stakeholder relationships and tendering processes were gathered, several 
key stakeholders were approached and personally interviewed in a structural manner. These 
included NEA bureaucrats, external consultants, private companies, banks as well as re-
searchers from local universities. To validate the information, a draft of the case study was 
sent to two key stakeholders who confirmed its accuracy.  
7.4.2 Background 
Based on the positive experiences from privatizing waste collection services (see chapter 
 7.2.1), MEWR and its implementing agency NEA envisaged also transferring other activities 
of the waste management value system to private companies. For the replacement of the 
MSWC Ulu Pandan, which will be closed shortly after 30 years of operation, the development 
of a new MSWC plant in the vicinity of the existing MSWC Tuas South was planned.  
                                                
168 Singapore ranks the fourth along with Sweden in the global corruption perception index (Transpar-
ency International, 2007).  
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Due to changes in the institutional environment that support increased private sector partici-
pation in infrastructure development (see above), NEA initially favored the development of 
the new MSWC Tuas South II under an institutional arrangement that possessed mostly 
characteristics of a spot market (see chapter  5.4.1.4). Hereby, NEA planned to tender pub-
licly an exclusive license for a private company to develop, own and operate an MSWC plant 
at Tuas South. The license would be granted to the bidder, who offered the lowest waste 
treatment fees, which would be capped for the first five years of operation. In this envisaged 
institutional arrangement, NEA would not guarantee any minimum waste delivery to the pri-
vate MSWC plant throughout the entire project life-cycle. It is important to note, that in order 
to prevent possible exploitation of market power (see chapter  4.2.3 for theoretical analysis) 
waste collection companies were excluded from the bidding for the MSWC license. NEA 
promised that after granting the license it would privatize the remaining MSWC plants by sell-
ing their assets to private companies and slowly deregulate price setting for waste treatment 
fees. However, the schedule of MSWC privatization and price deregulation was not dis-
closed. 
In 2000, NEA started tendering for the license to develop, own and operate the new MSWC 
plant with a nominal capacity of 800 Mg/day. However, the response from private companies 
was very unsatisfying, because only one bid was received that did not meet the minimum 
compliance criteria. The year 2001, NEA had to close the tendering procedures without 
granting the license. Instead, it started pursuing a hybrid institutional arrangement for the 
development of the new MSWC plant. 
The challenge for NEA was to implement a more suitable hybrid institutional arrangement 
that would balance the risk allocation between the public and private sector while ensuring 
efficient and reliable service provision. Based on the guidelines and standard procurement 
procedures of MoF for so-called “Public Private Partnerships”, the institutional arrangement 
of (D)BOT was chosen. Hereby, it was planned to contract a private company for the design, 
financing, construction and operation of an MSWC plant with a designed capacity of 800 
Mg/day. The operational period would be limited to 25 years with an option of extension upon 
mutual agreement between NEA and the private company. Because it was planned that the 
MSWC plant would have to be dismantled after the project termination, this institutional ar-
rangement was named by NEA as Design-Build-Own-Operate (DBOO).  
Under the DBOO agreement, the private company would not directly receive payments from 
the waste collectors based on delivered quantities but instead receive scheduled payments 
from NEA that are based on defined availability and performance criteria. Therefore, the pri-
vate partner does not bear the demand risks, which he was reluctant to bear in the market 
arrangement envisaged in the first place.  
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7.4.3 Tendering 
In December 2004, NEA launched the procurement for the new MSWC plant in Tuas South 
under the institutional arrangement of DBOO by issuing the notice for “Pre-qualification of 
tenderers for the provision of refuse incineration services under a design-build-own-operate 
scheme”. Interested bidders had to prove sufficient experience in developing and operating 
the MSWC plants and in implementing BOT or similar procurement schemes. A total number 
of 9 companies or consortia pre-qualified and received the tender documents. During the 
tendering phase, several meetings were held with all bidders to explain and clarify the project 
specification. Out of the 9 bidders, only 4 submitted an eligible proposal by the deadline in 
early 2005.  
Based on the offered availability payments as well as on non-financial performance criteria 
(for details see below) the private company Keppel Seghers was chosen as a preferred bid-
der. Keppel Seghers is owned by Keppel Integrated Engineering Ltd. (KIE) and part of the 
Keppel Corporation, which is an industrial giant that is publicly listed at the Singaporean 
stock exchange. In 2002, KIE acquired Seghers Engineering NV from Belgium, a specialized 
company for manufacturing of environmental technologies, such as MSWC plants.  
7.4.4 Institutional arrangement 
Stakeholder relationship 
In November 2005 the contract was awarded and two months later signed by NEA and “Kep-
pel Seghers Tuas South Waste to Energy Plant Ltd.”, the special purpose company (SPC) 
sponsored by Keppel Seghers. Within 6 months from contract signing, the SPC had to 
achieve financial closure with its two lending banks ING and DZ Bank. The commencement 
of full operation will have to start the latest 40 months after contract signing, i.e. in May 2009.  
After the successful commencement, Keppel Seghers will have to operate the MSWC plant 
for a period of 25 years during which it receives the so-called availability payments from NEA 
(see below). Private waste collection companies that deliver the residual waste to the MSWC 
plant will pay the treatment fees directly to NEA, which also sets prices.  
The following Figure  7-3 illustrates the most important relationships among the stakeholders 
of the MSWC Tuas South II:  
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Figure  7-3: Stakeholders and their relationships at MSWC Tuas South II 
Source: own, based on personal interviews (2006) 
Output specifications 
An important characteristic of the DBOO agreement is the definition of so-called output 
specifications. Here, the NEA did not specify the technical details for the MSWC plant, but 
instead defined the general technical framework for compliance during the operation. The 
private company Keppel Seghers could therefore optimize different technical and operational 
aspects throughout the life-cycle and freely design and combine various components, such 
as combustion unit, energy recovery, flue-gas cleaning system, process control and con-
struction works (see chapter  3.2). 
The main elements of the output specifications comprise: 
1. The available treatment capacity shall be at least 800Mg/day in relation to a design net 
calorific value (NCV) of 9.000 kJ/kg municipal waste. Waste with a NCV from 6,000 – to 
12,000 kJ/kg shall be treated. 
2. The plant shall be built at the land in the industrial area of Tuas South that is provided for 
lease by Singaporean Land Authority (SLA) or at another suitable land procured by the 
private company. 
3. The thermal treatment shall reduce the waste volume by at least 90% and the weight by 
at least 70%. The total organic content of the ash shall be less than 3%. 
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4. The ash shall be transported to the Tuas Marine Transfer Station from where it will be 
shipped to the off-shore Semakau landfill at no cost. 
5. All facilities and processes shall comply with all environmental regulations and stipula-
tions of the Republic of Singapore. Especially the flue-gas treatment system shall comply 
with the Environmental Pollution Control Act (EPCA). 
6. Electricity shall be generated at a minimum guaranteed level dependent on the waste’s 
NCV for own usage and sale to the spot market. The sale of excess electricity and its 
transmission have to be done in compliance with the “Transmission Code” of the Energy 
Market Authority of Singapore and SP PowerGrid.  
7. The turnover-time for waste delivery trucks shall be less than 30 minutes. 
8. Other specifications regarding civil works, waste receiving installations, electrical and 
mechanical design, control system, monitoring procedures, etc. 
The payment mechanism 
Throughout the operational period of 25 years, the SPC receives availability payments169 
from NEA that are calculated by a set of defined performance criteria. The installments are 
done on a monthly basis and consist of the following six components: 
(1) + Combustion capacity payment (CCP) 
(2) + Electricity generation payment (EGP) 
(3) + Service payment (SP) 
(4) + Electricity generation incentive payment (EGIP) 
(5) + Payment for energy market charges (PMC) 
(6) - Payment deduction (PD)  
 = Total payment by NEA 
 
The combustion capacity payment (CCP) includes two payment elements for the fixed assets 
of the MSWC plant: (i) a fixed capital cost component without indexation for debt service, 
return on equity and taxes; as well as (ii) a fixed operation and maintenance component that 
is subject to indexation (consumer price index). Similarly, the electricity generation payment 
(EGP) consists of a single fixed component for the electricity generation comprising a fixed 
capital cost component without indexation for debt service, return on equity and taxes; and a 
fixed operation and maintenance component. The service payment (SP) is based on the 
variable operation and maintenance component and is subject to indexation. The electricity 
generation incentive payment (EGIP) is 2% share of actual revenues for generated energy 
sold to the Singaporean spot market. To cover the transaction costs for the sale of electricity, 
                                                
169 Availability payments are often applied in PPP road projects - see for example the E39 Klett-
Bårdshaug project in Norway.  
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the payment for energy market charges (PMC) is part of the total payment. In addition to the 
above mentioned five positive elements, the payment structure also includes payment de-
ductions (PD) that reflect penalties for (i) not meeting the required quality of bottom ash, (ii) 
turn-around times longer than 30 minutes or (iii) failing to generate minimum required elec-
tricity.   
Besides minimizing life-cycle costs that are directly related to the MSWC plant, there exist 
also other financial incentives to the SPC that are not directly reflected by the payment 
mechanism stipulated in the contract between NEA and the SPC.  
The first one is related to land use. In that the SPC used the designated land at the industrial 
zone in Tuas South, it would have to close a land lease agreement with the Singaporean 
Land Authority (SLA). Because the lease fee depends on the actual space used for the 
MSWC plant and its auxiliary facilities, the SPC has an incentive to minimize total land use. 
The optimization of land use is an important issue in the densely populated island.  
Secondly, NEA will pay 30S$/Mg to the SPC for avoiding the disposal of bottom ash at the 
Semakau landfill. It has therefore a strong financial incentive to minimize the generation of 
bottom ash and to divert it from the disposal at the offshore landfill site, e.g. by using it for the 
production of construction materials170. 
The recovery of scrap metals is the third incentive for the SPC. With increasing market prizes 
for metals and sufficient content of metal in the waste, it could be financially beneficial to in-
stall equipment for extracting these metals during the combustion processes. However, the 
SPC is not allowed to separate marketable recycling products (e.g. glass, plastic, metals) 
upfront before thermal treatment, because NEA wants this part of the waste management 
value chain to be done by waste collectors.  
The following Figure  7-4 indicates the most important financial arrangements and qualitative 
flow of funds between the key stakeholders: 
                                                
170 This is one reason, why Keppel currently sponsors a large research project on the utilization of 
bottom ash at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.  
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Figure  7-4: Flow of funds among key stakeholders at MSWC Tuas South II 
Source: own, based on personal interviews (2006) 
Risk allocation 
The presented institutional arrangement is characterized by a sophisticated allocation of risks 
between the NEA and the private SPC. Based on the defined output specifications as well as 
the payment mechanism, the risk allocation is summarized in the following Table  7-2: 
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Risk NEA Private 
Availability of minimum effective MSWC capacity of 800 Mg/d  X 
Minimum energy recovery  X 
Compliance with environmental laws and regulations  X 
Net calorific value (NCV) of waste outside 6,000 – 12,000 kJ/kg X  
Composition of waste other than reflected by NCV  X 
Quality of residues (mass reduction > 70%, volume reduction > 
90%, total organic content of bottom ash < 3%) 
 X 
Construction and planning costs  X 
Permission and monitoring costs  X 
Costs for dismantling/ demolition after project termination  X 
Construction delay  X 
Land use  X 
Change in law X  
Demand risk X  
Price for sale of electricity 98% 2% 
Change of inflation rate X  
Change of taxation X  
Change of price for operating materials/ consumer price index X  
Change of disposal fee for bottom ash X  
Change of gate fee X  
Table  7-2: Risk allocation for MSWC Tuas South II 
Source: own, based on interviews (2006) 
7.5 Discussion 
The case study of the MSWC Tuas South II has revealed two important findings. First, it 
showed that private companies were not willing to engage in the institutional arrangement of 
market under the given circumstances for the MSWC in Singapore. Secondly, it provided an 
in-depth view of the characteristics of the hybrid institutional arrangement of (D)BOT.  
The unwillingness of private companies to engage in the institutional arrangement of market 
in which they have to develop, own and operate an MSWC plant under a license of NEA is 
consistent with the elaborated theoretical framework for the MSWC and the quantitative find-
ings from Germany. The attributes for the transactions of the MSWC Tuas South II can be 
characterized by (i) high site and physical asset specificity, (ii) medium intensity of dedicated 
assets, due to the limited number of customers (waste collection companies), (iii) medium 
volume uncertainty, because the development in the future of waste quantities is relatively 
unknown and (iv) low technology uncertainty, because MSWC is already a commonly applied 
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technology in Singapore. Given these attributes of transaction, the heuristic model of institu-
tional arrangements based on the theory of transaction cost economics is coherent with the 
rejection of a market arrangement. In case of the MSWC Tuas South II, private companies 
were unwilling to make idiosyncratic investments for transactions with the described charac-
teristics because no contractual safeguards existed (compare also with chapter  5.3). How-
ever, the attempt of the Singaporean government to implement a market arrangement for the 
MSWC has revealed very valuable insights into the functioning of this infrastructure sector171. 
It can be speculated that the initially desired institutional arrangement of market might have 
worked if vertical integration of the MSWC had been allowed, because this would have con-
siderably reduced volume uncertainty. However, the prohibition of vertical integration is justi-
fied to prevent market exploitation in the comparatively small market of Singapore. 
The successfully implemented hybrid institutional arrangement of (D)BOT was better suited 
to function for the specific characteristics of the MSWC infrastructure sector. In case of the 
MSWC Tuas South II, a major reason for the emergence of this particular hybrid institutional 
arrangement was a shift in public policy. Since the end of 1990s, the MoF supports increased 
private sector participation in infrastructure development. The presented institutional ar-
rangement for the MSWC Tuas South II applied the general guidelines and standard pro-
curement procedures for “Public Private Partnerships” and showed how life-cycle integration, 
output specifications, payment mechanism and adequate risk allocation provide incentives 
for the efficient development and operation of an MSWC plant. Due to the illustrated per-
formance incentives, the presented hybrid institutional arrangement of (D)BOT forms a suit-
able alternative for hierarchical institutional arrangements, in which X-inefficiencies can sur-
vive (see chapter  4.2.1).  
 
                                                
171 For further theoretical and empirical analysis on trial-and-error privatization or outsourcing see e.g. 
Post, Broekema, & Obirih-Opareh (2003) or Bennedsen & Schultz (2005). 
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8 Summary and conclusions 
8.1 Research objectives and methodology 
This research aimed at the theoretical and empirical analysis of the institutional arrange-
ments for the provision of municipal solid waste combustion (MSWC) infrastructure. Thereby, 
five detailed research objectives were addressed: 
1. To gain a purposeful understanding of the technical and economic aspects of MSWC, 
2. To analyze the microeconomic characteristics of the market for MSWC and to identify 
possible deviations from the model of perfect competition, 
3. To elaborate on a theoretical framework for categorizing and describing institutional ar-
rangements for MSWC, 
4. To verify these institutional arrangements in the two developed markets for MSWC of 
Germany and Singapore, 
5. To explain the reasons for the emergence of the institutional arrangements for MSWC in 
these two markets. 
To accommodate the transdisciplinary character of the research objectives, critical theory 
review and its implications to the research object were combined with quantitative and quali-
tative case study analyses. This chapter provides a summary of the key findings with refer-
ence to the addressed research objectives and identifies major theoretical as well as practi-
cal implications. The conclusions from the empirical analysis (research objectives 5 and 6) 
switch between theory and data, which is characteristic of the chosen research methodology 
of descriptive and exploratory case study analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989b). 
In this connection it is important to emphasize that the research did not aim at the evaluation 
of particular institutional arrangements for MSWC. Therefore, no recommendations can be 
given for choosing a particular institutional arrangement in a project specific setup. 
8.2 Technical and economic aspects of MSWC 
Waste treatment is a crucial element of the waste hierarchy and an important activity in the 
waste management value system. MSWC is the most widely applied technology for waste 
treatment in many developed countries. It is primarily done to convert the heterogeneous 
mixture of harmful substances in the residual municipal waste into inert materials that can be 
fractioned and captured in the slag and flue-gas. While the volume and weight of the waste is 
considerably reduced, the energy and recyclable materials contained in it can be captured 
during the various processes. 
MSWC plants consist of various machinery components, which include waste receiving and 
charging facilities, firing unit, energy recovery, flue-gas cleaning, emission control and moni-
toring system as well as auxiliary facilities. These components are designed and combined 
depending on the project specific requirements.  
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Today, the state-of-the-art MSWC plants reduce the negative environmental impacts of the 
applied physical and chemical processes to a minimum. Furthermore, MSWC generates im-
portant positive environmental impacts by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and land use 
for the disposal of final residues. 
The financial analysis of costs and revenues throughout the life-cycle of MSWC plants 
showed that the capital investments are by far the largest share of total their life-cycle costs. 
They are determined by various project specific factors (total capacity, waste characteristics, 
flue-gas cleaning requirements, redundancy, civil works, local site conditions and energy 
utilization) and global factors (competition, macro economy, public acceptance and legal re-
quirements). Other life-cycle costs include planning, operation, maintenance, residual dis-
posal and financing costs. There exists a strong negative correlation between total unit costs 
and the capacities of MSWC plants. However, as the research showed, these economies of 
scale cannot be explored indefinitely due to technical limitations. An important finding of the 
analysis is, that up to 75% of the total life-cycle costs of MSWC plants are fixed costs. 
The assessment of revenues identified waste treatment fees (based on actual throughput or 
availability payments) as the most important revenue stream during the life-cycle of MSWC 
plants. Other revenues include sale of recovered energy and materials as well as possible 
subsidies. However, with increasing prices for energy and material resources, the share of 
waste treatment fees of the total life-cycle revenues will decrease. As a result, the energy 
and resource efficiency of MSWC will gain in importance in the future and therefore provides 
incentives for improved technical and operational performance. 
Another important conclusion from the technical and economic analysis of MSWC plants es-
pecially for the practice, is the identification of multiple opportunities to leverage capital in-
vestments, operational expenditures and revenues against one another. In practice, an as-
sessment of all life-cycle costs and revenues should be thoroughly conducted to form the 
basis for efficient provision of MSWC infrastructure as well as continuous innovation. Institu-
tional arrangements should therefore be chosen to employ organizations hat are able to op-
timize the total life-cycle costs and revenues in their investment decisions.  
8.3 Microeconomic characteristics of the market for MSWC 
The analysis has revealed that the characteristics of the market for MSWC deviate in multiple 
ways from the assumptions of the economic model for perfect competition and that they can 
be potential sources of market failure. It was shown that the possible existence of a natural 
monopoly, which is caused by the subadditive cost function of MSWC and limited contesta-
bility, depends on the relationship between the total unit costs for MSWC and the costs for 
transporting waste to a MSWC plant. There are two types of natural monopoly that can 
evolve: a local natural monopoly with spatial limitations or an extended natural monopoly. 
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However, even in densely populated areas with comparatively low transportation costs, the 
size of an extended natural monopoly is limited due to technical restrictions in the maximum 
size of MSWC plants. Applicable regulative measures to avoid or limit monopoly pricing (e.g. 
price regulation) must be based on a thorough assessment of the elaborated interdependen-
cies.  
Another potential source for market failure is the existence of different positive and negative 
technological externalities. Here, command-and-control measures are best suited to reduce 
negative environmental externalities, but also taxes, subsidies, liability for damages and 
tradable permits can help to reduce positive and negative externalities and be applied in ad-
dition to command-and-control measures. Education and ethical appeal172 or measures 
based on the Coase theorem have very little practicability to the MSWC infrastructure.  
While incomplete markets or unstable market equilibriums are unlikely to cause inadequate 
adaptation of the market for MSWC, a comparatively high inflexibility in coping with signifi-
cant long-term demand changes can cause a market failure through timely limited gaps be-
tween demand and supply. In practise, any policy changes with a high impact on demand or 
supply in waste treatment must therefore be implemented with appropriate scheduling to al-
low for adequate market adaptation. 
Possible causes for market failures that are rooted in incomplete information and uncertainty 
are unlikely to evolve for MSWC infrastructure, because signalling and screening mecha-
nisms are usually in place in the relevant geographical markets due to the high capital in-
vestment costs for MSWC infrastructure. 
Altogether, the economic analysis of the market specific aspects of MSWC revealed various 
deviations from the economic model of perfect competition. Different applicable measures to 
mitigate any problems caused by these deviations were identified. It was shown that none of 
the existing types of market failures necessarily necessitates a provision of MSWC by the 
public sector. Instead, various institutional arrangements can be considered appropriate from 
the microeconomic point of view. The presented theoretical elaborations controvert the influ-
ential public policy recommendations of the German “Rat von Sachverständigen für Umwelt-
fragen”, who strongly favors the public provision of MSWC (RSU, 2002, pt. 1147). An impor-
tant practical implication of this research study is therefore to revise these recommendations. 
A further recommendation drawn from the theoretical analysis is that the small customers of 
MSWC plants, e.g. small municipalities or private enterprises, should find means to aggre-
                                                
172 However, education and ethical appeal can be applicable to the other elements of the waste hierar-
chy, e.g. waste reduction and recycling, but their impact depends strongly on the normative and cul-
tural-cognitive institutional elements. 
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gate their demand in case of locally existing natural monopolies. This will restrict the mo-
nopolist in enforcing Cournot-prices.  
Based on the theoretical discussion of internalizing technological externalities, one important 
conclusion with high practical implications is that MSWC plants should participate in green-
house gas emission trading programs. By doing so, positive external effects from substituting 
fossil fuels could be better internalized and therefore increase the economic incentives for 
improved energy recovery. 
8.4 Theoretical framework for the institutional arrangements for MSWC 
The theoretical framework for the institutional arrangements for MSWC is developed based 
on the transaction cost economics and stakeholder analysis. Based on transaction cost eco-
nomics, the institutional arrangements for MSWC can take the shape of a hierarchy, various 
hybrid forms or a market. They are selected by individuals with bounded rationality to mini-
mize transaction costs, which are the functions of asset specificity, uncertainty and fre-
quency. The extended theoretical model showed that the predictions of transaction cost eco-
nomics are also valid to public ordering and therefore applicable to MSWC.  
In theory, the institutional arrangements for MSWC can be categorized into (1) hierarchical 
institutional arrangements: public administration and public company; (2) hybrid institutional 
arrangements: operations model, DBOT, public-private joint venture and private company; 
and (3) spot market. Due to comparatively high site and physical asset specificity, the theory 
of transaction cost economics predicts the application of hybrid or hierarchical arrangements 
for MSWC. The other two transaction attributes of frequency and uncertainty, which are spe-
cific for individual MSWC projects, are likely to influence the choice between hybrid and hier-
archical arrangements.  
Most important stakeholders of MSWC projects are politicians, bureaucrats, public service 
providers, citizens, private companies, manufactures, financiers as well as consultants. The 
stakeholder analysis showed from the theoretical point of view that these stakeholders can 
have different influences on the emergence of institutional arrangements. The involved ac-
tors that are either individual stakeholders or participants of a stakeholder organization do 
not necessarily aim at minimizing transaction costs, but instead may act opportunistically with 
bounded rationality and pursue different pecuniary and non-pecuniary objectives.  
8.5 Verification and quantification of the institutional arrangements in Germany and 
Singapore 
This research provides a unique quantitative analysis on institutional arrangements for 
MSWC plants in Germany. The results of a survey among all 65 MSWC plants in Germany 
have verified the existence of all hierarchical and hybrid institutional arrangements that were 
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theoretically elaborated. The survey also showed that the theoretically possible institutional 
arrangement of a spot market is not applied to MSWC in Germany. 
With a total capacity share of approx. 39.7%, the hybrid institutional arrangement of a public-
private joint venture is most frequently applied in Germany. It is followed by private company 
(16.6%), public administration (14.9%), public company (14.7%), operations model (10.1%) 
and (D)BOT (4.0%). 
In addition to verifying the institutional arrangements, the survey also quantified how MSWC 
plants are horizontally or vertically integrated. Currently, almost half of the MSWC plants in 
Germany are horizontally integrated through identical shareholders, who fully or partially own 
multiple MSWC plants. Even though there does not exist a dominant market concentration in 
Germany yet, further horizontal integration should be intensively observed by antitrust 
agency to prevent the development of monopolistic structures. Vertical integration with other 
activities in the waste management value system was identified at approx. 40% of the 
MSWC plants in Germany. Here, antitrust agencies have the obligation to ensure that market 
players do not exploit market power across the waste management value system. 
In Singapore, there exist four MSWC plants in total. By the year 2007, all of them operated 
under the hierarchical institutional arrangement of a public administration. Currently, a new 
MSWC plant is under construction to which the institutional arrangement of a (D)BOT is ap-
plied. 
Overall, the quantitative analysis of institutional arrangements for MSWC in Germany and 
Singapore validate the conclusions from transaction cost economics that predict the applica-
tion of hierarchical and hybrid institutional arrangements for MSWC. However, no specific 
pattern exists that explains the choice between the different forms of hierarchical and hybrid 
institutional arrangements.  
8.6 Rationale for the emergence of the institutional arrangements in Germany and 
Singapore 
Altogether, eight representative case studies from Germany and one case study from Singa-
pore were conducted to explore the emergence of different institutional arrangements. The 
criterion for the selection of the case studies was to represent all applied hierarchical and 
hybrid institutional arrangements that were validated in the quantitative survey. 
The empirical analysis showed that institutional arrangements change over time and that 
new institutional arrangements emerge. Any quantitative survey is therefore only a snapshot 
of the current situation in a geographical market. A profound understanding of the historical 
developments in the market for MSWC is therefore required for any policy development or 
practical activity. Therefore, prior to changing any law or regulation on MSWC, i.e. the formal 
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institutional environment, an assessment of its impact on applied institutional arrangements 
is recommended. 
The multiple case studies have shown that hierarchical institutional arrangements can 
emerge in large municipalities with high demand for waste treatment and dedicated assets, 
like in the City of Berlin, especially if technological uncertainties are high. If technological 
uncertainty is low, like in the Singaporean case, the hybrid institutional arrangement of a 
(D)BOT based on the availability payment will provide a suitable alternative to hierarchical 
arrangements.  
The gathered evidence also indicated that the hierarchical institutional arrangement of a pub-
lic company can emerge out of a public administration through formal privatization. A strong 
motivation for doing so is an increase in operational and investment flexibility that might be 
required due to changes in the institutional environment. The case study analysis also re-
vealed that the institutional arrangement of a public company is sometimes used to expand 
the business activities of existing public companies and to cross-subsidize public activities 
with profits made from MSWC.  
In some explored case studies, waste management plans had a strong impact on the emer-
gence of hierarchical and hybrid institutional arrangements. Because these plans mandatorily 
required municipalities to ensure the development of MSWC plants for a defined waste col-
lection area, hierarchical or hybrid institutional arrangements emerged and were later trans-
fromed to different institutional arrangements due to economic problems or changed stake-
holder objectives. An important conclusion is that such centrally developed waste manage-
ment plans should have only very limited impact on the institutional arrangement. E.g. they 
should not determine where and for which municipalities a new MSWC plant has to be built.  
The multiple case studies revealed that hybrid institutional arrangements can emerge from 
hierarchical institutional arrangements or from scratch. The case studies from Germany 
showed that the existence of strong private waste management and energy companies is 
very important for the development of hybrid institutional arrangements. Therefore, a liberal-
ized waste collection market or energy market, in which such private companies can evolve, 
is considered as a pre-requisite for the development of many hybrid institutional arrange-
ments. Various reasons have been identified due to which private waste management as 
well as energy companies want to expand their value chain and invest in MSWC plants. The 
explored case studies provided evidence, that the existing formal and informal relationships 
that had evolved at the hybrid institutional arrangements for waste collection or energy pro-
duction supported the emergence of hybrid institutional arrangements for MSWC with similar 
stakeholders.  
Finally, the uncertainties in receiving a planning permission were identified to have strong 
impact on the emergence of institutional arrangements. The case studies showed that in in-
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stitutional environments, where the receiving of a planning permission is difficult and requires 
high transaction costs, the emergence of hierarchical institutional arrangement is more likely. 
However, a transformation to a hybrid institutional arrangement can take place at a later 
stage when uncertainty is reduced. This finding validates the prediction of transaction cost 
economics that institutional arrangements also align with the transaction attribute of uncer-
tainty. 
Overall, the case studies showed that formal as well as informal institutions play an important 
role in the emergence of institutional arrangements for MSWC. Transaction cost economics 
as a stand alone theory framework can provide general explanations for the emergence of 
hierarchy, hybrids or market. However, the objectives of individual stakeholders and the par-
ticular institutional environment play a decisive role for the selection of a particular institu-
tional arrangement within the groups of hierarchy, hybrids and market. 
These findings have important practical implications. They emphasize that formal institutions, 
such as laws, regulations and written standards alone do not determine the application of a 
particular institutional arrangement. Informal institutions, which change only over a long pe-
riod of time, must also be considered when planning the employment of a particular institu-
tional arrangement. 
8.7 Outlook and recommendations for further research 
This research provided a unique and comprehensive analysis of the MSWC infrastructure 
sector. The theoretical and empirical assessments have laid the foundation for further re-
search on institutional arrangements in general and the waste management sector in spe-
cific.  
Further research can be conducted to expand the empirical analysis to other waste treatment 
technologies, most importantly mechanical biological treatment. Here, the results might devi-
ate from MSWC due to different transaction attributes (e.g. high technological uncertainty) or 
different formal and informal institutions (e.g. different level of technological acceptance in 
the society). 
Another possible field for further research could be a comparative analysis of institutional 
arrangements for MSWC. Existing benchmarking systems (see e.g. Przybilla, 2002; Steg-
mann, 2002) could be expanded to test the impact of institutional arrangements on the per-
formance of MSWC infrastructure provision. However, constraints in accessing confidential 
data and information are expected to be the major challenges for such research. As an out-
come of such a comparative analysis, the development of a so-called public sector compara-
tor (PSC) would have high practical relevance. Such a PSC is frequently applied in other 
infrastructure sectors, e.g. public real estate sector, and provides a transparent decision 
making support tool for choosing the institutional arrangement. 
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A further research need is identified with respect to possible interdependencies between in-
stitutional arrangements for MSWC plants and the waste hierarchy. This research proposes 
testing the hypothesis that hierarchical institutional arrangements and some hybrid institu-
tional arrangements have a negative impact on waste separation and recycling strategies, 
because the public sector may have strong motivations to ensure the employment of MSWC 
capacities, which it fully or partially owns. 
Overall, the research has highlighted the importance of conducting theoretical and empirical 
analysis on institutional arrangements in physical infrastructure provision. By rigorously ap-
plying various theoretical frameworks to MSWC and based on a comprehensive understand-
ing of complex technical and economic aspects of MSCW, this research hopes to trigger 
similar theoretical and empirical studies in other geographical markets as well as in other 
infrastructure sectors. 
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9.1 Interviews 
The following table provides a selection of interviews that were specifically undertaken as 
part of the presented research. 
Name Organization Topic 
Prof. Dr. Kazuaki Miya-
moto 
Musashi Institute of Technology, Yoko-
hama 
PFIs in Japan 
Mr. Nobutaka Kano; Mr. 
Akira Nakamura 
Manager of Chikusa Environmental 
Works Office, Nagoya City 
Narumi PFI project 
Mr. Ryo Hiraga; Mr. 
Teroaki Fujikawa 
Japan Waste Research Foundation, 
Osaka Research Center 
Japanese PFI waste pro-
jects 
Masakazu Matsuzaki Hitachi Zosen, Ohdate Ecomanagement 
Corp.; Tokyo 
Ohdate PFI project 
Mr. Dr. Andreas Korn Fichtner Consultant DBOO Tuas South, Singa-
pore 
Prof. Dr. Heinz-Georg 
Baum 
Bayerisches Institut für Abfallforschung Private Participation in 
Waste Management 
Mr. Goh Chin Aik Keppel Integrated Engineering, Singa-
pore 
Keppel Tuas South Waste-
to-Energy Plant 
Mrs. Christina Lee Sulo/ Müller Allvater, Singapore Private Waste Collection in 
Singapore 
Mr. Vincent Yeo Ministry of Environment and Water Re-
sources (MEWR), Singapore 
PPP Waste Policy in Sin-
gapore; DBOO Tuas South 
Mr. Dr. Luiz Diaz CalRecovery Inc., USA; Editor of the 
journal “Waste Management” 
Recent development in 
waste management 
Mr. Thomas Kempin BSR Berliner Stadtreinigung MVA Ruhleben 
Mrs. Dr. Bettina Enderle Allen & Overy, Frankfurt German waste laws and 
regulations 
Mr. Dr. Stefan Elßer 3i Stuttgart Investment in MSWC 
Mr. Helmut Wensing BKB AG, Helmstedt MSWC plant Helmstedt 
Mr. Josef Staus SITA Abfallverwertung GmbH  MSWC plant in Zorbau 
Mr. John Waffenschmidt, 
Mr. James Emmet 
Covanta Energy Corp., Fairfield, NJ; 
USA 
MWC in the USA, Participa-
tion of Covanta 
Mrs. Dr. Eileen Berenyi Governmental Advisory Associates, 
Westport, CT, USA 
MWC in the USA 
Mr. Prof. Nicholas The-
melis 
Columbia University, WTERT MWC in the USA 
Mrs. Catherine Coble, Mr. 
Chris Skaggs 
Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal 
Authority (NMWDA), Baltimore, MD; 
USA 
Institutional arrangement 
for MWC in Baltimore 
Mr. Martin Vogell C.C. Reststoff-Aufbereitung GmbH & 
Co. KG 
Market for disposal of slag 
and ashes 
Mr. Erhard Barth AVA Augsburg GmbH Technical, social and eco-
nomic aspects of flue-gas 
treatment 
Mr. Steffen Scholz Martin GmbH  Investment costs for MSWC 
plant 
Mr. Urs Brunner VonRoll Inova, Zürich Operation and maintenance 
of MSWC plants 
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Mr. Dr. Ansgar Fendel Remondis, Lünen, Manager treatment 
facilities 
Waste management com-
panies and MSWC 
Mr. Werner Hols Remondis West, managing director GMVA Oberhausen 
Mr. Wagner ZRO, Gera, Head MSWC Zorbau 
Mr. Harm-Peter Büchner BKB AG, Helmstedt Energy producers and com-
panies and MSWC 
Mr. Bernd Hahn Sotec GmbH, commercial manager MSWC Pirmasens 
Mr. Norbert Schnauber ZAS Pirmasens, Managing Director MSWC Pirmasens 
Mr. Dr. Erhard Edom Ministry of Environment, Niedersachsen MSWC in Lower Saxony 
Mrs. Andrea Schappmann 
Mr. Dr. Jochen Fischer 
MSWC Zorbau / 
Stadtwerke Gotha 
MSWC Zorbau 
Mr. Dr. Peter Zulauf DZV Schwalm-Eder-Kreis und Land-
kreis Marburg-Biedenkopf 
MSWC Kassel, Marburg-
Biedenkopf 
Mr. Reuter AWA GmbH MVA Weisweiler 
Mr. Rolf Kaufmann BKB AG, Helmstedt MSWC of BKB 
Mr. Rolf Oesterhoff MHKW Rothensee GmbH / Stadtwerke 
Magdeburg 
MHKW Rothensee 
Mr. Tinnefeld City Duisburg GMVA Oberhausen 
Mr. Schnellbacher City Oberhausen GMVA Oberhausen 
Mr. Tippner Bezirksregierung Köln Waste Management plans 
in NRW 
Mr. Schreyer MSWC Kassel, Managing director MSWC Kassel 
Dr. Katja Lander Evonik, communication MSWC Pirmasens 
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 Appendix 1: Change of price for scrap metals in Germany between 1999-2007  
1999=100 adjusted to inflation
Source: EUROFER, ECB
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 Appendix 2: Example waste combustion diagram 
 
Source: VonRoll Inova (2007) 
 
 Appendix 3: Adaptation for market equilibrium  
Estimated Development of Supply and Demand for 
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 Appendix 4: Change of transaction costs for institutional arrangements in the public 
sector 
 
Appendix 4.1:  Change of transaction costs institutional arrangements in the public sector 
where k2 = k2’ 
Source: Own, adapted Williamson (1991) 
 
  
Appendix 4.2:  Change of transaction costs for institutional arrangements in the public sec-
tor where k2’ < k2 
Source: Own, adapted Williamson (1991) 
 Appendix 5: Operating municipal waste combustion plants in Germany (July, 2007) 
 
Appendix 5.1: Locations of MSWC plants in Germany 
Source: own, based on survey (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 Name of municipal waste combustion plant Location 
Nominal 
Capacity 
AVA Abfallverwertung Augsburg Augsburg 200,000 
MHKW Bamberg Bamberg 127,500 
MVA Ruhleben Berlin 520,000 
MVA Bielefeld Bielefeld 440,000 
RMHKW Böblingen Böblingen 140,000 
MVA Bonn Bonn 240,000 
Müllheizwerk Bremen Bremen 550,000 
MHKW Bremerhaven Bremerhaven 315,000 
MHKW Burgkirchen Burgkirchen 210,000 
MVA Coburg Coburg 115,000 
MHKW Darmstadt Darmstadt 212,000 
Stadtwerke Düsseldorf Düsseldorf 450,000 
TREA Breisgau Eschbach, Breisgau 150,000 
MVA Weisweiler Eschweiler 360,000 
MHKW Essen-Karnap Essen 740,000 
AVA Frankfurt-Nordweststadt Frankfurt am Main 200,000 
BKB Göppingen GmbH Göppingen 155,000 
MVA Hagen Hagen 120,000 
MVA Stellinger Moor Hamburg 280,000 
Müllverwertung Borsigstraße GmbH Hamburg 320,000 
MVR Müllverbrennung Rugenberger Damm  Hamburg 230,000 
Enertec Hameln Hameln 240,000 
MVA Hamm Hamm 295,000 
BKB Hannover Hannover 230,000 
TRV Buschaus Helmstedt 525,000 
RZR Herten Herten 290,000 
MVA Ingolstadt Ingolstadt 250,000 
MHKW Iserlohn Iserlohn 259,000 
AEZ Asdonkshof Kamp Lindfort 235,000 
MHKW Kassel GmbH Kassel 150,000 
MHKW Kempten Kempten (Allgäu) 80,000 
Müllverbrennung Kiel Kiel 130,000 
RMVA Köln Köln 569,400 
MVKA Krefeld Krefeld 350,000 
MVA Landshut Landshut 40,000 
 Name of municipal waste combustion plant Location 
Nominal 
Capacity 
Thermische Abfallbehandlung Lauta Lauta 225,000 
MVV Umwelt Trea Leuna GmbH Leuna 400,000 
MHKW Leverkusen Leverkusen 210,000 
MHKW Ludwigshafen Ludwigshafen 180,000 
TAV Ludwigslust Ludwigslust 50,000 
MHKW Mainz Mainz 210,000 
MVA Mannheim Mannheim 420,000 
Abfallheizkraftwerk Neunkirchen Neunkirchen 150,000 
MVA Neustadt  Neustadt 61,900 
Abfallwirtschaft und Stadtreinigungsbetrieb-
Nürnberg -ASN- 
Nürnberg 205,000 
GMVA Niederrhein Oberhausen 700,000 
MHKW Offenbach Offenbach 220,000 
MVA Geiselbullach Olching 95,000 
MHKW Pirmasens Pirmasens 180,000 
MHKW Rosenheim Rosenheim 60,000 
MHKW Rothensee Magdeburg 660,000 
AVA Velsen Saarbrücken 210,000 
SRS EcoTherm Salzbergen 120,000 
Zweckverband Müllverwertung Schwandorf Schwandorf 450,000 
Gemeinschaftskraftwerk Schweinfurt Schweinfurt 155,000 
MHKW Solingen Solingen 92,000 
BKB Stapelfeld Stapelfeld 345,000 
Kraftwerk Stuttgart Stuttgart 420,000 
MVA Tornesch-Ahrenlohe Tornesch 80,000 
MHKW Ulm-Donautal Ulm 120,000 
MHKW München Nord Unterföhring 700,000 
Müllkraftwerk Weißenhorn Weißenhorn 100,000 
AWG Abfallwirtschaftsgesellschaft Wuppertal  Wuppertal 425,000 
MHKW Würzburg Würzburg 230,000 
SITA Abfallverwertungs GmbH Zorbau 300,000 
Appendix 5.2: List of MSWC plants in Germany 
Source: own, based on survey (2007) 
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Fragebogen zur "Untersuchung von Organisationsmodellen für Planung, Bau,
Finanzierung und Betrieb von Müllverbrennungsanlagen"
Ziel der Befragung:
Im Rahmen meiner Dissertation "Organisationsmodelle für Müllverbrennungsanlagen" sollen unter-
schiedliche institutionelle und organisatorische Strukturen für Planung, Bau, Finanzierung und
Betrieb von Müllverbrennungsanlagen (MVA) analysiert werden. Neben Japan, Singapur und den
USA wird hierbei auch der Markt in Deutschland betrachtet. Im Rahmen dieser Befragung sollen
Informationen zu Eigentums- und Betriebsstrukturen sowie die wesentlichen Risiken und
deren Verteilung gesammelt werden. Die Ergebnisse der Dissertation dienen u.a. als Entschei-
dungsgrundlage für zukünftige MVA's  in Wachstumsmärkten (Europa und Asien).
Wissenschaftliche Betreuung der Dissertation:
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Dipl.-Wirtsch.-Ing. Hans Wilhelm Alfen
Professur für Betriebswirtschaftslehre im Bauwesen
Bauhaus-Universität Weimar
Diese Umfrage wird unterstützt durch:
(1) Verband Kommunale Abfallwirtschaft und Stadtreinigung im VKU (VKS im VKU)
(2) Bundesverband der Deutschen Entsorgungswirtschaft e.V. (BDE)
(3) Interessengemeinschaft der thermischen Abfallbehandlungsanlagen in Deutschland e.V. (ITAD)
Vertraulichkeit:
Es wird versichert, dass alle Bedingungen zum Datenschutz strengstens eingehalten, die gesammel-
ten Daten vertraulich behandelt und alle Angaben im Rahmen der Dissertation statistisch neutral
ausgewertet werden.
Wichtige Hinweise zur Beantwortung der Fragen:
Zur Beantwortung des Fragebogens sollten Sie möglichst über umfassendes kaufmännisches
Wissen im Rahmen von Müllverbrennungsanlagen verfügen. Von Vorteil wäre es daher, wenn Sie
eine leitende  Funktion in diesem Bereich Ihrer Einrichtung ausüben würden.
Um eine empirisch korrekte Auswertung des Fragebogens zu ermöglichen, bitte ich Sie höflichst um
die vollständige Beantwortung aller Fragen.
Ich bitte Sie, den Fragebogen auszudrucken und handschriftlich zu beantworten. Über eine
Zusendung per Post oder Fax bis spätestens 15. Februar 2007 würde ich mich sehr freuen.
Wenn Sie eine Zusendung der Auswertung erhalten möchten, dann geben Sie bitte Ihre Kontakt-
daten an. Sollten Sie die Fragen anonym beantworten wollen, so senden Sie mir bitte eine vom
Fragebogen getrennte Email mit Wunsch zur Zusendung der Auswertung.
Vielen Dank vorab für Ihre Mitwirkung!
Kontaktinformationen:
Dipl.-Ing. Torsten Kleiß
Bauhaus-Universität Weimar
Professur BWL im Bauwesen
Marienstr. 7A
99423 Weimar
Tel. 03643 - 58 4385
Mobil: 0176 - 200 277 06
Fax: 03643 - 58 4565
Emal: torsten.kleiss@bauing.uni-weimar.de
Web: http://www.uni-weimar.de/Bauing/bwlbau/neu/index.php
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(A) Persönliche Informationen (freiwillig)
Nachname: Vorname:
Position/ Aufgabengebiet:
Telefon:
Email:
(B) Allgemeine Angaben zur MVA (freiwillig)
Name der MVA:
Standort: PLZ:
Jahr der Inbetriebnahme:
Kapazität (t/a): für Heizwert (kJ/kg):
Investitionsvolumen (€):
(C) Eigentumsstruktur
In diesem Abschnitt sollen Informationen zu Organisations- und Rechtsform gesammelt werden.
1. Welche Rechtsform besitzt Ihre MVA?
Regiebetrieb Eigenbetrieb AöR GmbH AG
2. Wie ist das Eigentum an der MVA zwischen öffentlichen und privaten Gesellschaftern verteilt?
100% öffentlich >75% öffentlich<25% privat
>50% öffentlich
<50% privat
>25% öffentlich
<75% privat
>0% öffentlich
<100% privat 100% privat
3. Aus welchem Bereich kommen der/die öffentlichen Gesellschafter? (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)
Kommune Zweckverband
Eigengesellschaft mit 100% öffentlicher Beteiligung
(z.B. Stadtwerke, Entsorgungsbetriebe)
Gesellschaft mit öffentlicher Mehrheitsbeteiligung
(z.B. Stadtwerke, Entsorgungsbetriebe)
4. Aus welchem Bereich kommen der/die privaten Gesellschafter? (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)
100% privater Entsorgungsbetrieb
100% privates Energieunternehmen
Strategischer Investor
Gesellschaft mit privater Mehrheitsbeteiligung
(z.B. Stadtwerke, Entsorgungsbetriebe)
andere:
5. Erwägen Sie kurz- bis mittelfristig eine Änderung der Eigentumsstruktur?
Ja Nein
6. Sind die Gesellschafter auch an anderen MVA's direkt oder indirekt beteiligt?
Ja Nein Wenn ja, an wievielen?
Anmerkungen zur
Eigentumsstruktur:
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(D) Trennung von Eigentum und Betrieb
In diesem Abschnitt sollen Informationen zur möglichen Trennung von Eigentum am Anlagevermögen einer MVA
und dessen Betrieb erfragt werden. Zur Abstrahierung der möglichen Beteiligungskonstrukte soll hierbei nicht
zusätzlich zwischen möglichen Betreiber- und Betriebsführungsgesellschaften unterschieden, sondern diese als
eine Betriebsgesellschaft betrachtet werden.
7. Sind Eigentum und Betrieb Ihrer MVA rechtlich voneinander getrennt?
Ja Nein Wenn nein, dann fahren Sie bitte mit Abschnitt (E) fort!
8. Wer sind die Gesellschafter der Betriebsgesellschaft Ihrer MVA?
100% öffentlich >75% öffentlich<25% privat
>50% öffentlich
<50% privat
>25% öffentlich
<75% privat
>0% öffentlich
<100% privat 100% privat
9. Aus welchem Bereich kommen der/die öffentlichen Beteiligten? (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)
Kommune Zweckverband
Eigengesellschaft mit 100% öffentlicher Beteiligung
(z.B. Stadtwerke, Entsorgungsbetriebe)
Gesellschaft mit öffentl. Mehrheitsbeteiligung
(z.B. Stadtwerke, Entsorgungsbetriebe)
10. Aus welchem Bereich kommen der/die privaten Beteiligten? (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)
100% privater Entsorgungsbetrieb
100% privates Energieunternehmen
Strategischer Investor
Gesellschaft mit privater Mehrheitsbeteiligung
(z.B. Stadtwerke, Entsorgungsbetrieb)
andere:
11. Erwägen Sie kurz- bis mittelfristig eine Änderung der  Gesellschafterstruktur der Betriebs-
gesellschaft?
Ja Nein
12. Die Dauer des Pacht- bzw. Betriebsführungsvertrages beträgt (in Jahren):
13. Der Pacht- bzw. Betriebsführungsvertrag endet im Jahr:
14. Wurden die folgenden Risiken voll/teilweise/nicht auf die Betriebsgesellschaft übertragen?
voll         teilweise       nicht
Geringere Umsätze aufgrund außerplanmäßiger Betriebsstörungen
Geringere Umsätze aufgrund geringerer Kapazitätsauslastungen
Einheitspreis für Verbrennung
Einheitspreis für verkaufte Energie
Wirkungsgrad der Energiegewinnung
Höhe der Personalkosten
Höhe der Kosten für Betriebsmittel
Höhe der Kosten für Entsorgung der Aschen/Schlacken
Änderung der Finanzierungskosten für Anlageinvestitionen (z.B. EURIBOR)
Außerplanmäßige Investitionen aufgrund neuer rechtlicher Bestimmungen
Weitere Risiken
bzw.
Anmerkungen:
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(E) Beteiligungen
In diesem Abschnitt sollen Informationen zu Beteiligungen an anderen MVA's erfragt werden.
15. Sind die Gesellschafter der Besitz- oder Betriebsgesellschaft auch am Betrieb anderer MVA's
direkt oder indirekt beteiligt?
Ja Nein Wenn nein, dann fahren Sie bitte mit Frage 17 fort!
16. Bewerten Sie bitte auf einer Skala von 1 (nicht relevant) bis 5 (sehr relevant) die möglichen Vorteile
dieser Beteiligung an anderen MVA's? nicht      (relevant)       sehr
1 2 3 4 5
Bessere Konditionen beim Einkauf (Betriebsmittel, Ersatzteile)
Bessere Kapazitätsauslastungen durch Disponierung von Entsorgungsmengen
Kostenvorteile durch Teilung kaufmännischer Ressourcen (z.B. Buchführung)
Kostenvorteile durch Teilung betrieblicher Ressourcen (z.B. Wartungspersonal, IT)
Effizienterer Betrieb aufgrund von Erfahrungsaustausch (Know-How-Transfer)
Weitere Vorteile:
(F) Entsorgungsverträge
In diesem Abschnitt sollen Informationen zu den Entsorgungsverträgen zwischen der MVA (ggf. Betriebsgesellschaft)
und deren Kunden (öffentlich-rechtliche und gewerbliche) erfragt werden.
17. Sind die Gesellschafter der Besitz- oder Betriebsgesellschaft auch an Entsorgungsunternehmen
zur Sammlung und Transport der Abfälle beteiligt?
Ja Nein Wenn nein, dann fahren Sie bitte mit Abschnitt (F) fort!
18. Bewerten Sie bitte auf einer Skala von 1 (nicht relevant) bis 5 (sehr relevant) die möglichen Vorteile
dieser Beteiligung an Entsorgunsgunternehmen? nicht      (relevant)       sehr
1 2 3 4 5
Weitere Vorteile:
Bessere Kapazitätsauslastungen durch Disponierung von Entsorgungsmengen
Leichterer Zugang zu gewerblichen Abfallverursachern
Effizienterer Verkauf freier Kapazitäten am Spotmarkt/ durch kurzfristige Verträge
19. Wie hoch ist die durchschnittliche Auslastung der Anlage durch kommunale Abfälle? (in %)
20. Wie groß ist der Anteil von langfristig vereinbarten Mindestmengen (min. 5 Jahre) mit
öffentl.-rechtlichen Entsorgungsträgern in Bezug auf die gesamte Anlagenkapazität? (in %)
21. Mit wie vielen öffentl.-rechtlichen Entsorgungsträgern (örE) bestehen langfristige Liefer-
verträge (min. 5 Jahre)?
23.  Wie groß ist der Anteil von langfristig vereinbarten Mindestmengen (min. 5 Jahre) mit
gewerblichen Entsorgungsträgern in Bezug auf die gesamte Anlagenkapazität? (in %)
24. Mit wie vielen gewerblichen Entsorgungsträgern bestehen langfristige Lieferverträge?
22. Wie hoch ist die durchschnittliche Dauer der kommunalen Entsorgungsverträge? (in Jahren)
25. Wie hoch ist die durchschnittliche Dauer der gewerblichen Entsorgungsverträge? (in Jahren)
5/5
28. Beinhalten die langfristigen Entsorgungsverträge Preisgleitklauseln für?:
Inflation oder EURIBOR/ LIBOR
Betriebsmittel oder Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Personalkosten
Energiepreise
Entsorgungspreise für Aschen oder Schlacken
Abfalleigenschaften (v.a. Heizwert, Wassergehalt)
Änderung von Versicherungsgebühren
Ja Nein
Rechtliche Änderungen (z.B. neue BImSchV)
Ja Nein
Ja Nein
Ja Nein
Ja Nein
Ja Nein
Ja Nein
Weitere Preisgleitklauseln
bzw. Anmerkungen:
29. In welcher Form wird die thermische Energie aus der Verbrennung genutzt?
Stromerzeugung Prozessdampf für Industrie Fernwärme keine Nutzung
(G) Energetische Nutzung
In diesem Abschnitt sollen Informationen zur energetischen Nutzung und zu Verträgen mit den Energieabnehmern
gesammelt werden.
30. An wen wird die Energie verkauft? (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)
Örtliches Industrieunternehmen
Regionales Energieunternehmen/ Stadtwerke
Überregionaler Netzbetreiber
Strombörse (Spotmarket)
Weitere:
31. Ist der Hauptabnehmer der Energie ebenfalls Gesellschafter der Besitz- oder Betriebs-
gesellsschaft?
Ja Nein
32. Gibt es langfristige Verträge für die Energieabnahme? Ja Nein
33. Wie hoch ist die durchschnittliche Dauer dieser Energieabnahmeverträge? (in Jahren)
34. Wie hoch ist der durchschnittliche Anteil der durch langfristige Verträge verkaufte
Energie an der insgesamt produzierten Energie? (in %)
Anmerkungen:
(H) Finanzierung.
35. Wie wurde die MVA im Wesentlichen finanziert? (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)
Kommunalkredit
Kreditfinanzierung aus der Bilanz der Gesellschafter Projektfinanzierung
Anlagenleasing
Gesellschafterdarlehen
Vielen Dank für die Beantwortung der Fragen!
Bitte senden Sie den Fragebogen nun per Fax oder Post an die auf dem Deckblatt angegebene Adresse.
Ja Nein
Forfaitierung/ Factoring der Mindestabnahmeverträge
26. Gibt es vertraglich zugesicherte Abnahmekapazitäten, welche über den Mindest-
mengen liegen? (örE oder gewerbliche Verträge)
Ja Nein
27. Wie hoch ist die Summe aller maximalen Abnahmekapzitäten in Bezug auf die gesamte
Anlagenkapazität? (in %, Wert über 100% ist zulässig)
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Problemstellung 
1. Die Bereitstellung und der Betrieb von abfallwirtschaftlicher Infrastruktur ist eine Leistung 
der öffentlichen Daseinsvorsorge. Das Wertschöpfungssystem der kommunalen Abfall-
wirtschaft besteht hierbei aus Abfallsammlung, -umschlag, -transport, -behandlung, und  
-entsorgung. 
2. Die Müllverbrennung hat sich als umweltfreundliche und zuverlässige Abfallbehandlungs-
technologie zur Minimierung der negativen Umwelteinflüsse von Abfall bewährt. In vielen 
entwickelten Ländern ist die Müllverbrennung deshalb die am häufigsten angewandte Ab-
fallbehandlungstechnologie. 
3. Die öffentliche Hand ist für die Koordinierung und Überwachung der notwendigen abfall-
wirtschaftlichen Dienstleistungen zuständig. In der Praxis aggregieren Kommunalbehör-
den die Nachfrage an abfallwirtschaftlichen Dienstleistungen und machen eine klassische 
Make-or-Buy Entscheidung als Prinzipal der Transaktion, d.h. sie können entscheiden, 
ob sie die notwendigen abfallwirtschaftlichen Dienstleistungen selbstständig erbringen 
oder an Externe vergeben. 
4. Die institutionellen Arrangements beschreiben hierbei die Beziehungen der einzelnen 
Akteure, welche an spezifischen abfallwirtschaftlichen Projekten und Dienstleistungen 
beteiligt sind. Die institutionellen Arrangements werden durch formelle und informelle In-
stitutionen bestimmt und variieren zwischen den extremen Formen „Hierarchie“ und 
„Markt“, wobei verschiedene hybride Formen dazwischen existieren.  
Zielsetzung 
5. Das übergeordnete Forschungsziel ist die theoretische und empirische Analyse der insti-
tutionellen Arrangements für die Bereitstellung von Müllverbrennungsanlagen (MVA’s)  
auf der Basis einer fundierten Untersuchung ihrer technischen und wirtschaftlichen Ei-
genschaften. 
6. Zur Erreichung des übergeordneten Forschungsziels, wurden fünf detaillierte Unterziele 
definiert: 
a) Untersuchung der technischen und wirtschaftlichen Aspekte von MVA’s; 
b) Analyse der mikroökonomischen Eigenschaften des Müllverbrennungsmarktes und 
Identifizierung möglicher Abweichungen vom „Modell der vollkommenen Konkurrenz“; 
c) Erarbeitung eines Theorierahmens zur Kategorisierung und Beschreibung von institu-
tionellen Arrangements für MVA’s; 
d) Verifizierung der theoretisch hergeleiteten institutionellen Arrangements in den zwei 
entwickelten Müllverbrennungsmärkten Deutschland und Singapur; 
e) Untersuchung der Gründe zur Entstehung von institutionellen Arrangements für 
MVA’s in den beiden Märkten. 
7. Die Forschungsarbeit verfolgt nicht das Ziel, die institutionellen Arrangements aus tech-
nischer oder wirtschaftlicher Sicht zu bewerten und zu vergleichen. Ausserdem bleiben 
alternative Abfallbehandlungsverfahren, wie z.B. mechanisch biologische Abfallbehand-
lung, unberücksichtigt. 
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Stand der Forschung 
8. Die Anzahl der existierenden Forschungsarbeiten zu wirtschaftlichen und institutionellen 
Aspekten von kommunaler Abfallwirtschaft, insbesondere Abfallbehandlung, ist sehr limi-
tiert. Viele Studien zur Privatsektorbeteiligung bei der Infrastrukturentwicklung fokussie-
ren sich oft auf allgemeine und übergeordnete Aspekte, wie z.B. Risikomanagement oder 
Finanzierung. Ausserdem konzentrieren sie oftmals sich auf öffentliche Immobilien oder 
Verkehrsinfrastruktur. 
9. Es existiert eine kleine Anzahl von Forschungsarbeiten zu institutionellen und organisato-
rischen Aspekte der kommunalen Abfallwirtschaft in Deutschland. Die häufige Einschrän-
kung dieser Arbeiten ist dabei die breite Betrachtung des gesamten Wertschöpfungssys-
tems der Abfallwirtschaft, ohne dass auf die spezifischen Eigenschaften der einzelnen 
Wertschöpfungselemente in ausreichendem Masse eingegangen wird. 
10. In Deutschland sind viele theoretische Studien zu institutionellen Arrangements für Infra-
strukturbereitstellung erstellt worden. Die Anzahl der empirischen Studien bleibt jedoch 
sehr unzureichend. 
11. Es existieren bisher keine Forschungsarbeiten, in denen die theoretische und empirische 
Aspekte der institutionellen Arrangements für MVA’s vereint und auf Basis von Primärda-
ten analysiert wurden.  
Untersuchungsmethoden und Vorgehensweise 
12. Um dem transdiziplinären Charakter der definierten Forschungsziele gerecht zu werden, 
wurden quantitative und qualitative Forschungsmethoden miteinander kombiniert. 
13. Eine kritische Bewertung und Anwendung von anerkannten Theorien und existierenden 
Studien wurde für die Forschungsziele (a) – (c) erbracht. Hierfür wurde eine umfassende 
Literaturrecherche und Theorieanalyse durchgeführt. Im beschränkten Masse wurden die 
theoretischen Ergebnisse zusätzlich durch Primardaten unterstützt. 
14. Quantitative Forschungsansätze wurden zur Verifizierung der theoretisch abgeleiteten 
institutionellen Arrangements in Deutschland und Singapur angewandt. In Deutschland 
wurde eine umfassende Umfrage zur Erhebung von branchenspezifischen Daten für in-
stitutionelle Arrangements für MVA’s durchgeführt. Für den Markt in Singapur wurden die 
benötigten Daten und Information aus persönlichen Interviews und Sekundärquellen ge-
wonnen.  
15. Qualitative Forschungsmethoden wurden angewandt, um die Gründe für die Entstehung 
von institutionellen Arrangements für MVA’s zu untersuchen. Insgesamt wurden acht re-
präsentative Fallstudien aus Deutschland und eine aus Singapur durchgeführt. Die ge-
wählten Fallstudien decken sämtliche quantitativ verifizierten institutionellen Arrange-
ments ab. 
16. Die Anwendung von Fallstudien ist eine anerkannte Forschungsmethode. Ihre potentiel-
len Stärken im Bezug auf die definierten Forschungsziele bestehen v. a. in der Identifizie-
rung und Analyse von komplexen Prozessen und Beziehungen innerhalb von institutio-
nellen Arrangements. 
Wesentliche Ergebnisse der Arbeit  
17. MVA’s bestehen aus verschiedenen Anlagenkomponenten. Die Kapitalinvestitionen 
nehmen den grössten Anteil an den gesamten Lebenszykluskosten ein, wobei eine star-
ke negative Korrelation zwischen Stückkosten und Gesamtkapazität von MVA’s besteht. 
Die Abfallbehandlungsgebühren sind die wichtigste Ertragsgrösse im Lebenszyklus von 
MVA’s. Jedoch wird die Bedeutung der Einnahmen aus Energie- und Ressourcengewin-
nung im Fall weiter steigender Energie- und Ressourcenpreise zunehmen. 
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18. Der Markt für MVA’s weicht vom ökonomischen „Modell der vollkommenen Konkurrenz“ 
ab und besitzt potentielle Eigenschaften für Marktversagen. Es besteht die Möglichkeit 
zur Entstehung von lokalen natürlichen Monopolen mit räumlichen Grenzen oder räum-
lich unbegrenzten natürlichen Monopolen. Ausserdem können verschiedene technologi-
sche externe Effekte und Anpassungsmängel bei langfristigen Nachfrageänderungen als 
Ursachen für Marktversagen auftreten. Bei sämtlichen Formen von Marktversagen ste-
hen wirtschaftspolitische Eingriffsmöglichkeiten zur Verfügung. 
19. Keine der identifizierten Formen von Marktversagen erfordert eine Bereitstellung von 
MVA’s durch die öffentliche Hand als notwendige wirtschaftspolitische Eingriffsmöglich-
keit. Stattdessen stehen aus mikroökonomischer Sicht verschiedene institutionelle Arran-
gements zur Verfügung. 
20. In Anlehnung an die Transaktionskostenökonomie können institutionelle Arrangements 
für MVA’s aus theoretischer Sicht kategorisiert werden in: (1) hierarchische institutionelle 
Arrangements: öffentlich-rechtliche Organisationseinheiten, privatrechtliche Unternehmen 
der öffentlichen Hand; (2) hybride institutionelle Arrangements: Betreibermodelle, 
(D)BOT, öffentlich-private Joint Venture und private Unternehmen; sowie (3) Spotmarkt. 
21. Aufgrund der vergleichsweise hohen Anlagen- und Standortspezifität von Investitionen in 
MVA’s, sind hierarchische und hybride institutionelle Arrangements für MVA’s zu erwar-
ten, um Transaktionskosten zu minimieren. Die beiden anderen Transaktionscharakteris-
tika Häufigkeit und Unsicherheit sind unterschiedlich für spezifische MVA-Projekte und 
können die Wahl zwischen hierarchischen und hybriden institutionelle Arrangements be-
einflussen. 
22. Eine Stakeholderanalyse zeigt, dass die beteiligten Akteure von MVA’s unterschiedliche 
Einflüsse auf die Entstehung von institutionellen Arrangements ausüben. Sie streben 
nicht zwingend nach der Minimierung von Transaktionskosten, sondern handeln oftmals 
opportunistisch mit beschränkter Rationalität und folgen dabei verschiedenen pekuniären 
und nicht-pekuniären Zielen. 
23. Die Ergebnisse aus der theoretischen Analyse der Transaktionskostenökonomie wurden 
durch die quantitative Untersuchung der institutionellen Arrangements für MVA’s in 
Deutschland und Singapur bestätigt. 
24. Mit einem Anteil von 39.7% nehmen die hybriden institutionellen Arrangements von öf-
fentlich-privaten Joint Ventures den grössten Anteil and der Gesamtverbrennungskapazi-
tät in Deutschland an. Sie werden gefolgt von Privatunternehmen (16.6%), öffentlich-
rechtliche Organisationen (14.9%), öffentliche Unternehmen (14.7%), Betreibermodelle 
(10.1%) und (D)BOT (4.0%). 
25. Derzeit sind in Deutschland fast die Hälfte aller MVA’s durch gemeinsame Eigenkapital-
geber horizontal miteinander integriert. Vertikale Integration mit anderen Elementen des 
Wertschöpfungssystems der kommunalen Abfallwirtschaft wurde bei ca. 40% der deut-
schen MVA’s festgestellt.  
26. In Singapur werden alle vier MVA’s im Rahmen von hierarchischen institutionellen Arran-
gements betrieben. Eine neue MVA entsteht derzeit unter Nutzung des hybriden instituti-
onellen Arrangements (D)BOT. 
27. Ein Entwicklungspfad wurde modellhaft skizziert, um die verschiedenen Entstehungswe-
ge von institutionellen Arrangements für MVA’s aufzuzeigen. Jedoch sind keine spezifi-
schen Muster zu erkennen, welche die Wahl zwischen den verschiedenen hierarchischen 
und hybriden institutionellen Arrangements allgemeingültig erklären.  
28. Die Fallstudien lassen erkennen, dass hierarchische institutionelle Arrangements oftmals 
in grossen Kommunen mit hoher Nachfrage an Abfallbehandlung und somit hohen trans-
aktionsspezifischen Investitionen entstehen. Bei geringen technologischen Unsicherhei-
ten bietet das hybride institutionelle Arrangement (D)BOT auf Basis von Verfügbarkeits-
zahlungen hierbei eine geeignete Alternative. 
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29. Das hierarchische institutionelle Arrangement von öffentlichen Unternehmen kann aus 
formeller Privatisierung von öffentlich-rechtlichen Organisationen entstehen. Ein starker 
Beweggrund ist oftmals die Gewinnung erhöhter operativer und finanztechnischer Flexibi-
lität, die aufgrund von Änderungen des institutionellen Rahmens notwendig wurde. Das 
hierarchische institutionelle Arrangement von öffentlichen Unternehmen wird mitunter 
auch für MVA’s gewählt, um die funktionalen und geographischen Geschäftsbereiche von 
bestehenden öffentlichen Unternehmen auszuweiten oder um andere öffentliche Aufga-
ben mit Gewinnen aus MVA’s zu quersubventionieren. 
30. Viele hierarchische und hybride institutionelle Arrangements sind in der Vergangenheit 
entstanden, weil zentralisiert erstellte Abfallwirtschaftpläne die Kommunen zur Entwick-
lung von MVA’s rechtlich verpflichteten. Zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt ist hierbei oft ein 
Wechsel der institutionellen Arrangements aufgrund wirtschaftlicher Probleme oder ge-
änderter Zielstellungen von verschiedenen Stakeholdern zu beobachten. 
31. Hybride institutionelle Arrangements entstehen regelmässig auch direkt und ohne Trans-
formation aus hierarchischen institutionellen Arrangements. In solchen Fällen spielen 
häufig grosse private Abfallwirtschaftsunternehmen und Energiekonzerne eine wichtige 
Rolle. Die zuvor bestandenen formellen und informellen Beziehungen dieser Unterneh-
men zu öffentlichen Beteiligten aus anderen hybriden institutionellen Arrangements in-
nerhalb des Abfall- oder Energiesektors wurden dabei als wichtige Einflussfaktoren zur 
Entstehung der neuen institutionellen Arrangements identifiziert. 
32. Die Unsicherheiten im Rahmen von komplexen Planungs- und Genehmigungsprozessen 
für MVA’s haben ebenfalls eine grosse Bedeutung für die Entstehung der institutionellen 
Arrangements. In Fällen mit relativ unsicheren und langfristigen Planungs- und Geneh-
migungsprozessen sowie damit verbunden hohen Transaktionskosten sind oftmals hie-
rarchische institutionelle Arrangements entstanden. Die Änderung in ein hybrides institu-
tionelles Arrangement kann sich dabei vollziehen nachdem sich die Unsicherheiten zu 
einem späteren Zeitpunkt reduziert haben. 
33. Die Forschungsergebnisse zeigen nachdrücklich, dass formelle Institutionen nicht allein 
die Entstehung von institutionellen Arrangements determinieren. Informelle Institutionen, 
welche sich nur über einen langen Zeitraum verändern, müssen ebenfalls berücksichtig 
werden, wenn ein spezifisches institutionelles Arrangement angewandt werden soll. 
